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(i)
Abstract
The purpose of the essay is to arrive at a clear assessment of what 
the doctrine of physicalism means, as it concerns mental events and mental 
states; and to exhibit and adjudicate the factors which bear on its truth 
or falsehood* The main themes of the essay are the reduction of the 
mental to the physical, and the identity theory#
Chapter I explains why mental language is so apparently indispensable 
to various theoretical enterprises, and shows why it seems impossible to 
dispense with mental language in favour of behavioural language# The 
reductive programmes of Camap are discussed, and alternatives to them 
are introduced#
In Chapter II two theories with a physicalistic conclusion are 
examined, and found wanting. The first is Putnam’s theory that mental 
states are functional states of the organism, and that a Turing Machine 
table can represent the relation between mental states without implying 
what physical realisations they have# The second is Davidson’s "proof" 
that mental events are identical with physical events; its main weakness 
lies in the premiss that the mental and the physical interact causally# 
Chapter III is addressed to the ontological question of what mental 
phenomena there are. The main conclusion is that the evidence suggests 
that, in a strict sense, there are no mental events. This entails that 
physicalism is to be best understood in terms of the truth-relations 
between mental and physical sentences (or equivalently, in terms of the 
identity either of mental nronerties with physical properties, or of 
mental facts with physical facts)#
Chapter IV argues that physicalism can only be coherently stated in 
terms of the nomological equivalences between mmtal and physical sentences# 
The arguments which obstruct the truth of this doctrine for the case in
(il)
which the physical sentences have a behavioural content cannot be applied 
to the case in which the physical sentences have a cerebral content.
One important general difference between the truth-grounds of mental 
sentences and the truth-grounds of physical sentences (explained in terms 
of a consciousness condition) provides an explanation for why a reduction 
of the mental to the cerebral is the only possibility open for physicalism.
(ill)
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1. PREAMBLE
One of the central purposes of this essay is to examine the
intelligibility and the meaning of physicalistic theories of mental
phenomena# Another is to try and reach some conclusions about the
truth or falsehood of these theories. But rather than give a cursory
treatment to every single complexity which attends this difficult subject,
I have chosen to restrict the scope of the essay to a small number of
themes which, I believe, are of central importance. I have also tried
to discuss them in the detail which they deserve.
It would be otiose to stage a very elaborate introduction to a
subject so familiar to modem philosophy as this one is, but for those for
whom physicalism is not a permanent or living philosophical problem, a
few brief and general opening remarks will help to set the scene for the
complexities which are to follow.
There are several passages in both historical and contempozrary
philosophical writings which might be taken to suggest that physicalism,
like so many other non-doctrinal "isms", is nothing more than a habit of
thou^t, or some very general point of view concerning the structure of
the world, and the sources of our knowledge about it# But philosophers
and philosophically-minded scientists have taken care to devise more exact
formulations. Althou^ differing in detail, they all point in the same
direction. They range from the consciously physics-oriented formulations
of, say, J. J# C# Smart, to the more general hypotheses of those who
believe that in some sense or other, everything is ultimately physical in
nature. Physicalism, according to Smart, is
"the theory that there is nothing in the world over and above 
those entities which are postulated by physios and, of course, 
those entities which will be. postulated by future and more 
adequate physical theories"
1# J# J# C. Smart Materialism: Journal of Philosophy 1963 p 651.
while others, accepting the principle that every phenomenon has either a 
mental or a physical nature, propose that mental phenomena can be "reduced" 
to physical phenomena, or that mental phenomena are really physical phe­
nomena in disguise, or that in some sense a complete and adequate descrip­
tion of the world and its workings need incorporate no non-physical elements.
Now of course there is a certain amount of clarification to be done
before we can regard any of these hypotheses as specific enough for the
purposes of philosophical discussion. But the historical context of the 
theory of physicalism is not so difficult to describe. It will surprise
no one who is acquainted with philosophy that one of the closest and most
persistent allies which physicalism has had was (and still is) the positi- 
vistio movement in the natural sciences. The impressive tendency of the 
physical sciences gradually to provide explanations for more and more of 
what happens in the world clearly fortified the belief which lies at the 
centre of philosophical physicalism that everything is ultimately physical. 
But the real testing-ground for this belief was, and still is, the 
empirical study of man - although this is not of course to deny that 
physicalists of any persuasion encounter special and distinctive problems 
with colours, sounds, aesthetic qualities, and so on.
What physics could account for in the natural world, clearly, the 
better it seemed for the theory of physicalism. But there is a sense in 
which people are not yet part of the natural world, for it seems that their 
behaviour and mental life cannot, in some sense of cannot, be predicted and 
explained like other phenomena. It is not just a fact to wonder at, but 
a fact of the greatest importance, that the promised science of man has 
yet to make its appearance; indeed the world still awaits even the first 
small signs of its appearance. It is even fair to say, I think, that as 
far as the philosophical theory of physicalism is concerned, this fact has 
equally and oppositely compensated for the fortifying progress of the
natural sciences in other spheres. But of course neither of these opposing
facts by itself has been sufficient to settle the issue. Supporters of
physicalism will continue to sustain their beliefs on inductive grounds,
arguing that the only rational thing to believe is that physical explana-
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tions can be found for everything; while opponents of physicalism will 
continue to sustain their convictions largely on the grounds that theoretical 
reasons can be advanced to show why man is, and must be, exempt from science. 
Other less rational beliefs tend only to obstruct the issue.
Clearly, neither of these arguments by themselves is really sufficient 
to settle either the truth of physicalism or its falsehood. But my hope 
is that they give some credence to the idea that some of the most crucial 
points of discussion are methodological in character. In a way, I think, 
this is not surprising: for it is the very fact that we do at the moment
lack a science of man that surely makes speculation about the possible 
truth of physicalism a matter worth worrying about in philosophy. In other 
words, it is the very existence of this gap which makes it inviting to 
speculate about what, if anything, might fill it.
2. TEB NEED FOR KSHTAL TERI-IS
The interest which philosophers have developed in physicalism as a 
general metaphysic, and the ingenuity they have expended on refining this
2. This is the argument from the improbability of nomological "danglers”. 
See again Smart, op cit. p. 661.
3. If there is any truth in the "incubation" theory of philosophy, then 
we mi^t view the philosophical arguments about the methodological 
nature of physicalism as the best kind of preface which a developed 
science of persons could have. If such a science were to emerge 
from such a preface, then we mi^t be able to echo the thou^ts of 
J. Xi. Austin, who himself subscribed to the incubation theory. As 
Austin put it: "Then we shall have rid ourselves of one more part of
philosophy, .... in the only way we ever can get rid of philosophy, by 
kicking it upstairs". Ifs and Cans (in Philosophical Papers, eds. 
TJrmson and Wamock p. 282).
general doctrine so as to give it a precise form, can be easily explained* 
One explanation can be traced to a dissatisfaction with the traditional 
forms of dualism: monism, in some form, has seemed a more attractive goal
than dualism, simply owing to the greater economy and neatness of the 
former• And in a world in which physical explanations of natural and 
non-natural phenomena seem more and more readily available as time goes on, 
it becomes naturally tempting to suppose that a single syst^n of thou^t, 
or a single body of theory, mi^t suffice to explain every sin^e phenomenon 
that human as well as natural life comprises.
But there is a different idea, which goes some way towards explaining 
why physicalism has seemed a tempting goal for philosophical theory, and 
this is the suspicion that mental language, in its various forms, plays a 
systematic and indispensable rOle in organising experience and in construct­
ing theory* Of course we have, at present, no very precise way of saying 
what mental language is; although it may come as a surprise to leam that 
philosophers who share the suspicion that mental language plays an indis­
pensable role are not, in general, very embarrassed by this fact* They 
know, or have well-founded intuitions, about some of the things mental 
language contains if it contains anything, and they simply see these 
paradigm or central linguistic constructions as being of a sort without 
which little progress could be made in speaking theoretically about phe­
nomena in the way we want* But it does seem to me that one of the tasks 
of any really adequate appraisal of physicalism is at some stage to make 
this suspicion about the character of mental language exact - to find out 
what it is about this language that makes it indispensable* It follows 
from this that the lack of a clear view of how mental language differs 
from physical language, or alternatively of how mental phenomena differ 
from physical phenomena, ought to seem a good deal more of an embarrassment 
than it actually does. I shall try to reach some conclusions about both
these matters in the course of my essay* But at this stage 1 shall 
merely give an exposition, somewhat informally, of some of those theoretical 
problems which give rise to the suspicion that mental language plays a role 
in explanation which is both an importantly systematising one, and, in 
some sense of the word, a seemingly indispensable one as well* The 
general area in which those theoretical problems exist is the explanation 
of people’s actions, where by "actions" I mean to include linguistic 
act ions ("speech-act s")*
Consider, for example, that part of linguistic theory whose aim it 
is to give a description of linguistic structure - the structure of 
sentences* This enterprise Is part and parcel of the theory of action 
understood in the widest sense, for sentences are what people utter in 
their attempts to perform speech-acts*
The first thing to notice when considering this question of the
description of linguistic structure is that what qualifies as an adequate
description of something depends on the goal, or purposes, of the descrip­
tion* ¥e cannot talk about the adequacy of a description unless we 
specify the task in question* Chomsky, in Aspects of the Theory of 
Syntax^ and elsewhere, has fathomed this question of adequacy in some 
detail, and has elucidated various different concepts of adequacy for a 
linguistic theory which depend on the task in hand* His proposal was 
that a theory is adequate to direct observation if it enables the 
theorist to draw up a descriptive list of the sentences and other 
linguistic units which are actually produced* This he called observa­
tional adequacy# He secondly
Chomsky I Aspects of the 3%eorv of Syntax* Chapter I.
proposed that a theory is adequate relative to a descriptive task if it 
enables the theorist to "give a correct account of" (as he would put it)
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the linguistic intuition or competence of the idealised speaker-hearer*
And thirdly, he proposed that a theory is adequate to the task of explain­
ing this intuition if it enables the theory to select between any two 
different grammars which are both adequately descriptive of the speaker- 
hearer* s linguistic competence* Now clearly what anyone wants the 
linguist ultimately to succeed in is not just the first and second of these 
tasks, but the third as well. It was Chomsky’s suggestion that a theory 
adequate to this third task must contain terms for describing a corpus of 
innate knowledge of the languages both knowledge how and knowledge that. 
it seems. And here we have the introduction of mental phenomena into the 
explanation.
This may all seem a bit schematic. Chomsky’s problem can be alter­
natively described in the following way. When a person speaks, what he 
utters is a sentence or group of sentences. And sentences, by definition, 
have meaning. But what physically happens when a person speaks is that 
some series of acoustic events takes place; and acoustic events are not 
things which can be said to have meaning in the way sentences can. Besides, 
althou^ each sentence-utterance event is an acoustic event, it is obviously 
not true that each acoustic event is a sentence-utterance event. So the 
question arises; when does a particular acoustic happening constitute the 
utterance of a sentence, and when it does, how can it do so? What is the 
connection between the fact that a certain acoustic event took place and 
the fact that a certain sentence was uttered? Or, finally, what is the 
connection between the particular meaning which makes a sentence the 
sentence it is, and the particular acoustic configuration which forms its
5. In his Current Issues in Linmiistio Theory p. 62 (in Podor and Katzs 
The Structure of Language p p . 50-118). See also Aspects p p . 30-37*
physical basis on any occasion of its utterance?
Chomsky’s answer was that sentences are structured not merely by
simple phrase-structure rules, but by transformational rules too.^ This
complex system of generative rules, both semantic and systactic, is said ■
to form the content of a kind of innate or tacit knowledge which every
speaker of the language has. Or as Katz puts it: a correct linguistic
model is one which ,
«
"pictures the structure of the system and its unobservable 
components. In this way, a linguist can assert that his 
theory correctly represents the structure of the mechanism 
underlying,the speakers ability to communicate with other 
speakers."
The mental capacities with which the speaker has to be ascribed are, pre­
sumably, the capacities needed to apply those generative rules, and that 
knowledge, in actual speech and the perception of speech. To many people 
it seems unclear just what the nature of the requisite linguistic knowledge 
is, and just what the nature is of the linguistic skills which enable a 
speaker to apply this knowledge. None the less, so generative grammarians 
argue, language-users must be ascribed with mental and cognitive powers of 
some rather complex kind in order for their linguistic abilities to be 
explained.
According to generative grammarians, therefore, there is no way of 
explaining the connection betwe^ acoustic events (which are events des­
cribed physically) and the events consisting of the utterance of sentences, 
where sentences are items having meaning, without invoking rules and 
principles of an essentially mental character. However difficult it is 
to understand clearly in what sense those rules and principles do describe 
linguistic structure, Chomsky’s attack on the purely physical and
6. Chomsky: Syntactic Structures, passim
7. Katz: Mentalism in Linguistics p. 128. Language (40) 1964. My 
underlining.
8classificational approach to grammar, to which hia theory provides an 
alternative, does seem to have been successful. It suggests the general 
implausibility of describing the phenomena of language-use in a way which 
does not involve the use of mental terms.
Chomsky’s success in the negative enterprise of revealing the in­
adequacies of the non-mentalistic approach can be clearly seen, I think, 
if we look at some of the details of those nonnaentalistio approaches 
themselves. There used to be an influential method in linguistics, 
originated by Bloomfield and extended by Zellig Harris, known as the 
classificational or taxonomic method. This method, as Katz later 
described it,
".... holds that every linguistic construction, at any level,
reduces ultimately, by purely classificational procedures,
to physical segments of utterance"8
The physical segments of utterance for the taxonomic linguist were sounds 
(phones). Classes of sounds, or classes of sigaificant groupings of 
them, were classified as phonemes; so that the relationship of a sound or 
sequence of sounds to the phoneme was one of class-nnembership. Morphemes, 
similarly, were thou^t of as classes of sequences of phonemes; and 
sentences, ultimately, consisted of morphemes; so the relationship of 
phoneme-sequence to morpheme, and of morpheme to sentence, was again one 
of class-membership. This was the basic theoretical structure employed
by Bloomfield. From this basis Harris developed a method of linguistic 
description which he called the distributional method. Like Bloomfield, 
he saw language as being describable as four levels: the levels of sound
or nhone. of phoneme. or morpheme, and of sentence: with the relation of
a unit at one level to a unit at the next highest level being one of 
class-membership. But he went further than Bloomfield, and developed
8 Katz op cit p. 124<
what he thought of as a potentially mechanical method of uncovering ("a
large part of") sentence-structure - based on the distribution of units
at the lower level throu^out a corpus of antecedently elicited grammatical
sentences* Consider this example of the segmentation of a phoneme-sequence 
9into morphemes* The phonemic representation of the sentence He’s quicker 
is /hiyzkwiker/, Among the many methods of tracing the distributional 
structure of this sequence is to ask how many different phonsnea occur 
after the n-th phoneme in the sequence; then a peak in the number of 
different successor-phonemes is supposed to mark a semantical or syntactical 
break, by indicating the independence of the phoneme at which the peak 
occurs from the phonemes which follow it* The peaks in the phonemic 
representation of He’s quicker come at /y/, /z/, /k/ and /r/, thus correctly 
showing the morpheme or word-boundaries at (i.e. immediately after) those 
points# In a precisely analogous way to this, Harris supposed that a 
great proportion of sentential structure - syntax - could be described.
In fact, in the example I have described, it se^s that assumptions 
about meaning ^  play a quite central role* It has been assumed, for 
instance, that a peak in the number of successor-phonemes at the n-th 
phoneme indicates the semantic or syntactical independence of the sub­
sequence of which that phonane is the terminal phoneme from the other 
sub-sequences within the whole. Objections aside, at any rate, Harris 
certainly saw his method as an essentially mechanical procedure for 
uncovering structure. "The method as a whole", as he described it,
"can be viewed as part of an orderly set of kindred methods 
capable of yielding a large part of language structure in 
terms of the relative occurence of sounds, these occurences 
being the physical events of language" 10
9* Cf. Harris! Phoneme to Morpheme, Language (31) 1955 p. 190. For the 
distributional method at other levels see Discontinuous Homhemes. 
Language (2l) 1945; Kornheme to Utterance. Language (22) 1946; 
Distributional Structure. Word (10) 1954.
10. Harris; Phoneme to Morpheme nu. 212-3.
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It was assumed by Bloomfield, as by Harris, that the distributional method, 
and the taxonomic method in general, did not require a stock of theoretical 
terms of any great variety or richness, and that it certainly did not 
require mental terms* But subsequent theory saw that the limited number 
of theoretical terms which they did allow themselves enabled the theorist 
to achieve Chomsky’s first, observatioiial level of adequacy, while falling 
short of the descriptive level i>t adequacy in several respects* For 
firstly, the method is not generative* It can only describe previously 
elicited well-formed sentences, and therefore contains none of the 
resources of a theory of sentence-structure in general* The un-uttered 
or unspoken sentences, for instance, are beyond its reach*
Secondly, Chomsky has argued that even the structural descriptions 
which the taxonomic method gives for the previously elicited sentences 
are inadequate* This is because an analysis into immediate constituents, 
which is what the taxonomic method provides, can never reveal all the 
so-called grammatical relations (e.g* Subject-Verb, Verb«Object, etc*} 
within any sentence* According to Chomsky, only a grammar containing a 
base component and transformation rules can describe all these relations*^ 
These criticisms of Chomsky’s, then, concern the programme of analysis 
into immediate constituents — which is the kind of analysis that grammar 
conceived along classificational or taxonomic lines was supposed to 
provide* When to Chomsky’s critical attack on this programme is added 
the claim (which is often made by modem linguists) that transformational- 
generative rules are "psychologically real" while taxonomic rules are not, 
the result is an argummt to the effect that mental or psy^logical con­
cepts are an essential part of an adequate
11* For this famous argument, esp* for the case of John is easv/eaeer to 
Chomsky Bvntactic_^tructuren (1937) ; Perception, a 
(in Boston Studies in the Phil, of Science 1961/2 ed*
Watofsky 1963) pp* 199-205*
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theory of language. We may lack a good understanding of the concept of 
the psychologically real; hut when this deficiency is made good, the 
inadequacies of taxonomic linguistics as compared to the transformational- 
generative approach will add up to a strong case in favour of a linguistic 
theory which is actually descriptive, in some clear sense, of mental 
operations and capacities.
Another argument for the apparent indispensahility of mental terms
ou^t to be mentioned briefly here. The argument, which is basically due
to Grice, says that the meanings of language-elements (words, sentences)
can themselves be best explained by reference to what a speaker means by
producing an utterance on a particular occasion, and in such a way as not
to presuppose the concept of word- or sentence^eaning. Utterers’ meaning,
in its turn, is to be explained in terms of the utterer's intentions in
producing the utterance he does produce; and so the concepts of word-
meaning and sentence-meaning are ultimately to be explained in terms of
12the utterer’s complex intentions towards his audience.
It seems initially that we will never be able to prove in a completely 
conclusive way that either Chomsky or Grice were right in what they said 
about the need for mental terms, or the need for principles which describe 
mental structure; for essentially they are trying to establish the nega­
tive claim that no theory not containing mental language could ever be 
produced which would be adequate to the subject-matter in question. But
12. Grice J Mmnning. Phil. Review (66) 1957 pp. 377-88; Utterer’s Meaning. 
Sentence-Meaning and Worf^ -Mef&nip^ . Foundations of Language (4) 1963 
pp. 1-18. Strawson, in Meaning and Truth. (Oxford, Clarendon Press 
1970) has defended the view that the approach to sentence-meaning 
via semantic and syntactic rules which generate truth-conditions for 
a sentence must ultimately rest upon the notions of intention or 
belief, for, on his view, we cannot elucidate the concept of the 
truth-conditions of a particular sentence without reference to the 
speech-act of saying something true (or: making a true statement) - 
which is where intention and belief essentially reside. See also 
J. Searle: Chomsky’s revolution in Linguistics. New Tork Review of
Books, June 29th 1972.
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we surely have to admit that both these approaches to the problem of 
sentence-meaning - Chomsky’s approach which links sentencennieaning to 
sound-sequences via a description of mental structure, and Grice’s 
approach which links sentence-meaning to the concept of speakers intention - 
do have a strong tendency to suggest that a vocabulary of mental terms, or 
more broadly speaking a vocabulary of terms for mental capacities and 
functions of one kind and another, is indispensable, in some sense, for 
an adequate theory of language and language-use*
Mental terms se®n indispensable for any adequate theory of sentence- 
meaning. It ou^t to be possible to link this fact with the proposal 
which Brantano originally made, and which Chisholm has explored in more 
detail, that mental language as a whole is "holistic" and "irreducible".
This proposal says, in effect, that we cannot provide necessary and 
sufficient law-like conditions for the truth of any mental sentence 
without employing terms which are themselves mental. I shall explain 
this phenomenon at ^eater length in the next section, when I give a more 
detailed exposition of the failure of the behaviourists’ approach to 
mental phenomena. In this section I have tried to establish, by example, 
the plausibility of the general principle that mental terms are indis­
pensable to the construction of adequate theories in many branches of 
science.
It used to be the case not many decades ago, that theories in general, 
and theories of behaviour in particular were derided if they were found to 
employ terms which referred to specifically mental capacities or the 
operations of specially desigiiated faculties of the mind. And it seens 
that the derision which such theories received was due to the fact that 
general requirements of empirical verifiability (or falsiflability) were 
not and could not be satisfied. This critical phenomenon appeared as 
part of the general phenomenon of positivism in the sciences and philosophy.
13
By hindsi^t it seems a strange phenomenon, since the methodology of this 
part of positivism was never made quite as waterti^t as its proponents 
could have wished. Perhaps the criticism of theories on the grounds that 
they were mentaltstic or nsvchologlstio can be seen, again by hindsi^t, 
as a disguise for a different kind of criticism, namely the criticism that 
the particular mentalistic terms which were employed often had little or 
no real systematising power. That is to say, the criticism that the 
theories in question were of the wrong methodological sort may have become 
confused with the quite different criticism that they were just false, or 
inadequate as theories as far as predictive power was concerned.
But whatever was the case then is different now. Mentalism in 
science and psychology is back in the ascendant. It remains a task for 
philosophy to discover not only why it is that mental language poses such 
problems of analysis as it does; it also remains a philosophical task to 
discover whether there does exist some form of analysis in physical terms 
which is philosophically acceptable. In addition, it is a philosophical 
task to clarify what form such an analysis should take.
3. BEHAVIOTJHM, REDUCTION
So far the only statements of physicalism which we have before us 
are the statement of Smart which I quoted in the first section, and its 
slightly less technical relatives which I gnve shortly afterwards. We 
now need to look at some formulations which are more detailed. However, 
there is a broad but important distinction which I believe must occupy a 
position at the centre of any such investigation, and so before introducing 
any of the more detailed hypotheses, I shall explain what this distinction 
is, and say how it divides such hypotheses into two exclusive categories. 
Only then shall I bring the hypotheses themselves into sharp focus.
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I have already said that any really adequate appraisal of the theories 
of physicalism must involve an exact statement of what the difference is 
between mental phenomena and physical phenomena, or what the difference is 
between mental language add physical language# It would be natural to 
expect such a statement to precede the examination of the theories them­
selves* But this is not the strategy I shall adopt in this essay, for 
the reason that the philosophical problems inherent in tackling such concepts 
as nhvsical phenomenon, mental nhenomenon, physical or mental vocabulary, 
are exceedingly complex, and generally underestimated in modem discussions# 
So I propose to leave these important questions until later points in the 
essay (see Chapters III and IV), in the hope that the answers which emerge 
there will not alter the validity of the conclusions arrived at in these 
earlier sections.
The distinction which divides physicalistic theories of mental phe­
nomena into two categories is the distinction between the reductive and 
the non-reductive, There are several accounts of the concept of reduction 
in the philosophical literature, but fortunately it is not important for 
the purposes of this essay to adjudicate their competing claims. Perhaps 
the most general and agreed characterisation of the reduction of one 
theory to another is given as follows# A theory T^ can be said to be 
reducible to a theory T^, if all the theorems and postulates of the 
reduced theory T^ can be deduced from a conjunction of the theorems and 
postulates of the reducing theory T^ together with certain identificatory 
principles o? "bridge laws", where these laws contain concepts belonging 
to both T^ and T^. An example given by Nagol^^ is the reduction of 
Thermodynamics to Mechanics, where the following manoevre (amongst others)
13. Nagel: The Meanipg of Reduction in the Natural Sciences#
la Banto and Morgenbesser (eds). Philosophy of Science* pp. 
239-312.
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takes place. There Is a law of Thermodynamics known as the Boyle-Charles 
law, and there is a law of Mechanics which connects the pressure of a 
volume of gas with the average kinetic energy of its molecules; the 
former law can be deduced from the latter once the identificatory principle 
is accepted that temperature is. mean molecular kinetic energy.
Taking the reduction of Thermodynamics to Mechanics as our paradigm, 
we can say that what a reduction of one theory to another is designed to 
do, amongst other things, is to enable a deduction of all the postulates, 
basic assumptions and general truths of one theory from those of another; 
the bridge laws or identificatory principles serving the purpose of 
enabling the deduction to take place.
Some explanatory remarks are in order about this notion of a bridge 
law. Firstly, a bridge law has the following important characteristics: 
its antecedent open sentence describes the same property as its consequent 
open sentence does (because property-identity is what reduction establishes), 
and the terms in which that property is described in the two open sentences 
belong, to put it not very precisely, to different levels of inquiry.
These characteristics are present, for instance in the bridge law that
I (x)(x is water - x is E^O)
where the terms "water" and "EgO" belong to different levels of inquiry, 
and where the phrases "being water" and "being E^O" determine the same 
property in different ways.^^ A second important fact about bridge laws 
is that not every law of nature is a bridge law, and there are many state­
ments of natural law from whose truth we cannot deduce that one property 
reduced to another. A simple example can show this. It is a law of
14. The prefix "N" stands for the words "It is a law of nature that ...", 
and is used throughout this essay in giving a statement of any 
natural law.
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nature that if anything has just been bom, then it will eventually die, 
and conversely; and yet the property of being born is not thereby 
reduced to the property of eventually dying. Nor can a bridge law be 
a causal law; a law which allows us to predict a phenomenon of the sort 
mentioned in the ri#ithand side of the law from the occurence of a phe­
nomenon of the sort mentioned in the left-hand side. This is because, 
in a causal law, the phenomena between which the causal relation holds 
must be distinct phenomena, whereas in a bridge law one and the same 
phenomenon (in general a property) is mentioned under two descriptions.
A third characteristic of a bridge law, and this time one which is 
shared by natural laws in general, is that they assert a stronger sentential 
equivalence than that of mere material equivalence. A statement of 
material equivalence is written without the "N" prefix, thus:
(x) (x is M =  X is p)
since such a statement only asserts that the truth-value of the contained
sentences (or their instances) hannen to correspond. A statement of law,
or a statement of nomological equivalence between sentences, on the other
hand, asserts that the contained sentences (or their instances) are non-
accidentallv or systematically equivalent in truth-value. Statements
of material equivalence are extensional, in the sense that co-extensive
terms can be inter-substituted "salva veritate", while statements of
15natural law are not. Another well-known difference between statements
15. The difference between extensional truth and nomological truth can be 
easily demonstrated: a statement of the form
(x)(x is K s X is P)
is equivalent in its truth-conditions to a statement of the form
(x)(x is M = X is P or X is a unicorn)
on the assumption that there are no unicorns. But for a law-statement
N(x )(x is H = X is P) a similar equivalence
N(x)(x is M “ X is P or X is a unicorn) 
is clearly dissallowed. Otherwise it would have to be concluded that 
the property of being M was reducible to the property of being P or 
being a unicorn.
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of material equivalence and statements of nomological equivalence is that 
only the latter support counter-factual propositions.
While material equivalence is a weaker relation than nomological 
equivalence, necessary equivalence is stronger. A statement of the form 
"Np", if true, is true in every nomologically possible world, while a 
statement of the form "Op", if true, is true in every possible world, 
which include those which are logically possible but not nomologically 
possible. So statements of nomological equivalence, written
N(x )(x is M s X is P)
while stronger than statements of material equivalence, written
(x)(x is M =  X is P)
are weaker than statements of necessary equivalence, written
D(x)(x is M =  X is P)
When a statement of nomological equivalence is a bridge law, then we can 
infer from it a statement of property-identity; "being M « being P". 
Whereas from a statement of material equivalence we can only infer a 
statement asserting the co-extensiveness of property-words: "’being M’
is co-extensive with ’being P';_ while from a statement of necessary 
equivalence we can, I think, infer a statement asserting the synonymy of 
property-words. Thus D(x)(x is male and unmarried x is a bachelor) 
implies that the property-words "being male and unmarried" and "being a 
bachelor" are synonymous.
/order to
So much for the prefatory logical considerations which are_needed in
13
fix the concept of a property-re duct ion. Unfortunately, not all cases 
where a reduction is actually proposed are quite so straightforward or 
well-organised as our paradigm# In the case of the physicalists* attempt 
at reducing the mental to the physical, the situation is typically as 
follows: we have a cluster of general truths about organisms expressed
in mental terms, and we have another cluster of general truths about 
organisms expressed in non-#ental terms# Clusters 0^ and Cg, in the 
present state of our knowledge, hardly constitute theories, let alone 
axioraatised theories# All the same, the reductive exercise is to arrive 
at bridge laws or identificatory principles which, in conjunction with 
the truths expressed in physical terms, entail all the truths expressible 
in mental terms# So what is required are statements of the following form:
N (x)(x is M =  X is P)
where now we specify that the term "M" belongs to mental terminology and 
the term ”P" belongs to physical terminology#
Now a reduction of the mental to the physical, understood in these 
terms, could be attempted in two ways. The first way is to find laws of 
the appropriate type linking mental phenomena to behaviour, and the second 
way is to find laws of the appropriate type which link mental phenomena 
to cerebral phenomena - phenomena of the brain or central nervous system# 
Reductions of the first type (l shall call them behavioural reductions) 
were advanced by members of that school of theory known as the behaviour- 
istic school, while reductions of the second type (l shall call them 
cerebral reductions) have been contemplated in more recent years. There 
is a good reason for the appearance of cerebral reductions; for as I 
shall now show in some detail, attempts to produce behavioural reductions 
have one notable feature, and this is that they are bound to issue in
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failure.
Efforts to effect a behavioural reduction began when behaviourism 
began. But althougii behaviourists sought connections ("conceptual" as 
well as nomological) between mental and physical terms, their avowed aim 
in doing so was to "translate" all the sayable things about an organism 
into the purified vocabulary of the physical language, so ultimately dis­
pensing with mental language altogether. They generally explained their 
task in these terms rather than in terms of a mental-to-physical reduc­
tion; but since the laws they typically tried to find were of the bridge- 
law type, rather than, say, of the causal-law type, it was a reduction in 
the sense I have explained which in fact they were after. When we 
remember that bridge laws establish the identity of properties, we can 
see that the concept of a translation of mental language into physical 
language was an appropriate one to use, for if a mental property can be 
shown to ^  a physical property, then presumably any non-modal context 
containing a mental-property term can be translated into one with the 
physical-property term in its place.
There are different descriptions of the behaviourist’s programme 
which make less immediate sense. J. A. Fodor has recently said, for 
instance, that:
"To qualify as a behaviourist in the broad sense of that 
term , one need only believe that the following proposition 
expresses a necessary truth: for each mental predicate that
can be employed In a psychological explanation, there must 
be at least one description of behaviour to which it bears a 
logical connection" 16
But it is extremely unclear what it would be lilœ for a mental predicate
and a description of behaviour to be "logically connected". A predicate
of any kind, strictly speaking, cannot have logical connections with
16. Fodor Psychological Explanation p. 51.
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anything; and if we speak in terms of psychological open sentences# under
universal or existential closure# then it is hard to see that any behavioural
open sentence# under a corresponding closure# is likely to stand in a
logical connection to it# if the phrase "logical connection" is taken in
17any of its usual strict senses. It is altogether more satisfactory to
represent the behaviourist as one who engages in the task of translating
mental language into physical language, and who does this, inter alia# by
trying to establish bridge-law statements of the form "B(x){x is M s  % is p)".
TMs certainly seems to have been Skinner’s programme in his early
book Tne Behaviour of Or-^anlsas. In that work he wrote:
"In approaching a field . for purposes of scientific 
description# we meet at the start the need for a set of 
terms. Ik)st languages are well equipped in this 
respect# but not to our advantage. In English# for 
example# we say that an organism sees or feels objects# 
hears sounds# tastes substances# smells odours# and 
likes or dislikes them; it wants, seeks and finds: 
it has a numose. tries and succeeds or falls: it learns
and remembers or forgets; it is frightened, engrv. hannv 
or depressed; asleen or awake; and so on. Most of these 
terms must be avoided in a scientific description of 
behaviour ...# The Important objection to the vernacular 
in the description of behaviour is that many of its terms 
imply conceptual schemes ... the vernacular is clumsy 
and obese; its teras overlap each other# draw unnecessary 
or unreal distinctions, and are far from being the most 
convenient in dealing with the data .... The ... 
criterion for the rejection of a popular term is the 
implication of a system or of a formulation extending 
beyond immediate observations" 13
In spite of his doubts about some of the ordinary mental predicates of
English# Skinner clearly took it to be the task of psychology to explain
behaviour in the quite ordinary sense of that term; as he expresses it#
17. It was once assumed by those who argued that desires could not cause 
actions that a predicate like "... desires to A" stood in a con­
ceptual connection to a predicate like "...does A", where "A" is a 
piirase for an action. If this is the kind of "connection" Fbdor 
We-in "mind," then all I can say is that it seems extremely doubtful 
whether an exact and precise description could be given of what sort 
of connection it is.
18. Skinner# B. F. The Behaviour of Ormnims^ p p . 6-7.
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"behaviour ia what an organisa is dfitos** (p* 6). >:So he clearly must 
have thought that a general explanation of behaviour could be achieved 
by employing just the relatively non-mental terms of English which conformed 
to his particular methodological standard. In fact he seems not only to 
have thought that the same explanation could be given with hia reduced 
stock of non-mental terms as that which could be given with all the terms 
of English (both non-mental and mental); but he also seems to have thought 
that a greater degree of systématisation could be achieved by using only 
the former.
Other examples could bo found in the literature of behaviourism to
illustrate how methodological considerations of one kind or another led
psychologists to restrict their own lexical resources to a certain minimum
stock (on the whole a non-cental stock), while at the same time believing
that they could accomplish any serious project in the behavioural sciences
as effectively with limited resources as they could with all the resources
19of the language - mental and non-mental alike. Camap was the first
philosopher to explore this variety of behaviourism with any degree of
logical rigour. As he said in The Methodological Character of Theoretical
Concents, belmviourism, together with the philosophical tendencies of
early positivism,
"led often to the requirement that all psychological concepts pn 
must be defined in terms of behaviour or behaviour dispositions"
21This was the view he explored in Testability and Moaning. once his earlier 
flirtation with a complete reduction of psychological concepts to a
19. Skinner’s methodology was shared for instance by Neurath. See his 
Binheitswissenschaft und Psvoholo^iG (Vienna: Gerold add Co., 1933); 
FouMationsTofTthe Social Sciences (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1944).
See Kempel’s Logical Positivism and the Social Sciences (in The 
Le.'reov of Log. Positivism, cds. Achinstein and Barker) for other 
references to ileurath’s views on physioallsm.
20. îü.nnesota Studies I (pp. 33*76) p. 71.
21. Carnap: Testability and Heaning. Phil, of Scl. 2  (1936) pp. 419*71, 
and ±  (1937) pp. 1*40.
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phenomenalistic basis had proved unsuccessful. The first exploratory 
proposal of Testability and Heanin,? was that for any psychological sentence 
there existed some non-psychological sentence describing behaviour having 
the same truth-conditions. This correspondence in truth-value would,
Carnap supposed, either be guaraîiteed by natural law or else by the nature 
of the concepts themselves. In other words, the statements connecting 
the mental with the physical could be either statements of natural law, or 
they could be analytically or conceptually true statements# in some sense 
of those battered terms. If such statements could be found, then Camap 
supposed that we could translate any context containing the mental termi­
nology into one containing the physical terminology, and without "loss
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of content". îîow I do not think we need to examine the goals of this 
programme in order to appreciate how peculiarly afflicted the means of 
achieving them turned out to be. For as Camap himself came to see, this 
doctrine of the "explicit definability" of psychological terms in 
behavioural terms seems doomed to falsehood. On the face of it, the 
reason looks purely factual; for any psychological open sentence you 
choose, it seems that there simply does not exist a non-psychological 
sentence with the same conditions of truth, at least if the non-psychological 
sentence contains only terms belonging to what Camap called the "thing 
language", i.e. "that language which we use in every-day life in speaking 
about the perceptible things surrounding us".^^ It seems wholly improb­
able that we could find a statement having the character of
22. The program of Per loclsche Aufbau dor Kelt (Berlin-Schlachtense 
Weltkreisverlag 1928)
23# Carnap’s view was that one statement could translate another "without 
loss of content" if they both implied the same observation-statements. 
See his Psvcholorrv in Phvslcal Langua;re. pp. 165-93 in Ayer, A. J. 
(ed.), Lorrical Positivism. (Originally published in Erkentnis 1933 
as Psychologie in Phvsikalischer Snrache).
24. Camap; Testability and Meaning. Philospbhy of Science 2. P« 466.
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(l) (x)(t)(x wants a biscuit at t =  x*s arm will extend towards
some biscuit shortly after t)
A statement of this character does not even approach to being true without 
an amendment to the effect that x*s arm will extend towards something 
believed bv x to be a biscuit * or without some amendment along these 
lines which includes a mental word. And if such an unamended statement 
as (l) ia unlikely to be extensionally true (true by material equivalence), 
it is even more unlikely that a law-like version could be found.
It would be over-hasty to abandon the "explicit definition" approach 
without a consideration of some of its possible variants. The first 
variant comes from reducing the generality of statement (l). Instead of 
trying for a statement which connects a mental property with a behavioural 
property (in the case of (l), the property of wanting a biscuit and the 
property of extending the arm towards some biscuit), we could try for a 
statement which pertains to a single individual only:
(2) (t)(Fred wants a biscuit at t = Fred’s arm will extend towards
some biscuit shortly after t)
Such a statement has little to do with properties, as I shall explain 
later, but its defects parallel those of statement (l): for nothing is
likely to prevent there coming a time when Fred has false beliefs about 
biscuits, but if this is possible th^ a mental qualification is again 
needed in the behavioural sentence.
Whether there is any s^ s^tem in these failures remains to be seen.
To see how likely it is that there is, however, consider yet another varia­
tion on the "explicit definition" theme. The variation I have in mind 
here is one which Camap did not consider; it consists of specifying not 
just a single non-psychological sentence on the rif^t hand side, but a 
lengthy disjunction of non-psychological sentences; for it certainly is
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the case that the physical motions accompanying a desire for a biscuit 
are exceedingly various. Could we devise a sentence having something 
like the follo^dng logical structure?
(3) N(x)(t)(x wants a biscuit at t =  x*s arm will extend towards some
biscuit after t og,x will salivate 02, x will .. ... 02. ......)
The question at issue here is partly the question of whether a statement 
of law could be disjunctive in form; but only partly. For the fact, if 
it is one, that there are laws in existence which contain short two- or 
three-termed disjunctions (l have in mind one formulation of Ifewton’s 
law of motions "N(x)(no resultant force acts on x = x remains stationary 
or X moves uniformly in a strai^t line)”) would not provide much encourage­
ment for the physicalist, because his disjunctions would almost certainly 
be exceedingly lengthy, and almost certainly open-ended. Newton’s law of 
motion, for instance, which has the disjunctive form 
"N(x )(x C = X H 02.X j)", is extremely compact compared with the type 
of disjunctive statement which the behaviourist would have to devise.
It would seem that the hopes for this disjunctive version of the physicalist 
thesis are effectively dashed, therefore, not so much by the spectre of 
disjunction as such, as by the spectre of its lengthiness and its open- 
endedness.
None the less, the physicalist might still be encouraged by a 
realisation of the following fact; that every law-8tat@nent of the 
simple form which N(x)(x is S^O s  x is water) has, can be arbitrarily 
converted into a statement which has a disjunctive aspect, and which, 
compared to the Newtonian example, is neither compact nor closed at its 
right-hand end, e.g.:
N(x)(x is = X is parcel A of water 02. x is parcel B of water
02. X is parcel C of water ^  . .. .. .. etc.)
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This fact ml^t lead him to believe that the converse operation could be 
effected to re-convort a long-ish phyoicalistic disjunction into a single 
unified term. But the physicalist would, I contend, be wrong to put cay 
faith in this hope, and for two reasons. The first is that for any law 
which is either disjunctive or convertible-to-disjunctive, there exists a 
certain kind of unity among the concepts represented ia the disjunct. In 
the case of Newton’s Law of Motion, for instance, the concepts of rest and 
uniform strai^it-line motion belong together (for according to the more 
recent view that motion is always relative, are ever the same concept); 
while ia the case of the disjunctive version of the law .about H^Q and water 
the elements of the disjunct are conspicuously unified by the notion 
•parcel of ivater. In the case of the long disjunction attempted by the 
physicalist, on the other hand, it seems extremely unlikely that there ia 
a single concept which coheres the individual disjuncts and which is 
expressible purely la physical terms.
Gliis brings us to the second reason why a disjunctive reduction is 
liable to fail; and that is that the beat candidates with which a set of 
physicalistio disjuncts can be unified or completed with some degree of 
certainty are, at least at the present time, mental in character. Even 
if it is true, it ia not quite sufficient to say (for example) that I’s 
ana will extend towards some biscuit in his vicinity, for he ml^t mistake 
the biscuit for a balooa or a bagel - or he mi^t mistake a balooa or a 
bagel for a biscuit. It therefore has to be inserted that x’a arm will 
extend towards something ia his vicinity which he iud^s, perceives or 
believes to be a biscuit. Without a physicalistio reduction of :lud.^ dng. 
percelvin.? or believing, there seems no way of avoiding at least one of 
these psychological concepts in any attempt to analyse reductively wîiat 
we.ntln.f? a biscuit is.
Mental predicates seem to have no corresponding physical predicates
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which are even co-extensive with them, let alone physical predicates 
which are co-extensive with them as a matter of law. So far I have only 
sou^t to illustrate this truth - a truth which Brentano was the first to 
suspect - and not until the end of Chapter 17 will I try and say anything 
to explain or provide a context for it.
Carnap’s ovm explorations of the "explicit definition" approach to 
psychological terms did not take him quite as far as to make him speculate 
a disjunctive reduction. The obvious falsehood of the most primitive 
approaches (e.g. those like (l) and (2)) led him to adopt a method of 
what he referred to as reduction sentences. His initial view was that 
if was some sentence representing the physical conditions in which a 
certain organism found itself, and if was some psychological sentence 
concerning that organism, then there was some sentence 3^, describing 
non-psychologlcally the response of the organism, which stood to the other 
two sentences in the following relation;
of which one instance mi^t be;
(5) N (Fred wants a biscuit =  (if there is a biscuit present, then
Fred’s arm will extend towards it)
But the elementary truth-functional laws of ’ tell us that S wouldm
be true if were false; or that, in the specific case, Fred wants a 
biscuit if there is not a biscuit present - an absurd result. This well- 
known and decisive objection leaves nothing further to be said about 
reduction-sentences formalised in this way.
Camap later made an attempt to repair the defect in this method by
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introducing schéma to nartiallv interpret psychological terms* This was 
an accent which consisted in a method of "bi-lateral reduction". Using 
again the terms S^, and S^, his new view was expressed as saying that:
(5) ir(3^=) (s_^= sp)
Sentences of this sort only provided -partial interpretations for the 
mental sentence S^, since even if a particular instance of (6) were true, 
there would remain the possibility of other conditions implying an 
equivalence between and a set of response-séatences. An instance of
(6) might be
(?) N (P is asked how he feels (P feels terrible =  P says "I feel
terrible"))
which specifies a necessary and sufficient condition of P’s feeling 
terrible, but only in the circumstances that P is asked how he feels. 
In other circumstances the tests fail to apply.
The reduction-sentence (?) is equivalent to the conjunction of
(s) H (P feels terrible (P is asked how he feels =) P says "I feel
terrible"))
(9) N((P is asked how he feels and P says "I feel terrible") P feels
terrible)
But this shows even more clearly that the example as a whole would not 
do as an attempt to give nomologically necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the truth of P feels terrible in non-psychological terms, since in 
order to make statements (8) and (9) true, it seems to be required that 
some explanation would need to be incorporated about P’s tmderstanding of
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the question, and about his meaning a certain thing by saying "I feel 
terrible". And even if this additional information were built in to the 
example, the new assertion would most likely fail to record general truths 
about P - for, at least if he is like the rest of us, he would occasionally 
choose not to answer the question, and still feel terrible* But the 
example illustrates the method Camap evolved for the partial interpretation 
of psychological sentences in non-psychological terms. As a method, 
clearly, it is not adequate to provide necessary add sufficient general 
and law-like conditions for the truth of psychological sentences, and 
indeed it was never supposed to do so. The reduction involved is a weak 
one; but its details give us additional evidence of the difficulty of 
nomologically connecting the psychological with the non-psychological.
In the case of both the naive but strong reductive theories, and the 
more logically sophisticated but weaker ones too, the failure seems to 
consist in the fact that, at the very least, some psychological sentence 
appears to be needed in the analysis of any given psychological sentence. 
This hypothesis of the behaviourally irreducible nature of mental language 
suggests itself at two levels; both at the level where we try to give a 
non-psychological analysis of a singular psychological sentence (e.g. 2  
feels terrible) and also at the level where we try to give a non- 
psychological analysis of a general psychological sentence (e.g. (for any 
x) X feels terrible) - the task in the former case being to arrive at a 
general truth about P, and the task in the latter case being to arrive at 
a general truth about feeling terrible. But whether Brentano*s irreduci- 
bility hypothesis is one which can be proved, or at least in some sense 
supported by a rigorous deduction is, to date, an open question.
It is also a question of the first importance to this branch of the 
philosophy of mind. Many philosophers have taken the fact that mental 
language is irreducible to behavioural language (in the sense explained)
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to suggest that mental language is irreducible to any kind of non-mental 
language, and they have concluded from this that mental properties cannot 
be reduced in any way to non-mental properties. One of the themes of 
this essay will be to examine whether this line of reasoning is correct.
We have seen in this section that the evidence for the irreducibility of 
mental language to behavioural language is extremely compelling, but the 
question of whether mental language is irreducible to cerebral language is, 
I shall eventually argue, a quite different and independent question.
What I shall be challenging, in other words, is whether the systematic 
failure of any behavioural reduction of the mental is sufficient to support 
the claim that a cerebral reduction is impossible as well.
In the next section I present some physicalistio hypotheses of a sort 
which do not rely upon a reduction of the mental to the behavioural.
4. ALTERNÂTI7ES TO A BEHAVIOÜHAL REDUCTION
One of the initial hopes of the reductive enterprise was to be able 
to so establish a connection between terms or sets of terms that the 
reduced set could effectively replace the reducing set, in any significant 
area of speech or theory. This connection, I explained, would have to be 
nomological: the mental sentence would have to be true whenever and only
whenever the behavioural sentence was true, and not just in the exten- 
sional sense of the word "whenever". That nomological connectedness in 
a bridge law must be the standard for the reduction of one property to 
another can be easily appreciated if we survey the alternatives. Meaning 
equivalence, or synonymy, between a mental predicate and a behavioural 
predicate must, on any reasonable interpretation, be too strict a standard 
for a reduction of one property to another, since not only are the 
predicates of our paradigm reduction ("temperature" and "mean molecular
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kinetic energy") not synonymous, but synonymous predicates are not, in
general, names of inter-reducible properties.
And while synonymy is too strict a standard, mere coextensiveness
is too weak. Quine writes that:
"we have satisfactorily reduced one predicate to others ... 
if in terms of these others we have fashioned an open sentence 
that is 00-extensive with the predicate in question .... i.e. 
that is satisfied by the same values of the variables" 25
But if this were correct, it would follow that the property of thinking
about food would be reducible to the property of having saliva in the
mouth, on the single condition that all and only those people who thought
about food had saliva in the mouth; which would be in implausible
■  ^26 result.
Reductive theories of the kind considered in the last section were 
"peripheralist" theories, in the sense that the things to which mental 
properties were to be reduced were behavioural properties - described, of 
course, in physical terms. Now as an alternative to theories of 
behavioural reduction there grew a suggestion that mental phenomena ou^t 
to be connected not with behaviour or physical motions but, in some way, 
with neurophysiological features of the organisms brain or nervous system. 
There is therefore the possibility of a "centralist" or (what I have called 
a) "cerebral" reduction, which, if actually carried out, would have the 
effect of establishing an identity of mental properties with cerebral 
properties, via bridge laws of the form N(x )(x is M =  x is P), where this 
time "P" is not a behavioural predicate but a predicate of some physical 
language describing a property of the brain or central nervous system.
Or, alternatively, at a less general level, it would consist of establishing
25# ¥• V. Quine , Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers, p. 188.
(in The Vavs of Paradox and other es sa vs. New York 1966)
26. See again footnote 15, above, and its attendant text.
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bridge laws about particular individuals of the form
N(t)(A is M at t =  A is P at t), where the generality is only a
generality with respect to different moments in the life of the same 
individual.
The general ideology of this reductive programme is much the same
as that of the behaviourist programme; to demonstrate the ultimate dis-
pensibility of mental language* Moreover the idea that mental properties
and cerebral properties are one and the same has a certain amount of
27intuitive appeal* ¥e know that many of the phenomena of inanimate 
nature have no "analysis" in terms of outward visible features, whereas
a suspicion exists that objects belonging to the same kind have a common
internal microscopic structure* While objects subsumed under the concepts 
lemon or cat, for instance, have no jointly necessary-and-sufficient 
external features, it is more plausible to think that they have common 
structural features at the microscopic or genetic level* Advocates of 
the programme of cerebral reduction mi^t ask what reason there is to 
suppose that mental phenomena mi^t be different in this respect.
The reduction of the mental to the cerebral, either in the form of 
a reduction of mental properties to cerebral properties or in the form of 
nomological truths about particular individuals taken one by one, is a 
matter which I shall not try to treat fully until Chapter IV (section 2), 
where the crucial question will be whether the kinds of factors which 
tended to falsify all efforts at a behavioural reduction tend to also 
falsify any cerebral reduction. It is important at this point to explain 
the methodology of the other approach to physicalism, namely the non- 
reductive approach.
The essence of a non-redoctive physicalistio hypothesis is that it
27 Thanks to Putnam* s article Is Semantics Possible? Metaphilosophy, 
1970.
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suggests the Identity of particular mental phenomena with particular 
physical phenomena, without any implication of generality at all. That 
is to say, it would be a non-reduotive hypothesis that
Tom' 8 being in pain at noon on Friday » Tom' s being at noon on Friday
or that
Tom' 9 remembering that at noon on Friday « Tom' s being Ÿ  noon on
Friday
where and cerebral predicates, and where there is no sugges­
tion that if Tom were to be in pain at noon on Saturday, then he would be 
/6 at that time ; or that if Fred were to remember that %  noon on Friday 
then ^  would be Ÿ" that time. The reason why a hypothesis of this 
very particular and non-generalis able kind is non-reductive ia clear 
from the previous explanation of what a reduction itself consists of.
No bridge law connecting the property of being in pain with the property 
of being 0 would be necessary (althou^ it would be sufficient (see 
Chapter IT, section 2)) to establish such a particular identity. In a 
non-reductive theory, mental "particulars", specified by a phrase of the 
form A's H-lng at T. are asserted to be identical one by one with physical 
"particulars", specified by a phrase of the form A's P-ing at T% but on
grounds quite different in kind from those which motivate an identification
23of a mental property with a physical property. Another feature of the
23. Such differences of level are sometimes expounded in terms of the 
difference between types and tokens. It is frequently said that 
the Identity theorist has just two choices: either to identify a 
type of mental phenomenon with a type of physical phenomenon, or 
else to identify particular token mental phenomena with particular 
token physical phenomena, independently of idiat type they belong to. 
E.g. Fodor and Block use this terminology in khat PsycholoMcal States 
are Not.
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difference is that while a reductive theory is only properly advanced as a 
scientific hypothesis, to he confirmed or falsified by the facts, a non- 
reductive theory cannot be scientific in quite the same sense. It is for 
this reason, perhaps, that a non-reductive theory may be unmisleadingly 
called a philosophical or metaphysical theory.
The label "identity theory" is therefore not by itself sufficient to 
distinguish the reductive from the non-reductive; an identity theorist 
can suggest anything ranging from the identity of a mental with a physical 
property, at the most general and ambitious level, down to the identity of 
mental with physical "particulars", at the least general level. Only an 
identity theory at this least general level is non-reductive.
The credentials of identity theory (both reductive and non-reductive) 
will be a major theme of this essay. But before bringing this section to 
a close, I shauld like to mention a type of reduction outlined by Quine, 
which is called by him "ontological reduction", but which the distinction 
between the reductive and the non-reductive as I have just explained it 
would fail to categorise clearly either one way or the other. The concept 
which is perhaps fundamental to ontological reduction in Quine's sense is 
the concept of explication. Roughly speaking, explication consists of 
locating, for any object which needs analysis, or whose ontological 
credentials are unclear, some other object with which it can, for various 
purposes, be identified. But two items connected in this way need not be 
identical in the strict Leibnizian sense; and so the logical strictures 
imposed by the law of that name turn out to be simply irrelevant to whether 
an explication is successful or acceptable.
A simple example of explication would consist of considering a three­
penny piece or a fly-button to be identical with a missing rook piece in 
a chess game, where neither object shares all the properties of the other 
and, clearly, where the chief motive for assimilating the two is to provide
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a functional equivalent for a lost item. The apparatus of explication 
is more complicated than this simple example suggests, of course, and 
together with various elaborations and supplementations which Quine provides, 
is supposed to enable us to "eliminate" the entities of one theory in favour 
of the entities of another - thus ontoloeicallv reducing the one theory to 
the other. (Frege's analysis of numbers in terms of sets is supposed to 
be a paradigm case of ontological reduction.) The programme of ontological 
reduction is one which is clearly worthy of consideration in the general 
business of analysing mental phenomena, for its suggestion is that mental 
entities, if such there are, could be eliminated in favour of physical 
entities. I shall therefore consider it eventually. But since onto­
logical reduction is a topic which is only tangentially connected in method 
to the main themes of this essay I shall confine my discussion of it, 
together with my sceptical conclusions, to an appendix.
5. moGRmmio BEimis
Having now identified the main termini of my investigation, I must say 
something of what will lie in between them and the present point in the 
essay. I think it needs no argument that a really adequate physicalistio 
theory would have to take into account the various rather subtle differences 
idiich can be found within the entire corpus of what, up to this point, we 
have uncritically referred to as mental phenomena. Some systematic exposi­
tion would be needed, firstly, of what sorts or natural categories of 
mental phenomena there are; and secondly, of what differences the items 
belonging to these categories exhibit in respect of causal and explanatory 
connections with other phenomena, the conditions of their successful 
individuation, and so forth.
Now not all of these matters can be fully explored in an essay of
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this length. For example, I shall leave largely undiscussed the question 
of whether we ou^it to speak of mental activities, mental processes, or 
mental features, etc. ; and concentrate instead upon the two categories 
whose existence is generally thou^t to be less controversial, viz. the 
category of mental states and the category of mental events. It is the 
physicalistio analysis of items belonging to these categories which I shall 
devote most of my energy to; hoping, of course, that some of the details 
will be transferable to items of other categories, if and when they emerge 
at all clearly.
To begin with I shall deal with a certain non-reductive, physicalistio 
account of mental states, which has been put forward in recent years as an 
alternative to that version of the identity theory which asserts that for 
each type of mental state there is a type of physical state which is 
identical with it. The theory of mental states which I have in mind en­
tail sj as a conclusion, that a mental state can be identified with (in the 
explicative sense (see I, 4)) a class of physical states whose members are 
identified by certain functional tests. So there is the actual theory of 
mental states on the one hand, and there is a non-reductive physicalistio 
conclusion which follows from it on the other. îîy aim in the next 
chapter will be to conduct a critique of the theory itself, leaving an 
assessment of the conclusion until the appendix. In this sense I shall 
be first examining the route along which the theory travels, rather than 
its physicalistio terminus.
In order to understand exactly what is asserted and what is denied by 
this theory, and indeed in order to get the whole subject of physicalism 
into clear perspective, there is one more preliminary job which needs to 
be done, which is to lay out in detail the different levels of generality 
on which any physicalistio conclusion mi^t be asserted.
Let us survey the question of generality for the case of mental states.
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On the face of it, we can distinguish logically between three different 
levels of generality. On the first and least ambitious level, th^re is 
the theory that each particular mental state of a particular person at a 
particular time - i.e. each instance of a particular mental state of a 
particular person - is identical in the strict sense with a corresponding 
instance of a particular physical state of that person. Let us assume 
(what I shall later expose to criticism) that an instance of a particular 
state of a particular person is correctly nominated by a phrase of the 
form "P*s being .... at T", where "P" names a person and where "T" names 
a time, and where the blank "...." is appropriately filled. Then this 
first theory asserts sentences of the following sort 
Time-Specific Level
Tom's being in pain at T^ » Tom's at T^
Tom's being in pain at T^ = Tom's at Tg
Fred's being in pain at T^ =» Fred's at T^
Fred's being in pain at T^ “ Fred's at Tg
.
where none of the blanks in the right-hand side need be filled in the same
way, althou^ they must each be filled with a non-mental term. On the
next most ambitious level, there is the theory that each Instance of eadi
particular mental state of a particular person is, at anv time, identical
in the strict sense with an instance of some particular physical state.
This second theory asserts sentences of the following sort 
Person-Specific Level
(t)(Tom's being in pain at t « Tom's at t)
(t)(Fred*s being In pain at t » Fred's at t)
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where each one of these sentences generates, as instances, sentences like
Tom's being in pain at T^ SB Tom' 8 at
Tom's being in pain at T^ =s Tom' 8 at
Fred's being in pain at T^ = Fred* s .......at
Fred's being in pain at T^ = Fred's *2
where " " always contains the same non-mental filling, and where
always contains the same non-mental filling. Or equivalently, 
you could leave out the time specification altogether, and say, for 
instance in Tom's case,
Tom's being in pain *= Tom's .
On the third and most ambitious level of all, there is the theory that 
without regard to time or person, for each instance of a particular mental 
state there is a particular physical state, an instance of which it is 
identical with. On this third level the theory asserts sentences like 
Property Level
(x)(t)(x*s being in pain at t * x's at t)
which of course generates, as instances, particular sentences like
Tom' 8 being in pain at T^ *= Tom* 8 at T^
Tom' 8 being in pain at Tg *a Tom's at T^
Fred's being in pain at T^ « Fred's at T^
Fred's being in pain at T^ a= Fred's atl2
where " " is always to be given the same non-mental filling. This
third theory can be represented as saying things like 
Being in pain » .
although, as I shall show at a later point, the exact connections between 
such a statement of property-identity and any more particular statement
38
of the kind just listed (above) are oomplex.
The differences between these theories are differences of generality: 
the first contains no generality whatever, the second generalises with 
respect to time, and the third generalises with respect to time and 
individual, A fourth theory which generalised with respect to time, 
individual and psychological state, would be clearly over-general, and 
for that reason unworthy of serious consideration. I have chosen to 
display these matters explicitly because I want to explain what the theory 
of mental states which I shall be concerned with in the next chapter 
asserts and what it denies. That theory asserts the falsehood of an 
identity theory at the Person-specific level or the Property level' ? but 
has as its conclusion a series of sentences, which althou^ superficially 
of the Property level form: 
being in pain =
are in fact of a sort whose blank is not filled by a physical description. 
The most this theory can assert by way of a mental/physical identity- 
sent ence is something explicative like
Being in pain is to be identified with the class whose members 
are: Tom's being ___________ at T^, Tom's being __________ at Tg,
Fred's being _________ at T^, Fred* s being _________ at T^,
Fred's being «,,, at T^, *,,,, etc* 
where the blanks can each be differently filled. So although the theory 
asserts the falsehood of any non set-theoretic identity at ihe Person 
specific level or the Property level (and on empirical grounds), it 
ambitiously seeks to find a different unitary analysis of the general 
state of being in pain.
The plan for the succeeding two chapters is as follows. In CJhapter 
III, I shall address myself to the altogether more basic series of 
ontological questions concerning the existence of items belonging to the
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60-called categories of mental events and mental states; and to the
interpretative question of what kinds of thing phrases of the form
"A's being G", "being G", "A's being G at T" are in point of fact
appropriate to nominate# And in the final chapter I shall return to
discuss, in the main, the possibilities left for a centralist reduction
of the mental, as an alternative to both (i) the behavioural kind of
reduction discussed in this chapter, and (ii) the standard non-reductive
"identity theories" which identify particular mental events with particular
physical events or particular mental states with particular physical
states. Broadly speaking, my conclusion will be that a certain kind of
centralist reduction is the single open possibility there is for physicalism,
and that this a possibility only because Brentano's hypothesis of the
29irreducibility of mental language is not exceptionlessly true.
29. While writing this essay 1 became aware of the conclusions worked 
out by D. C. Dennett in his book Content and Consciousness (London 
and New fork, 1969), some of the more heterodox of idiich, althou^ 
argued on different grounds, coincide with those of the present 
essay. I signpost these points of coincidence in Chapters III and 
17.
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Chapter II. Two Theories Examined
IIA. The "Functional" Theory of Hontal States 
1. Introduction
2* Exposition of the Turing Ikichine theory 
3* Criticism of the Turing Machine theory 
4#, Relevance of the theory for physicalism
IIB. A Theory of Mental Events
1. Exposition of Davidson's theory
2. Causal interaction between the mental and the physical;
reasons as causes
3. Causal interaction between the mental and the physical; 
: mental states as causes.
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IIA. The "Fimctional" Theory of Mental States
1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I intend to expose the déficiences of two theories 
about the nature of the mind. These theories have not been arbitrarily 
selected! they have both been quite widely endorsed in recent philosophy, 
and they are both designed, by their exponents, to support certain 
physicalistio conclusions. The first theory I shall consider has come 
to be known as the functional state theory, or occasionally as the func­
tional theory of mental states* According to the most general form of 
this theory, mental states are those states of the organism which have some 
function in the genesis of behaviour, and indeed are those states of the 
organism which are, in a sense I shall seek to explain, identified by what 
their functional relationships are. Now the interest of this theory for 
the doctrine of physicalism is considerable: for it not only suggests a
way of distinguishing the mental from the physical, but it also contains 
important implications for both reductive and non-reductive forms of the 
physicalist doctrine.
But the theory has been held with more or less conviction by a number 
of people, and because of their varying convictions, in a number of forms. 
Stuart Hampshire, without actually using the word "function", once 
suggested^ that feelings ere characterised by the fact tliat they give rise 
to certain inclinations, e.g. pain (of the type occasioned by bodily 
damage) is characterised by the inclination it gives rise to, to withdraw 
the damaged part. Chomsky has spoken about mental concepts in a similar 
vein in the context of the theory of grammar:
1. Hampshire: Feelln? and Expression. London 1961.
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"The mentalist need make no assumptions about the 
possible physiological basis for the mental reality he 
studies# In particular, he need not deny that there 
is such a basis* One would guess, rather, that it is 
the mentalistic studies that will ultimately be of 
greatest value for the investigation of neurophysiological 
mechanisms, since they alone are concerned with determining 
abstractly the properties that such mechanisms must exhibit 
and the functions they perform" 2
And Gilbert Harman writes that
psychological states and processes are functionally 
defined . 3
"Just as states of an automaton are to be defined in terms 
of functional relationships rather than in terms of the 
exact nature of their physical realisation, so too for 
psychological states (the same psychological states may be 
differently realised in different people, or even in the 
same person at different times)* These states are defined 
in terms of their functional relationships to other 
psychological states, as in reasoning; to input, as in 
responses to observation; and to output, as in intentional 
action" 4
However the views expressed in these quotations can hardly be regarded
as specific enough for a philosophical critique to be based upon them.
They do not embody any indication as to how the difficult word "functional"
and the difficult phrase "functional relationship" should be understood;
and they do not make totally clear the relationship which any mental state
bears to a physiological or physical state. In these respects they are
only sli^tly more specific than Armstrong's general formula:
"The concept of a mental state is primarily the concept of 
a state of the person apt for bringing about a certain sort 
of behaviour ...."5
2. Chomsky: Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, p. 193»
3» Harman: Knowledge, Reasons and Causes. Journal of Philosophy 1970,
p. 851.
4. Harman, loo cit. p. 649»
5. D. M. Armstrong: A Materialist theory of the Mind p. 82.
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Fortunately, there exist more exact formulations of the theory that mental 
states are functional states, the most specific of which is Putnam's view 
that the way in which mental states are organised can he compared to the 
way the Machine Table of a Turing Machine codifies the functional states 
of such a machine- It is this formulation of the functional state theory 
on which I shall therefore concentrate my attention- But there is 
another relatively specific formulation of the functional state theory 
which has been presented by J- A. Fodor, and whose shortcomings I think 
it is instructive to see, before progressing to the details of Putnam's 
view.
Fodor's view is, it seems, that when giving a psychological descrip­
tion of a state of a person, we thereby sav (or, as I shall put it, make 
manifest to our audience) what its specific function is in relation either 
to other psychological states, or to the behaviour of the organism con­
cerned- At least I think that this is a reasonable interpretation of 
many of the things Fodor says about psychological states. For according 
to Fodor, pfiirt of our theory of a persons behaviour consists in giving 
descriptions of
"The internal states of organisms .... in respect of the 
way they function in the production of behaviour ....
The properties of these states are determined by appeal
to the assumption that they have whatever features are g
required to account for the organism's behavioural repertoire"
What this aspect of our theory tells us about these internal states,
according to Fodor, is
"what role they play in the production of behaviour •*- 
Theory construction proceeds in terms of such functionally 
characterised notions as memories, motives, needs, drives, 
desires, strategies, beliefs, etc. with no reference to the 
physiological structures which may, in some sense, correspond 
to these concepts .... If I say "he left abruptly upon 
remembering a prior engagement" I am giving an explanation 
in terms of an internal event postulated in order to account 
for behaviour" 7
6. Fodor; Explanations in Psvcholoev p. 173
7» Fodor: Explanations in Psychology p. 172. (My underlining)
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But this theory of Fodor*s, interpreted to mean that a psychological 
description says or makes manifest what specific function the state in 
question has, can be seen to make the functional state theory immediately 
false. For when we describe a personas state (either his state or the 
state of his mind) as the state of believing that rain is Immineni^  say, 
we do not, in describing him in those terms, say (or even by implication 
make manifest to our audience) what the specific function of that state 
is in relation to further states of mind or to his actions. It may be a 
fact about that person that subsequent to believing that rain is imminent 
he remembers leaving his umbrella behind on the train - and it may also 
be a fact that we can exnlain his remembering leaving his umbrella behind 
by saying that he believed rain was imminent. (He would not have 
remembered about his umbrella if he had not acquired the belief about the 
rain) • But this does not mean, or require, that ^  describing his 
psychological state as one of belief that rain is coming we explicitly 
(or even implicitly) relate it either causally or as a possible explanation 
to any subsequent psychological state. And the same goes for the relation 
between a state psychologically described and some subsequent action. 
Suppose the man suddenly runs for shelter - and suppose that, in explain­
ing this action, we refer to his state of belief that rain is on the way. 
Then, even though that may be a correct explanation in that situation, it 
does not mean that in describing his state as a certain kind of belief- 
state we thereby say what its specific functional role is in relation to 
some action he later performs. The words "he believes that rain is on 
the way" may plausibly be said to describe a state; but the words by 
themselves do not tell us what specific subsequent psychological states 
or subsequent actions of his can be explained by them.
The correctness of my interpretation of Fodor*s functional state 
theory, and the falsehood of the theory under that interpretation, is
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also clear from an analogy vdiich Podor gives. According to this analogy, 
a psychological description stands in the same relation to a brain state 
as the term "valve-lifter" stands to a camshaft.® In both cases, he 
thinks, the description gives the specific function of a structural 
mechanism or part, and it is called a functional description because the 
description itself informs us as to what specific function the part per­
forms. The valve-1ifter is specifically: that thing which lifts valves;
in the same way, a psychological description is supposed not merely to 
describe some state of the organism or its brain, but to describe it 
functionally. But it is clear that the analogy does not hold; since, 
psychological terms in themselves simply do not describe the specific 
functions of brain-states in the way the tern "valve-lifter" admitedly 
does a camshaft. Hor can we patch up the analogy by construing a psycho­
logical description as somehow having the same meaning as a phrase like 
"action-causer" or "state appropriate for the production of behaviour".
¥e cannot construe psychological descriptions in this way for the simple 
reason that individual psychological states do not invariably cause 
actions; there are plenty of mental states which can be perfectly "idle", 
and which need have no obvious bearing on a person’s behaviour at all.
A man may be indulging in a fantasy or a daydream about how he might have 
behaved differently on some occasion which is now past. He mi^t be 
running through the details of an amusing story in his head; he mi^t be 
basking in the memory of some former public glory of his; and yet none 
of these facts need show themselves in what he subsequently does* Psycho­
logical information of this sort can be valued for its ovm sake. If, in 
podor*s example of "he left abruptly upon remembering a former engagement", 
the mental eveht mentioned is one which is "postulated in order to acconnt 
for behaviour", then of course, so specified, it must account for the
8. Podor; Explanations in Psychology pp. 177-9.
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behaviour. But it seems implausible to say that all mental states owe 
their existence to such a postulation.
It is not even true that mental states are all and only those which 
are suitable for explaining their owner’s behaviour; or, to mimic 
Armstrong’s words, that mental states are all and only those which, on 
suitably chosen occasions, are ant for the explanation of their owner’s 
behaviour. Although it is quite true in a general way that actions very 
often can be explained by reference to previous or concurrent states of 
mind, it is not by any means true that this is the only way to explain 
actions, or even the best way. Actions can be explained by reference to
the state of mind of a person other than the agent, as when it is said that
a certain school-boy did what he was told because his teacher wanted him 
to; or an action can be explained without reference to a state of mind 
at all, as when it is said that a dinner guest ate with just his fork 
because etiquette required it; and there are other kinds of cases, in 
which the explanation for what someone did does not lie in the agent’s 
mind, but elsewhere. This is not to deny that in a case where an action 
needs to be explained, there usually ^  some state of mind of the agent 
which is relevant, for I think there usually is; it is to deny that when 
we explain actions, we always or necessarily do so by citing a mental
state of the agent.^ But if actions do not necessarily need to be
explained in terms of a mental state of the agent, and if it is also true 
that an agent’s mental state need not have any causal bearing on his 
behaviour, then it cannot be true that mental states are states of a sort 
which are ant for bringing about, or explaining, behaviour.
9. And an action can be explained by the absence of a desire, as in "I 
put my umbrella up because I did not want to get wet". This is 
perfectly explanatory, but different from "I put my umbrella up 
because I wanted not to get wet". The first implies the counter- 
factual "If I had wanted to get wet I should not have put up my 
umbrella"; but the second does not.
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In as much as mental states are not functional in the sense of that 
word used to interpret Podor*s theory, then mental states cannot he dis­
tinguished from physical states by their functionality (conceived in that 
sense). And in as much as mental states seem not to be especially apt 
for bringing about behaviour, in the sense of that phrase employed in my 
interpretation of Armstrong’s view, then mental states cannot be distin­
guished from physical states by using that concept either. Clearly, an 
adequate distinction between the mental and the physical must begin with 
a characterisation of the mental which is itself adequate.
If mental states are said to be functional in the weaker sense of 
providing necessary conditions for the truth of a statement about behaviour, 
then ailthou^ this is more plausible, it fails to provide a strong enou^ 
test with which to distinguish mental from physical states. Having a 
pair of legs is a state without which it is impossible to go for a walk; 
having a brain in one’s skull is a state without which it is impossible 
to work out a problem or write a letter; and yet neither of these states 
can plausibly be described as mental states. It remains to be seen 
whether there is any other sense which can be assigned to the word 
"functional" which makes it capable of adequately characterising just 
those states which are mental. Only if this is so will it be possible to 
draw the mental/physical distinction in those terms.
2. EXPOSITION OP THE THRING MACHINE THEORY
I now move on, as promised, to examine the detailed opinions of H. 
Putnam on the nature of mental states and their organisation. The quota­
tions from Chomsky, Harman and Podor which were given in the previous 
section all contained the idea that the nature of a psychological state 
is to be explained independently of how it comes to be "realised" in
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matter; although Chomsky and Podor thou^t it possible, none the less,
that a mental description mi^t have the role of describing the function
of a physiological mechanism* These two intuitions, that there is no
physical realisation that is necessary to any particular mental state,
and that mental states are in some sense "functional" states, both have
a place at the centre of Putnam* s theory.
In considering pain, Putnam writes ;
. pain is not a brain state, in the sense of a physical- 
chemical state of the brain (or even of the whole nervous 
system), but another kind of state entirely* I propose the 
hypothesis that pain, or the state of being in pain, is a 
functional state of the whole organism" 10
11This hypothesis Putnam calls the "functional state hypothesis". Many
of the states which Putnam describes as psychological are those which
others would be inclined to think of as being physical : the state of
12pain, the state of hunger, the states of thirst or agression* Apart
13from the specific case of pain, there are signs that he considers all 
the other more obviously cognitive states to be functional states as well; 
states like being able to recite the Ancient Mariner or knowing the 
chemical composition of sugar, and others of the same degree of complexity. 
The functional state hypothesis, then, can be taken as the hypothesis that 
psychological states in the broadest sense are functional states of the 
organism*
Putnam explains that a large part of the motive for adopting this 
theory derives from the clear empirical falsehood of that version of the 
"identity theory" which identifies every tvne of mental state with a 
particular tvne of physico-chemical state of the brain. Such a theory
10* Putnam: Psychological Predicates. Art, Mind and Religion (ed. 
Capitan and Merrill) p* 41.
11. Putnam, op cit. p. 44.
12. See Quine for example; Word and Object. § 54.
15. Putnam: Psychological Predicates p p . 43» 45. The Mental Life of 
Some Machines p. 211.
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would be one which belonged to the Property level, in the sense I explained 
earlier (Chapter I, section 5)* Putnam regards such an identity theory as 
implausible, partly because a person who is in pain on two successive 
occasions can have very different brain states (described in certain physico­
chemical terms, at least), end also because two animals can both be in pain 
(the same state) even if they belong to different species, and have, as a 
matter of fact, quite dissimilar brain structures. Putnam argues that^  
in order for the identity theorist to be ri^t, the physical-chemical state 
with which pain is to be identified
"must be a possible state of a mamallian brain, a reptilian 
brain, a mollusc's brain (octopuses are mollusca, and certainly 
feel pain) etc. At the same time, it must not be a possible 
(physically possible) state of the brain of any physically 
possible creature that cannot feel pain" 14
Since this is implausible, he reasoned, a method of collecting brain-states
must be arrived at which does not make small differences in physical-
chemical structure matter.
The functional state theory replaces the view that a psychological
state is a physico-chemical state, and says that the psychological states
of two creatures (or two successive states of the same creature) are the
same providing that they have identical functional relationships to other
states, to "input", and to the organisms behavioural repetoire. To put
it summarily, the theory says that psychological states are the same
which have the same function.
But we are not yet in a position to critically assess this theory,
for we still need to know in more exact detail what is meant, in the
context of the theory, by the phrase "functional relationship". Putnam
provides these details by comparing a body of psychological information
about a person with the information represented on a machine table for a
14. Putnam: Psvcholo/d-cal Predicates p. 44.
50
Turing Machine» The concept of a Turing Machine, and the concept of a 
machine table for such a machine are exact and precise concepts; and so 
the way to understand Putnam's view on the nature of the mind is to under­
stand what a Turing Machine is, and how its machine table describes its 
operations*
A Turing Jîachine is
"a device with a finite nwber of internal configurations, 
each of which involves the machines being in one of a 
finite number of states, and the machines scanning a tape 
on which certain symbols appear» The machine's tape is
divided into separate squares on each of which a symbol
(from a finite fixed alphabet) may be printed" 15
Such a machine is defined bv Its machine table, which essentially specifies 
how the machine will change its state when a certain "input" is received, 
and how it will discharge a certain "output" when a change of state cooes 
about* So whether or not any actual physical mechanic can be described 
as a Turing Machine depends upon whether or not its operations can be 
described by a machine table.
Since, as X shall illustrate in a moment, a machine table can be 
either probabalistio or deterministic, it is possible for an actual 
physical device to be described as a probabalistio Turing Machine and as 
a deterministic Turing Machine at the same time» A machine is a deter­
ministic Turing Machine if each state specified by the machine table has 
only one state named as its successor, and only one as its predecessor.
It is probabalistio if each state specified by the machine table has 
several states listed as its possible predecessors, and several listed as 
its possible successors — the exact probabilities of transition between 
that state and its several possible predecessors and successors also being 
given in the machine table* This shows clearly why it Is that if a physical 
system or type of physical system is a probabalistio machine, it can be
15# Putnam; Mnda and Machines, p# 140.
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a deterministic machine too* To call it a probabalistio machine is to 
say that its machine table records the probabilities of transition between 
various states; which is compatible with there being some different 
machine table wlxich only mentions probabilities 0 and 1 - that is, one 
which gives a deterministic description. Conversely, if something is a 
deterministic machine, it can also be a probabalistio machine, for similar 
reasons*
To call a device a deterministic Turing îlachine, or to call it a 
probabalistio Turing lîachlne, is just to say what kind of machine table 
it has. These notions can now be illustrated as follows. The simplest 
machine worth describing^^ is one which has two states, A and B, which is 
deterministic, and which only has two possible inputs: only two letters
can appear on its input tape. Then the machine table migght look like 
this :
state A state B
input 1 . B2 A2
input 2 A1 B1
(Figure l)
where the instruction "B2", for example, means "change to state B and 
print the symbol "2" in place of the symbol now in front of you; and 
finally» scan the next space on the input tape" • The instruction to scan 
the next space of the input tape is naturally part of every instruction - 
but in every other respect the instruction is specific to the state which 
the machine is in and to the input which it is receiving. Now in the 
case of this simple, deterministic, two-state machine, the "functional" 
relations are strictly causal - for they are simply the determining rela­
tions which the machine table specifies for each state. The causal
16. For a description of a four-state machine see Putnams Minds and 
Machines in Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind.
52
relations for state A, for example, are two in number: state A determines
the printing of pymbol "2" and a change to state B when the input is input
1; and it determines the printing of symbol "1" and no change of state
when the input is input 2, To say that the states of such a machine
(states A and b ) are Identified functionally would be to say that the
identity of each state is fixed by the machine table column. If ttfo
separately named states have identical machine table columns under them,
then it would follow that those separately named states are one and the 
17same.
The case of a probabalistio machine is in principle just the same: 
but a causal or determining relation here is not a causally deterministic
17* This is an example of what Quine calls the "identification of indis- 
cemibles". _ See From a Logical Point of View no. 70-3? Word and 
Object p. 230. It might be useful to have an example of this 
procedure at work, in order to see the interplay between the 
identity of a state and its machine table column. Suppose the 
finest individuation of states which the theoriest can adopt, 
independently of functional considerations, yields states k» 2.» 
and Suppose the machine table for these is
& k c. 1
il. ?b ?a ?b ?b
12. ?a ?c ?a ?c
13. ?o ?b ?c ?a
14. ?d ?d ?d ?d
(where the use of "?" summarises the fact that every instruction in 
any one row contains the same input letter, and each state has the 
same probability - it does not matter what they are for the purposes 
of the example). Then since the column under g. coincides with the 
column under c^  state a, » state Cj and the a, column can be 
eradicated from the machine table. But if a, = 2  ^ then each "c" in 
every remaining column has to be re-written as "a", which yields 
another identity, viz that of the column under &  with the column 
under d. This leaves us with
& k
il. ?b ?a
12. ?a ?a
13. ?a ?b
14. ?a ?a
53
one - only a probabalistio one, A machine table for a three-state, 
probabalistio, three-input machine mi^t look in part like this:
state A state B state C
input 1 B2"& a « * •. ♦
Alt
B2f
input 2 ••• C3t ...
Alt
Clt
input 3 ... ... A3Î
C2t
. . B2t
(Figure 2)
where the instruction corresponding to any input and any state specifies 
a set of -probable changes to a range of other states. ¥hen the input is 
input 2 and the machine is in state B, for instance, the machine table 
says that the probability of printing "2" and not changing state is l/6, 
the probability of printing "5" and changing to state C is I/5, and the 
probability of printing ”1" and changing to state A is I/2.
With this general description of a Turing Machine before us, we can 
now see clearly what it means to say that a psychological state is a 
functional state. For according to Putnam, a person is, a Turing machine, 
in the sense that the organisation of his mental states can be set out on 
a machine t a b l e . A  person's psychological states are functional states, 
according to this view, in just the sense in itfhXch states A, B or C of
13. A machine tape is an essential part of any Turing Machine. It is 
a tape on which symbols from a finite alphabet appear, and which the 
machine can "scan", erase from, or print onto. A Turing Machine 
is essentially an effective computing device: but to make it
realistic as a model for persons capable of perceiving and acting, 
certain additional specifications have to be made. Pu-bnam addst 
that the machine has to be thou^t of as equipped with a sensory 
system that scans the machines environment and which prints symbols 
into the machines tape, and also with motor organs which are such 
that when the machine itself prints certain symbols onto the tape, the 
motor organs execute certain "actions". See The Men-fcal Life of 
Some Machines pp. 178-9.
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the previously described machines are functional states: it is an
essential feature of them that they are related to other states in 
various ways, end their identities as states are fixed precisely by 
what these ways of relating are# Two psychological state-descriptions 
describe the same psychological state if and only if their respective 
machine table columns coincides this is the sense in which psychological 
states are the same which have the same function#
How it is important to appreciate that is included in this theory 
that a person is a Turing machine, and what is denied by it. In particular, 
it ia important not to und^estlmate it# What I have in mind here is 
the fact that the characterisation of a Turing Machine which Putnam gives, 
and in which I have followed him, allows that every object can be trivially 
described as a Turing Machine by thinking of it as having only one state#
A stone is a Turing Machine if its sole state is thou^t of as the state 
of being a stone; gmd a brick is a Turing Machine if its sole state is 
thought of as the state of being a brick; and so forth# And only 
sli^tly less trivially, any human being can easily be described as a 
Turing Ka<dxine if he or she is thou^t of as having only two states: the 
state of bein? conscious and the state of bein^ r itnconscioug# A machine 
table for a person thou^t of in this way could be easily written, for it 
would simply contain a specification of the transition-probabillties 
between those two states in the face of various inputs; . and in this case 
the catalogue of relevant inputs would be relatively short, since th^are 
few types of stimuli which are catastrophio enou^ to cause a change fr<m 
consciousness to unconsciousness, or from unconsciousness to consciousness# 
This trivi&lising thou^t-experiment is to be resisted if the theory 
is to be taken seriously# In its serious form, it says not simply that 
a person Is a Turing Machine, but that a person Is a Turing Machine of a 
sort whose machine table lists all and only the person's psychological 
states and their mutual functional
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connectlona# This ia the first major claim tlmt the functional state 
theory makes* The other is that each psychological state owes its 
identity to what its functional connections are* This is to say that 
it is essential to the identity of every particular psychological state 
that it has the functional connections it hast that it is not merely 
accidental or usually the case that It has those connections; and that 
any psychological state would not be the psychologicsl state it is, if 
its listed functional conneotlone wore different#
This second claim ia clearly a strong one# It Is a consequence of 
the view that a poraon is a Turing Machine taken In conjunction with the 
view that any machine state listed on the machine table owes its identity 
to the details of the instructions contained in the relevant machine table 
column (a view which was explained in the last section as being definitive 
of what a machine table is)# We saw that for any machine table, two 
separately listed states must be identified with each other if and only 
if those separately listed states have machine table columns which contain 
identical instructionsj and so it follows frœa this that, on the view 
that a person is a Turing machine, two differently specified nsvcholorical 
states are different if sad only if their machine table columns contain 
sets of instructions differing in at least one detail#
An analogy might be useful in understanding this point# The 
announcement that any psychologtcal-etat© concept is # functional-state 
concept might be compared with the truth that the concept of a/?e is a 
historical concept# Just as it is essential to ry age's being what it is 
that I waa bora ia a particular year, it is said by the functional state 
theory to be essential to any psychological concept's being what it is 
that it has certain connections and relations with other states, and with 
behaviour# *1hat specific psychological state a person la in is fixed 
by thsso connections and relations, in just the same way as what my age
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la, la fixed by the year of my birth* The year of my birth is criterial*
The fact that the year of my birth la criterial does not entail, how­
ever, that no other tests or procedures can be used to find out how old I 
am* Clearly they can* And in an analogous way, the fact that there 
are certain things which are criterial of what psychological state a 
person is in does not entail that there are no tests or procedures of a 
non-criterial sort which can be reliably employed to determine a persons 
psychological state* So while it is of the essence of the functional 
state theory to stress the criterial features of psychological states, it 
does not make the mistake of denying that, in everyday life, the identity 
of a psychological state can be effectively discovered by non-criterial means*
3* CRITICISM OF THE TURHÎC MACHINE THSOET
In the form in which I have just explained it, the functional state 
hypothesis ia certainly much more specific and ambitious than any simple 
formula to the effect that psychological states have a role to play in 
determining behaviour. How whatever the final merits of these more 
simple formulae, the functional etxte hypothesis ia its fullest and most 
elaborate form is, I believe, defective in a number of respects. Accord­
ingly, I shall devote this section to attempting to explain exactly how.
It has to be conceded at the outset, however, that the principle of 
individuating psychological states which the theory supplies has a certain 
amount to recommend it. The theory suggests, in effect, that psychological 
states are one and the same which have the same function, where the word 
"function" is understood in the prescribed sense* We can see the element 
of plausibility in this claim if we consider how certain facts about the 
history of psychology ai^t be adduced to rebut a critic of the theory who 
claimed that psychological states are to be Individuated solely or 
primarily by their linguistio specifications.
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This critic does not consider that the concept of function need he 
introduced in order to individuate psychological states, for his sugges­
tion is that the language we use to describe the mind supplies all and 
only the discriminations we need; so that each linguistically different 
specification of a psychological state specifies a different psychological 
state* "How else can such linguistio differences be explained?**, this 
critic asks.
This critical question only presents a real challenge to the functional 
state theorist on the assumption either that there is a pair of pssrcho- 
logical state-descriptions, say **?^** and which are linguistically
different but which are #uch that the two different states they describe 
have the same function, or else that there ia a pair of psychological 
stat e-descriptions, say "P^ ** and "P^ **, which thou^ linguistically 
different, specify the same psychological state. Otherwise there is no 
conflict. But the critic can be answered in a general way without finding 
out whether such a conflict in fact exists, for in his own defence the 
functional state theorist can show that his theory reflects with a certain 
amount of accuracy the way in which theories of the mind have historically 
developed.
An example, which is in the nature of a parable, will suffice to 
illustrate how. Before the concept of the unconscious acquired a place in 
our thought, a single discrete psychological state was specifiable with 
the predicate
**♦,,* believes that fire is hot"
Then the concept of the unconsoioua was introduced, so that lAere there 
was previously only one state, there were now two, namely those specifIcable 
with the predicates
**,,*, unconsoiously believes that fire is hot" 
consciously believes that fire is hot"
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Forging a difference between conscious and unconscious beliefs, the 
functional state theorist explains, was a process based on, and justified 
solely by, the fact that there is a functional difference between beliefs 
of those newly specified kinds. The meanings of the words "conscious" 
and "unconscious" was even explained and made leamable by reference to 
these functional differences*
If this short example shows what is generally the case when a 
psychological word is introduced into the vocabulary, then the advocate 
of the use of functional criteria is individuating psychological states 
possesses an argument with which ho can answer his linguistic critic. 
However, in point of fact, the functional state theorist is claiming much 
more than that functional considerations are sometimes or usually relevant, 
or that they play some role in determining the identity of a p^chological 
state, for he insists that the identity of any psychological state is 
comnletelv determined by its causal end probabalistio connections with 
other such states and with behaviour. Moreover, idmt the functional state 
theorist wants us to accept is not just that causal or probabalistio con­
nections are the factors which totally determine the identity of each 
psychological state, but that these facts can be captured by the resources 
of the theory of finite (deterministic or probabalistio) automata. The 
central question, therefore, concerns the credibility of these more 
ambitious doctrines.
Let me firstly discuss, in order to remove two objections against the 
theory which, in one way or another, impute circularity. In each case, 
the circularity is said to reside in the claim that the identities of 
psychological states are determined by their links with each other, and 
with behaviour.
There is one sort of circularity which need not detain us. One 
formulation of the theory says that a particular psychological state ia 
identified by its functional (causal and/or probabalistio) connections
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with other such states; so it mi^t therefore be objected that a reference 
to the thing identified appears in the statement of the conditions which do 
the identifying, a reference which appears in the form of the pronoun 
(see the first clause of this sentence)» But this is not serious, for the 
pronoun in question does not have to appear* The theorist could alter­
natively say that a particular psychological state %  la just that state 
which has such-and-such relations to other psychological states and to 
behaviour» For instance he could say such things as this: "the state of
not knowing that p is just that state which causally precedes the state of 
knowing that n. in the event that the subject sees or understands for the 
first time that p"» So at least it can be asserted in a non-circular way 
that a particular psychological state can be identified by what other 
psychological states it either follows or gives rise to (when certain 
specified stimuli impinge on the organism) »
The second imputation of circularity is more interesting because, 
unlike the first, it is actually veridical# That is to soy, it points to 
a certain circularity in the functional state theory which actually exists» 
The Imputation runs as follows» If any psychological state is identifiable 
only in terms of the functional links it has with other psychological 
states, then clearly we have to say the same for those: so that we have 
a situation in which each particular psychological state is identified in 
tems of something which is identified in terms of something which is 
Identified in terms of •»»• what? How one natural reply to this imputa­
tion is to suggest that the causal claim which runs forward in time may 
have an end in behaviour, and that the causal chain which runs backwards 
in time, so to speak, may have a beginning in some stimulus-event•
Behaviour and initial stimuli are the points at which attempts to identify 
psychological states anchor th^selves*
But in point of fact this reply will not do» Behaviour and stimulation
60
cannot be the non-mental places at which mental identifications anchor 
themselves, because it is simply an error to suppose that behaviour and 
stimulation can themselves be specified non-montally# Stimuli, whatever 
they are, have to be seen or judged or accented by the agent or organism 
to be of a certain kind, and behaviour, in so far as this means intentional 
action, has to be connected in some way or other with the intentions and 
beliefs of the agent* The presence of the mental cannot be eliminated by 
talking hastily of stimuli and behaviour; and so it appears that each 
psychological state, if identified in terms of its forward and baclorard 
causal links through other psychological states to the organisms "input" 
or "output", is really being identified in terms of things of the same sort 
as itself* It seems to follow from the functional state theory that there 
is a sense at which attempts to identify psychological states cannot com­
pletely escape the mental sphere* As a matter of fact, this circularity 
seems to be nothing other than what Brentano is credited with having noticed 
(and which I argued in favour of in the first Chapter), that the mental 
is irreducible to the behavioural.
In the last few paragraphs I have been concerned to show that the 
functional state theory cannot be defeated by either of the imputations 
of circularity which I described* However, this does not render it 
impregnable* In fact, I now want to concentrate on the central question 
of whether the truths which need to be captured about psychological states 
can, as the functional state theory says, be captured within the frame­
work of the theory of finite automata. For a number of reasons, the 
answer which I want to suggest is in the negative*
An organism describable by a machine table can only be described
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as having a finite number of internal states. In Putnam's words, a 
Turing Ifecliine is
"a device with a finite number of internal configurations,
each of which involves the machines being in one of a
finite number of states ...."19
The question which arises here is whether a human organism can be adequately 
represented as having only a finite number of possible psychological states, 
and as being subject to only a finitely various input.
The facts suggest that the answer to this question is Ho,. But we 
must be careful to distinguish the number of psychological states a 
person can be in at any one tlme,fronL the number that are possible for 
him altogether. It is a common assumption in philosophy that a person 
can, at any particular instan^t, be in more than one psychological state; 
but this is an unwarranted assumption, and only serves to confuse the 
issue. It is a mistake, in the first place, to infer from the fact that 
a person had more than one belief or desire, thàt he was in more than one 
mental state - for in fact there is only one mental state which a person 
(more accurately: his mind) can be in at any particular time. Supposing
someone were to say: knowing that the earth is round is a psychological
state, and believing that the universe is finite is another, so they will 
appear as two distinct states on the machine table, with a different set 
of connections (either deterministic or probabalistio) specified for 
each; and such that a person who had that knowledge and that belief at 
the same instant In time was in both states at once. In that case, the 
suggestion mi^t continue, a deterministic machine table will specify two 
instructions corresponding to the next input (whatever it is), one for 
the knowle(%e state and one for the belief state. But then the problem 
will arise that they cannot both specify the next psychological state for 
the person, or the next most likely, for the chances are that the
19. blinds and Machines. p. 140, Already quoted; see footnote 15 above.
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Instructions corresponding to each of the two states will be different#
Perhaps on© Instruction takes priority, but which? And Why?
But surely anyone who reasoned in this way would have made a basic
mistake about how many psychological states a person can be in at any one
time# It may be a mistake which ordinary language encourages, but it is
a mistake all the same — since the fact is that a person can only ever be
in one state at any on© instant of time. If a person îoiows that the earth
is round, and if he also believes that the universe is finite, then we
have not described two states, but have only given a partial description
of one state, the state of his mind. Nor is this a definition#
Consider a common object like a lawimoYor, by analogy# Its blades
may be rusty, its box may be structurally unsafe, and its carburettor, if
it has one, may be out of order. These are states which the blades, the
box, and the carburettor respectively are in; bit it does not follow,
just because these are parts of the lawnmower, that the lawnnower itself
is in three states# It is in one complex total state, a state >diich can
be described by saying, among other things, that part of the lawnmower ia
rusty, part is structurally unsound, and part ia out of order# So too
for the mind# Althou^ ii in describing a person as thinking about Vienna
or desiring a drink we may for all we know be giving descriptions lÆich
apply to just a bit or a portion of his brain or nervous syst«n, the fact
remains that in giving these descriptions we are not describing anything
other than his mind; we are describing the single state his mind is in
at the time# The mistake of thinking that a person can be in more than
one psychological state at any particular Instant in time is made by
Block and Fodor, in the course of their discussion of Putnam's theory*
"behaviour can be the result of interactions between 
simultaneous mental states **• the functional state 
identity theory can provide for the representation of 
seqential interactions between psychologioal states, 
but not for simultaneous interactions# Indeed the 
functional state identity theory even fails to account
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for the fact that an organism can be in more than one 
occurent psychological state at a time, since a probabalistic 
automata can only be in one machine table state at a time" 20
If a person believes that p and believes that q, then we contribute to a
total description of his single psychological state by saying that he does
(being careful to avoid saying that he believes p and q). A machine table
description can capture this fact without difficulty.
What the machine table description cannot capture, however, is the
fact that the total number of different psychological states which are
possible for a person is infinite. It is true that there is not an
infinite amount of time in the life of an organism, but this only shows
that the number of different psychological states the individual will
21actually nass through is finite. The number possible for him altogether
20. Block and Podor: IJhat Psychological States are Hot pp. 170-1.
21. In spite of the following two arguments. The first is the argument 
from the divisibility of states like belief, knowledge, and so on; 
and the second argument is the argument from the divisibility of 
change in general. Both can be dealt with quite quickly. The first 
argument is this: Suppose I believe that the sky is blue, in the
sense of believing that each part of the sky is blue. Then it follows 
that for each part, I have belief concerning it, that it is blue.
But then a division of the slqr into infinitely many parts makes the 
number of my beliefs infinite* The argument rests on the simple 
mistake, however, of confusing a single belief about an infinitely 
divisible thing ^ t h  an infinitely divisible belief* It cannot be 
inferred from the fact that I have a single belief about A, together 
with the fact that A has an infinite number of parts, that I have a 
belief about each of the parts.
The second argument is similar, and faulty for much the same 
reasons. It is this: suppose I see a thing changing colour from
blue to green, and that I believe what I see. Then since the number 
of colour gradations between blue and green is theoretically infinite, 
like the number of points on a finite line, then it follows (so the 
argument goes) that I can be said to have a belief corresponding to 
each of the colour-states the thing passes throu^. Or take the 
following argument: I see a thing which is blue at the left-^ iand end
and green at the right hand end, and I inspect it from left to ri^t, 
believing what I see; therefore I must have a distinct belief corres­
ponding to each of the infinitely many colour-tones between the left 
hand end and the right hand end. In the first example there is a 
gradual change in an object, and in the second example there is a
(footnote continued overleaf)
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ia infinite, since what he believes or desires can be specified by attach­
ing any declarative sentence to the words
He believes that
or
He desires that
(Etc.)
and we know, because of the recursive aril generative nature of syntax, 
that the number of such declarative sentences is infinite. This would 
be enough to trouble the theory indeed, even if it were not for the 
infinite number of stimuli ti^t can impinge u^on a person end determine how 
his internal states change. These stimuli ere, for the linguistic adult, 
themselves largely linguistic, for any sentence in Engli^ is sayable in 
his company. It seems clear that finite machine table is too small to 
accommodate the potentially Infinite number of psychological states that 
a person can be in, and also that a finite machine tape is too small to 
accommodate the infinite variety of linguistic stimuli that a person might 
receive.
In making this point, I might just as well have used the notions of 
competence and nerformance which Chomsky employed ia explaining how a 
finite language-user could have some conceptual grasp of a generative
(Footnote 21 continued from page 63 
gradual change in what I see.
But in both cases we again have a violation of the evident 
principle that belief is not divisible. Imhen I see a thing change 
colour, and believe what I see, then what I believe is that the 
thing changes colour. But it does not follow from this that for 
each minute colour-change, I have a belief concerning it. Or even 
if I do, the fact that X do would not be logically connected with 
my belief that the object changed colour.
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language. A machine table description must go further than giving an
account by hindsight of the finitely various performances of one or a
group of organisms, for it must give a complete predictive account of
what psychological states an organism would attain in the event of any
one of an infinite variety of linguistic stimuli. But the description
which the theory of Turing machines offers contains no recursive or
generative devices which enable anything other than a simple enumeration
of a finite number of psychological states to be listed. To this extent,
a description of an organism which is given on a machine table is bound
22to be inadequately rich.
The objections described so far have concerned the claims made by 
the functional state theory about the way in which psychological states 
must be individuated from each other and captured by the resources of the 
theory of finite automata. The second group of objections, which I come 
to now, concerns the claim that shared psychological states share their 
machine table columns, in the total machine tables for the organisms con­
cerned. Again, I think it can be shorn that no plausibility whatever 
attaches to this claim, and therefore that the functional state theory as 
a whole is defective on this count as well as on the first.
22. Computing engineers tell us that, at least for the case of digitàll 
machines, any binary computing machine can be described as a 
Turing Machine, i.e. i^ a Turing Machine. Our problem about 
representing the linguistic capacities of an adult speaker of 
English on a machine table could be formulated, therefore, in terms 
of the following question: can an actual person's speech capacities
be represented as a digital computing machine's capacities for 
printing out (binary) sequences of p's and I's?
I suspect the answer to this question is again go. I suspect 
also that the answer lies in the capacity of a binary print-out to 
represent only languages structured in a simple phrase-structure 
way. If this guess is correct, then Chomslqr's demonstration that 
a phrase-structure grammar is (by itself) inadequate as a descrip­
tion of English would be additional evidence, or anyway evidence 
from a different quarter, that no binary computing device can model 
the linguistic capacities of a speaker of English.
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It is a consequence of identifying psychological states functionally 
that two animals of different species can have the same psychological 
state, although their brains are in different states from a certain 
structural, or physico-chemical point of view; the same goes for two 
different animals of the same species, and the same goes for two different 
time-stages of the same animal* And it is because of this consequence 
that the theory seems to some extent attractive* Plausibility also 
attaches to the theory because, as 1 explained earlier, it seans to 
reflect some facts we know about the process of theory-construction in 
psychology.
But we must weigh the aspects of the theory which make it seem attrac­
tive against other aspects which make it seem less plausible. Consider 
the following case: a person (call him P) idio is in pain will, with a 
probability of 70^, change his state to the state of being in -pain and
having a readiness to shout "I'm in -pain" idien some sympathetic person 
23comes near. Part of his machine table presumably will then look like this:
State A State 3
a pain « pain + a readiness to
shout "I'm in pain".
input *» some sympathetic B -
person is seen to 
approach
(Figure 3)
23. Concentrating on the case of a probabalistic machine rather than a 
deterministic one is in one respect relatively realistic. We 
simply do not know of any deterministic laws connecting one type 
of psychological state with another; nor can we be sure that there 
are any. But we are better at assigning probabilities to various 
transition-events between one psychological state and another in 
the face of various different stimuli.
67
where the blank ia the left-hand instruction is filled by whatever 
"symbol" the machine is to print* But if this connection between states 
is part of what defines the state of pain for that person, then it becomes 
impossible for a dog, say, to share the state of pain, since, lacking a 
language, he can never be described as being ready to shout "I'm in pain". 
The functional state theory requires that shared psychological states 
have to be described as having shared functional connections with other 
states and with actions, but the state of pain for P seems to require a 
response which quite clearly the dog could not produce*
This is a particular instance of a general difficulty. A second 
person, person Q, mi^t have a readiness to shout something in French or 
Dutch or Singhalese, if these were his languages. Or he might have a 
readiness to shout something in English using different words from those 
which person P has a readiness to use* One way of overcoming this 
general problem, it seems, mi^t be to re-desoribe state B in a way which 
would enable a dog to share it, and which would also avoid any dependence 
upon the relevant expressions being in English. Suppose State B was to 
be re-described as the state of being in pain and having a readiness to 
signal (or call) for help. Clearly this is a possible dog-state, and 
clearly it contains no mention of an expression in English (or in any 
other particular language).
I do not know whether the particular re-description just suggested 
would find acceptance among functional state theorists. Perhaps it would 
not* In any event, the problem which the theory has to confront at this 
point is clearly one of generalising from the machine table description 
for one individual of a particular species or kind, to machine table 
descriptions for other individuals of the same species or kind. One of 
the demands it must be reasonable to make of a theory of the kind put 
forward is that machine tables for individuals visibly fall into
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psychological kinds in just the way that the Individuals do - in other 
words, psychological state descriptions, stimulus-descriptions and 
response (or action) descriptions must, it seems, he generalisahle.
Suppose our concern was not with the state which the state of pain produced, 
hut with the action which the organism performed as a result of his being 
in pain. We could describe one human action of this type as vellin/? that 
it hurt, but once again this is an action which, clearly, no dog could 
perform. So here too the problem exists of Aether a suitable re­
description of the human action could be found, which could be applied to 
a dog as well.
Finally I want to discuss a similar type of difficulty which the 
functional state theory presents. In the case where the machine table is 
probabalistic, the law-statements it contains are a fortiori not deter­
ministic but probabalistio. The laws say things like; In the event 
of a certain type of stimulus, an organism in state X will change into 
state T with such-and-such a probability. But the statement must not 
merely record a statistical generalisation (like "If anyone is an 
Englishman, then there is an BOfo likelihood that he lives in a city**.), 
but a statistical law (like "If a coin is tossed, then there is a 50^ 
chance of its coming down heads".).
Now a difficult problem for the theory appears at this point, since 
it seems that a situation which the theory ou^t to allow is one in which 
there are two psychological states, state Â and state B, which are such 
that the probability of a change from state A to state B for one person 
is slightly different from the probability of a change from state A to 
state B for another person. But can the functional state theory actually 
allow that a change from state A to state B for the first person occurs 
with probability 70$^, while only with probability 65^ for the second 
person? It cannot; for according to the theory, any probability
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difference implies a difference of state. To put the point more clearly: 
the different probabilities of change .lathe situation just described would 
be registered on the machine tables for the organisms concerned. But 
since states are different when the associated machine table columns are 
different, it would follow from the theory that inot both people could 
have been in state A to begin with. Indeed the theory dissalows any 
situation of the kind described.
But this consequence of the theory is completely counter-intuitive. 
Normally speaking, we should either regard the two individuals as having 
different personalities (but broadly speaking the same range of psycho­
logical states) or else we would account for small probability-differences 
in some other way - by appeal to such everyday concepts as idiosvncracv.
Or perhaps the differences would be quite unimportant•
We want the theory to preserve our belief that psychological states 
are shared even when there are sli^t differences in the transition- 
probabilitiea; how could it do so? There seem to be two possible ways. 
Rather than count the psychological states of two subjects as different 
in type, as a consequence of probability-differencee, the theory mi^it 
propose to count them as being of the same type, but different in derrree 
of intensity, A p.robability-differenc© of the sort I mentioned, for 
example, could be seen as an indication of a difference of decree of 
belief (deoire, pain, etc.) between the two subjects rather than a 
difference in the state itself. All that needs to be said about this 
course, however, is that a slightly higher probability of response to a 
stimulus is not normally a guide to a greater decree of belief, pain, or 
whatever the state is. How much or how stronthe belief, pain or desire ia 
which a person suffers is not measured by any such simple probability 
measure, but by an enormously complicated set of different expressive and 
conventional features of his behaviour.
A different way for the theorist is for him to discount small
70
numerical differences in the transition-probabilities from one state to
another, and to erect clusters of probabilities, such that if two or more
numerical probability-values are close enough so as to fall into the same
cluster, the differences between, them are discounted for the purposes of
Identifying psychological states# But again, this is a hopelessly arbitrary
suggestion, and the theory as formulated gives no guide whatever as to how
to re-structure it in a less ad hoc way#
Problema of this sort are problems which arise in generalising from
the case of one individual and one machine table. It must be a constraint
on the theory that for a range of individuals (say people), the machine
tables for each individual must fall into ty^^s or kinds in just the way
the individuals do, in so far as their mental life is concerned. Putnam
recognised this problem when ho said:
"the difficulty of course will be to pass from models of 
specific organifsas to a normal form for the psychologioal 
description of organisms" 24
And yet without a solution to this difficulty the functional state theory
can hardly be said to live up to its promises. It is not sufficient
for the functional state theory simply to propose that each individual
organism can be described by a machine table which lists its psychological
states: any adequate version of the theory must show us how the machine
table description for an individual organism can be generalised in such
a way as to reveal the similarities with other organisms who share its
states - for this, after all, was one of the original pretences of the
theory.
24. Putnam; Pcycholoricsl Predicates t)« A?. Until recently it used to 
be fashionable in philosopliy to speak of "pain-4)ehaviour". Resort­
ing to this expedient to overcome the generalisation-problems 
raised here would be trivial and worthless (and as confusing as it 
was in its original context). Is there "belief-behaviour" and 
"desire for an apple behaviour" too?
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Similarities in machine table descriptions must occur where psychologi­
cal similarities exist between organisms* Even if the theory can provide 
for each individual singly, which I have argued is doubtful, It seems
unequipped to make the psychological similarities between Individuals 
25explicit•
4# RELEVANCE OP THE THEORY FOR PÏÏÎ3ICALISM
I end my investigation of the functional state theory with some 
remarks about its physicalistic and anti-physicalistic 'pretensions. The 
original insight which to a large extent prompted the theory in the first 
place was that two different creatures could be in the same psychological 
state althou^ from some narrowly structural or physico-chemical point of 
view their brains were in qualitatively different states* Putnam assumed 
that this is a simply empirical fact, and I follow him in this assumption 
if it means that under some suitably detailed tyne of physico-chemical 
description there is a difference to be found in the cerebral matter of 
two psychologically similar organisms* Moreover Putnam deduced that this 
empirical fact spelt the falsehood of any identity theory asserted at
25* A completely different kind of problem, and an additional one, con­
cerns the extent to which the so-called mental events are implicitly 
accounted for by the theory. A machine table lists only mental 
states; the question therefore is whether a given mental event can 
be identified with the event of change or transition between one 
appropriately selected mental state and another. Perhaps this can 
be done, but there are likely to be difficulties. Learning that p 
(an "event") is not simnlv a matter of coming to be in the state of 
knowing that p, since if it was, it would be indistinguishable from 
remembering that p or seeing that p (which are both also "events").
26. In spite of the fact that the theory that psychological states are 
machine table states, to lAlch the assumption leads, is almost 
certainly wrong.
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the Property Level* that is, that for any identity theory which asserts 
anything having the generality of*
being in pain » being .
there is a physico-chemical term suitable for occupying " " which
is of a sufficiently detailed kind as to make a statement of that 
generality false.
It seems that Putnam also assumed it to be an empirical fact that 
one and the same organism could, on two different occasions in its life- 
history, be in the same psychological state althou^ his brain, under a 
suitably detailed kind of physico-chemical description, was in a different 
physical state on the one occasion from the state it was in on the other. 
And Putnam concluded from this assumption that any identity theory on the 
Person-Specific level is also empirically false; or in other words, that 
a statement of Identity having the generality of;
Tom* 8 being in pain = Tom* s being ___________
is falsified by the existence of a physico-chemical description D suitable 
for occupying " " such that Tom is D on the first occasion of pain
and not-D on the second. I again follow Putnam in supposing that if the 
assumption is correct then such a conclusion would follow. But here it 
seems even less likely than in the previous situation that there Is no 
kind of physical description under which his brain on one pain-occasion 
is in the same state as his brain on any other pain-occasion. Whether 
or not this is so is a difficult question, and until I return to it in 
Chapter 17 (section 2) I intend to leave it unanswered. Let me say here 
that _ it seems more likely on the face of it that the same
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organism on two occasions (or two different organisms of the same species) 
will fall under a single physical description of some kind when in a 
psychologically similar condition, than that two organisms belonging to 
different species will. In point of fact even this latter possibility 
will turn out to have some justification.
To an identity theory asserted on the Time-Specific Level, similar 
facts and deductions cannot be supplied, for there is no generality at all 
in the identities asserted at that level. They must be of the form
Tom* 8 being in pain at T^ » Tom* s being _________ at T^
Whoever Tom is, and whatever his brain is like (whether its mechanisms 
are made of "grey matter" or balsa wood), it must be conceded even by an 
advocate of Putnam* s theory that whatever is said about psychological 
states being functional states precipitates no obvious clash with an 
identity-statement of this particular form. In other words, the 
functional state theorist must concede that everything is, on the face of 
it, consistent with an identity theory of this non-general and rather 
uninformative kind.
VRiether such an identity theory is likely to be true, and what it 
would exactly mean if it were, are also questions I reserve for later.
I also leave until later any assessment of an idea of a different kind 
which has been advanced by Podor on the basis of the agreed empirical 
facts just mentioned. Appreciating that the known facts about the brain 
and nervous systea rule out the possibility of a certain kind of "identity 
theory" on the Property Level and on the Person-Specific Level, but not 
obviously one on the Time-Specific Level, Podor suggested that
"the objects appropriate for identification with psychological «7
states are sets of functionally equivalent neurological states"
27" Podor: Psvcholoirical Explanation p. 118.
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As I explained in the last section of the last chapter, this appears to 
mean that beinm in rain, for instance, can be identified with the set 
whose members are all the neurological states possessed by any organism 
at whatever time it is in pain; in other words, the set whose members 
comprise such things as Tom's being _ _ _ _ _  at T^, Tom’s being _____
at Tg, Fred’s being at T^, Joe’s being •••« at T^, and so forth, 
where each blank is filled by a (may-be different) physico-chemical 
description, however precise or detailed. But as I also said in that 
section, the Appendix of the essay is the place in which an assessment of 
such a view will appear*
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113: A Theory of .Mental Events
1. EXPOSITION CP DAVIDSON’S TH30RT
In the first part of this chapter I concerned myself firstly with the 
theory that mental states are, in a certain sense, functional states of the 
organisa who possesses them; and secondly with the more precise theory 
that a person is a Turing Mchine. A conclusion of both theories is that 
any mental state can be identified with a set of functionally equivalent
states of the brain: this is the physicalistic truth which would appear
»
to follow if either theory were true. But I hop© to have established 
that a great deal stands in the way of the theories* truth. The unelabo­
rated theory that mental states are functional states seems m>t to account 
accurately for the facts, and the more specific view that an adequate 
description of a human being’s mental capacities can be captured by the 
resources of the theory of finite automata seems to leave many problems 
dangling, end unsolved.
In the second part of this chapter I intend to conduct a similar 
examination of another theory which has a physicalistic conclusion. The 
previous two theories were both theories of mental states: the theory
which now comes under scrutiny ia on© about mental events. Essentially 
it is due to Donald Davidson, and its conclusion is that many particular 
mental events are strictly identical, one by one, with particular physical 
events. So this is a theory at what I called the Time-Specific Level 
(see Chapter I, section 5). I have chosen to examine this theory for two 
reasons* The first is that Davidson’s work in the philosophy of mind is 
a good deal more comprehensive in its scop® — not to say subtle — than 
that of many authors. And Ilk© the functional theory of mental states, 
it is a theory which has a physicalistic doctrine as a conclusion rather
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than, as In the original work of Place and Smart, as a context-free hypo­
thesis. To this extent it is advanced by Davidson as a nroof of the 
physical nature of some mental events. The second reason is that the 
arguments with which I believe Davidson’s theoretical framework can be 
challenged happen to be exactly relevant to some of the main contentions 
of the functional state theory as well. That is to say that several of 
the points at which I think Davidson’s theory is defective are just those 
where the functional state theory is defective too* To this extent my 
critical programme has a certain unity.
Davidson’s argument is this. Firet, that particular mental events
and particular physical events can be causally connected: particular
physical events cause particular mental events in perception and perhaps
knowledge, and particular mental events cause particular physical events
when an agent acts intentionally (intentional actions are mental events,
for Davidson)• Second, that for any particular singular causal sentence
there must be a general causal lew wliich it instantiates, in the sense
that where there is a true singular causal statement, there exists some
re-description of the relevant events ia such a way as to make the state-
29ment explicitly an instance of the law.  ^ Thirdly, that there ere no 
strict deterministic laws connecting events when both ere described 
psychologically, and that there are no strict deterministic laws connect­
ing events described psychologically with events described physically. 
Fourthly, and therefore, the general laws of which particular mental-physical 
causal statements are instances must be framed In physical terms; but it 
follows from this that any particular mental event which interacts causally 
with a physical event must have a physical description, which is to say
23. Expounded in Mental Events ( In Experience end Theory. Eds., Swanson 
and Poster)♦
29. Argued in Causal Relatione JP 1963.
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that those mental events are physical events.
Now for my own part I regard the steps in this argument as not all 
of equal plausibility. I should, accept the second point, because it to 
a very large extent defines the sense of the word "cause" which is being 
employed in the argument, Step three concerns Brentano’s controversial 
doctrine of the "irreducibility" of mental language, and the question of 
whether mental predicates can occur with others in a statement of law; 
both of which I discuss at some length at other points in the essay (see 
Chapters I and IV). And stage four represents the conclusion. But what 
I believe has to be seriously questioned is the doctrine expressed and 
the presuppositions implicit in stage one, which asserts that particular 
mental events interact causally with particular physical events.
The view that the mental and the physical interact causally is, as 
we have seen, one part of what the functional state theory says. According 
to that theory, there can be complex and long causal chains which, begin­
ning with some stiiirulatory event, consist of the range of successive 
mental states the organism passes throu^, and end with behaviour. A 
particular mental state may be causally or functionally related to another 
mental state, which may in its turn be causally or functionally related to 
a further mental state, and so on. The initial mental state in such a 
sequence may be causally related to an antecent physical event "outside" 
the organism, and the terminal mental state may also be causally related 
to a physical event "outside” the organism (namely his action)• Those 
who speak of causal interaction between the mental and the physical may 
therefore be represented as speaking of those initial and terminal links: 
in the first of which the physical causes the mental, and in the second of 
which the mental causes the physical.
I shall concentrate here on Davidson’s treatment of the terminal 
links, in which, in his view, the mental causes the physical when a person
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acts for a reason. The sense of the word "cause" which ia relevant to 
this discussion is, it must he emphasised, that deployed by Davidson 
himself. According to him, causality is an extensional relation between 
particular events, and the existence of a true singular causal statement 
implies that there is a general causal law (althou^ we may not know what 
it is) under which the singular statement can be subsumed. To interpret 
the word "cause" differently is to change the subject.
2. CAUSAL INTüSlâCTIüN BETWS2N THE i^ llTAL AND TEE PEISICAL; 
REASONS A3 CAUSES
Davidson’s argument appears la his classic paper "Actions Reasons 
and Causes",which sets out to show how actions, which in his view are 
physical events, have causal antecedents which are mental; and that an 
account of those mental antecedents can be given in terms of an agent’s 
reason for his action. In Davidson’s view, the kind of reason for an 
action which is the cause of an action is vdiat he calls a primary reason. 
The explanation of %diat a primary reason consists of is as follows* an 
agent’s primary reason for an action consists of a "pro-attitude" towards 
actions of a certain type, and a belief that the agent’s action Is an 
action of that type. Davidson explains that a pro-attitude can be a 
desire, a want, an urge, a belief, In a fairly loose sense, provided it 
can be interpreted as an attitude #iich is appropriate for an agent to 
direct towards actions of a certain kind. The belief which enters into 
a primary reason Is simply a belief to the effect that the action concerned 
is an action of the specified kind. When combined with the fact that a
30# Journal of Philosophy 1963. The doctrine that the physical causes 
the mental in perception and possibly knowledge has its modern 
origins in Grice’s The CausaJL Theory of Perception.
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reason is only a reason for an action when the action is described in a
certain way, we can, according to Davidson, give a necessary condition for
reasons which are primary, in the following terms*
**a is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A 
under the description d only if H consists of a pro-attitude 
of the agent towards actions with a certain property, and a 
belief of the agent that A, under the description d, has that 
property" 31
Some examples might help to clarify how primary reasons are supposed 
to contain a pro-attitude and a belief. Suppose that
(1) I flipped the switch because I wanted to turn on the li#it
then "I wanted to turn on the li^t" would be said to give the priiaary 
reason for my flipping the switch; it would be said to consist of a belief 
that my switch-flipping action is an action of the type which causes li^ts 
to turn on, and it would be said to consist of some sort of pro-attitude, 
towards actions of that type (actions which cause lights to be turned on); 
In this example, I think, it is correct to assume that if the agent did 
flip the switch because he wanted to turn on the light, then he must have 
believed that his flipping the switch was an action of the kind which 
causes lights to turn on, for it is only in the light of this assumed 
belief that the reason he gives is Intelligible a reason* Consider a 
second example. Suppose that
(2) I went into the shop because I wanted to buy the watch in the window.
In this case also it does seem that we can explain how the fact that I 
wahted the watch in the window was the primary reason for entering the
31 Actions Reasons and Causes p. 639.
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shop by pointing to a belief that my entering the shop was an action of 
the type which leads to situations in which watches can be bou^t* So 
the thesis that a primary reason for an action la connected with a belief 
ia a plausible one. There are two minor difficulties, however, which it 
is worth mentioning ia passing. The first of those concerna the notion 
that a primary reason is connected in a certain way to a pro-attitude of 
the agent’s, in addition to a belief. Ero-attitudes, Davidson explains, 
include
"desires, wantings, urges, promptings, and a great variety 
of moral views, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices, 
social conventions, and public and private goals and values 
in so far as these can be interpreted as attitudes of an 
agent directed towards actions of a certain kind" 32
The iaclusiveness of this list suggests that a pro-attitude is not neces­
sarily a desire for a certain goal - althou^ it may be. If the agent’s 
pro-attitude on any occasion of action was simply a desire for a goal, 
then it would be a simple ratter to specify the pro-attitude given a 
specification of the primary reason. In the first of my examples the 
pro-attitude would be specifiable as a desire for the li^t to be turned 
on, and in the second example the pro-attitude would be specifiable ae a 
desire to buy the watch in the window. But if a pro-attitude can also be 
an urge or a prompting or an economic or moral or aesthetic prejudice, then 
there is some difficulty in automatically constructing the agent’s pro­
attitude from a mere specification of the primary reason alone. But 
whether the statement of the pro-attitudo should be so intimately connected 
with the statement of the agent’s primary reason is not altogether clear.
A second minor difficulty, add a related one, concerns the concept of 
constitution. A primary reason is said to consist of a belief and a 
pro-attitude; but what e:cactly does this mean? In the case of the doctrine
32 Actions Reasons and Causes, p.6864
that a primary reason consists of a belief, ve might interpret "consista" 
in terms of entailment, for it seems true that a sentence like
(3) P did A because he wanted to bring about situation 
cannot be true unless it is also true tîiat
(4) P believed that doing A would help to bring ^  about.
which is to say that (3) entails (4) - although (4) does not entail (3), 
even when P did A. But whether this interpretation of "consists" is the 
intended one is a^in not altogether clear. Nor is it clear whether 
saying that a primary reason consists of a belief and a pro-attitude means 
the same as saying that a person’s havin,? a primary reason consists of the 
person’s licvln? a belief and a pro-attitude*
But let us waive these minor problems, and attend to the crux of 
Davidson’s argument, which concerns the notion of cause. Davidson gives 
various arguments designed to show that the primary reason for an action 
is its cause, the main one of which can be introduced as follows. TÎ10 
first step is this: that to know that a person had a reason R for doing A,
and that he had certain beliefs and attitudes which are appropriate to any 
situation in which R is actually the reason for A, and to know also that
he did A, does not allow us to infer that he did A for the reason R. The
mere having of a.reason for an action does not explain the action, so it 
is alleged, even vhsn the action is performed the agent had the
reason. Eie reason must not merely be îuâd; it must be efficacious.
It must be the reason which explains the agent’s action.
The next step in the argument Is to ask; what is the nature of the 
efficacy which a reason has, when the reason is the one for which the
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action ia done? This situation is alleged to be illustrated by an example 
of the following kind# Suppose that a man wants to buy a watch# and 
suppose that he laiows that going into the watch-chop will enable him to 
buy the watch* And suppose he goes into the shop* Now merely on the 
basis of this infoiaaation we cannot explain why he went into the shop by 
saying that he wanted to buy the watch# since# althouf^ (allegedly) we 
can say that he had a. reason for entering the shop# the reason in question 
might not have been efficacious* If mig^t not explain wbv he went into 
the shop# since some other reason might have been operative at the time.
He wanted to insult the ovmer# say* So the question arises: what is the
link between a reason and an action when a reason wliich the agent had ia 
one which explains the action?
Davidson’s answer to this question is that the link must be causal; 
but the final steps to this conclusion are weak* One reason he {^ves is 
simply that the word "cause" is the only respectable ejnonym we have for 
the word "explain" ; so explaining an action by citing the reasons for it 
must be understood as a kind of causal explanation* "One way we can 
explain an event is by placing it in the context of its cause; cause and 
effect form the sort of pattern that explains the effect# in a sonse of 
"explain" that we understand as well as any"» He ends his argument with 
a challenge:
"If reason and action illustrât© a different pattern of 
explanation# that pattern must be identified" 33
And he concludes
"If ••** causal explanations are wholly irrelevant to the
understonding we seek of human action then we are without 
an analysis of the "because" in "Ho did it because *..«", 
when we go on to name a reason" 34
This then# is Davidson’s main argument* To explain an action by citing
33# Actions Reasons and Causes; p* 692* 
34* Actions Reasons and Causes; p* 633*
S3
the reason for which the action was done is to explain it in the light of 
it’s cause. And to rodcscribe an action in terms of the effective reason 
is# like redescribing a conflagration as "what the short-circuit produced" 
to redcscrib© it in terms of its cause.
This argument ia not without ingenuity; but it is# I believe# faulty. 
It derives its apparent strength from seeming to offer relief from two 
related pressures; one pressure is the pressure to explain the difference 
between cases of acting on or for a reason and cases of merely having a 
reason and acting; and the other pressure is the pressure to ellucidate 
the sense of the word "because" in a sentence like
(5) He closed the door because he wanted to stop the^drau^t
and the answer which it gives to the first problem# that acting on a 
reason is acting as a causal result of the reason# is really identical 
with the answer to the secondproblem# that "because" in (5) means some— 
think like "was caused by" (although contextual adjustments have to be 
made if the one phrase is to be substituted for the other). And yet it 
seems to me that the positive reasons for adopting this conclusion are 
very weak indeed. For in the first place, as I hope to show# the idea 
of merely acting and having a reason# with which cases of acting 22. a 
reason are supposed to be contrasted# is not at all clear# and certainly 
not contractive in quite the way Davidson supposes. And secondly# it 
seems hardly sufficient# as an argument# to suggest that "because" in 
action-sentences has a causal sense# on the sole grounds that no other 
clear sense for the word is available.
Let us take each of these points in turn. I have said that the causal 
analysis of reasons derives a good deal of its support from the contrast 
between cases cf acting on a reason and cases of merely having a reason
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and acting. But what needs to be questioned is whether the difference 
between these two types of case is significant; I shall begin to do 
this by questioning what it means to say that a person had a reason for 
doing some tiling in the situation in which the something he did was not 
done for the reason in question.
Let us take the following case as an example. Suppose that on some 
days of the week I visit the University Library, but when I do so, my 
reasons for doing so are not alifays the same. On Mondays my reason for 
visiting the library is that I want to return the previous week’s books. 
On Wednesday, my reason for visiting the library is that I want to read 
the now journals, and on Fridays my reason is that I want to chat to the 
librarian. Lot ua suppose this is a regular pattern, ITow someone 
could, if they wished, describe me as having three reasons for visiting 
the library - onè to return books, one to read the journals, and one to 
chat to the librarian. But in so describing mo, he need not say that on 
each of ry particular library visits I had three reasons for making that 
particular visit, one of which happened to be operative, depending on the 
day of the week. Nothing would obllro him (or us) to speak ia this way; 
and this is the extent to which the distinction between "operative" and 
"inoperative" reasons is somewhat artificial. Instead of saying that on
35, Daviison is not the only person who believes this contrast to be 
significant, Charles Taylor, in Ch, 1 of Tlie Sxrlantion of 
Behaviour, says* ” , that something is an action in the strong 
sense (i,e, of being directed towards bringing about a certain 
condition as an end) means not just that the man who displayed 
this behaviour had framed the relevant intention or had this 
purpose, but also that his intending it brought it about. That 
is, it is not a sufficient condition of an action’s occurring 
that a man intend to do something and that behaviour answering to 
the relevant description occur. For it is perfectly conceivable « 
and, indeed, happens in rare oases - that the two be unconnected, 
and that behaviour occur for some other reason" (p, 33)#
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the occasion of any particular lihrary-viait I have three reasons but only 
one reason for, it would be far less artificial to say that for each part­
icular visit I have one and only one reason for making it; and to leave 
the "inoperative" reasons out of the picture altogether, Monday’s reason 
la different from Wednesday’s reason, and each of these is different from 
Fridays reason - and the library-visita I make, althou^ actions of the 
same kind (according to one obvious way of classifying them) are particular 
individual actions having particular individual reasons of their own,
So in this situation, if I am described as having three reasons for 
visiting the library, this does not mean that three reasons are had by me 
on the occasion of each particular library*^sit, only one of which I 
select and somehow make operative depending on the day of the week.
Saying this might lead us to assert that reasons can be had for an action 
d^iich are inoperative reasons for that action, but this would be otiose.
The best non-otiose description of a situation of this kind involves 
saying that for each particular action I have .a_single“-( sufficient) reason, 
so that different particular actions are attended by the having of different 
reasons for doing it.
The supposition that a certain type of reason has to be classified 
as "operative” In order to distinguish them properly from those which are 
"inoperative" (merely had but not acted upon) may derive from the fact 
that very often we say of a person idiose does, or plans to do, a certain 
thing, that "he had every reason for doing it", and yet where, in the 
event, he does not do it for the reason we have in mind. Let us examine 
a typical situation of this kind, Suppose we know that a certain person 
has always wanted to practice his hand at trout-fishing, and the man in 
question suddenly makes a visit to Scotland in the middle of the trout- 
fishing season. He knows, and we know that he knows, that Scotland is 
where you can get trout. Without knowing why he went, we mi^t reasonably
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say, on the hasie of our knowledge about his aspirations as a fisherman, 
that "he had every reason for going" - but when he returns we leam that 
hla Scottish aunt was taken ill, and that he made the journey not to fish 
trout, but to look after her while she was unwell# Can we say in this 
case that he had a reason for making the journey, but that the reason was 
not operative?
Again, there is nothing to prevent us saying this; but there is 
nothing to compell us to either# If we say in this situation that "he 
had every reason for going", having in mind his relatively long-term or 
permanent desire to practice his fishing technique, we do not mean that 
he actually had that reason as he went, but merely that he had that perma­
nent or long-term desire, and that the desire mlrht. for all we know at the 
time, have been connected with his reasons for making the journey. Before 
we knew the truth about the reasons he did actually have, we simply enter­
tain it as a hypothesis that his wanting to fish trout was a reason of 
hla; but this ia not a hypothesis which we can go on entertaining once we
know that he went in order to see his aunt. It is a hypothesis which,
if he did not go for the trout-fishing reason, is just false. In the 
light of the facts as they turn out to be in this story, we cannot truly 
say that he had a trout-fishing reason as he went; but merely that ha had 
a long-term or permanent desire to fish for trout. But this, according 
to the etozy, is something we know about him in any case. The statuent 
"he had every reason for doing A, namely H" is used to mean something like 
"he very probably did A for reason E".
The standard situation is, I think, this, When we correctly say of
a person, before that he has a reason E^ for doing A at and if we
then observe that he does A at ^  and If, further, he sincerely cites a
different reason (Eg) for his doing A at that time, then we would 
standardly draw either of two conclusions, We would either conclude that 
both and were sufficient, so that R^ needs no mention if
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rz ' Rg is given. Or else we would conclude, I think, that the agent 
had abandoned as a reason for that particular action by the time he 
came to do it - although it may be a reason for his doing some other 
particular action of the same type on another occasion, "He had a reason 
for killing her, althou^ when he killed her that wasn’t the operative 
reason" means something like "Given his state of mind, he mi^t well have 
killed her for that reason - but ia the event he did not",
I have been arguing that the concept of an operative or effective 
reason derives a good deal of Its intelligibility from a supposed contrast 
with reasons which are had by an agent but which are not operative idien 
he acts. But I have criticised this Idea on the grounds that the notion 
of a reason which is had by the agent but not acted upon is one which is, 
at best, grounded in a certain way of speaking about behaviour which there 
is no necessity to adopt; and that because of this, the contrast between 
the two types of reason is an artificial one* ¥e must now deal with the 
other part of Davidson’s argument, which is to the effect that the word 
"because" has a causal sense when used in a statement like "He did so-and- 
so because he where we go on to give the agent's reason,
We saw that the argument to this conclusion consisted of two sugges­
tions; the first being that "because" in "he did it because has a 
causal sense because "was caused by" is the only respectable synonym we 
have for the word "because"? end the second being, to quote Davidson 
again, that if "causal explanations are wholly irrelevant to the under­
standing we seek of human action, then we are without an analysis of the 
"because" in "He did it because But this second claim is false,
since although we have no reason to suppose that actions do not have 
causes in the same way that other events do, it does not have to be the 
case that the a/rent’s reasons are identifiable as the causes; the actual 
causes mi^t be events which the agent has no knowledge of whatever. And
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as to the first claim, it is hardly a sufficient argument to say that the 
word "because" in a sentanc© Ilk© (5) must have a causal sense on the 
grounds that no other sens® seems immediately available# For it seems 
that if this was a sufficient argument, then presumably it would be 
equally sufficient to show that the "because" in
(6) He collected his pay because yesterday was Thursday
is causal# But how could yesterday’s being (Riursday be the cause of 
anything?
The word "because" occurs in many contexts in which it is almost 
impossible to construe it as being synonymous with "was caused by"; for 
examples
(?) Feter is in London because Paul ia out of town 
(s) My umbrella ia up because it is likely to rain 
(9) 2+2«4 because 1+1=2
Her®, the truth of the sentence preceding the word "because" is explained 
in some degree by the truth of the sentence following it; but the ex­
planatory connection is not of the kind which holds between one event and 
another event which it causes* Indeed it cannot be, because the
sentences following the word "because" in these examples are not descriptive
36* Nor does the word "explain" necessarily mean "cause", as Bromberger’s 
example shows* a pendulum’s period being T can explain its length’s 
being L, but it obviously cannot cause it# See S# Bromberger, ^
_ Annroach to ILmUnation (in R# J# Butler, ed#)#
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of events*
It is of course one thing to say that "becauso" need not everywhere
have a causal sense, and another thing to say that in a particular and
well-defined kind of context it does not have such a sense* ¥ith regard
to the well-defined type of context ia which an action is connected to an
agent’s primary reason;
"He did Â because he ***«**•••"
I suggest not only that the causal sense cannot be foisted on "because"
in virtue of some general theory about that word, but also that there is
a specific reason why it should not be; namely, that the causal relation
as understood and expounded by Davidson is a relation between particular
events, whereas the sentence following the word "because" in a statement
of an agent’s reason for acting does not often describe, or "apply to", an
event* Davidson’s arguments for the causal sense of "because" in such a
statement are uncharacteristically Inconclusive*
The persuasiveness of the doctrine that the agent’s reason for his
action is its cause is perhaps engendered by the illusion that reasons
arsentities* This is an illusion which is itself engendered, perhaps,by
the use of such idiomatic phrases as "He gave a reason for A", "The reason
for A is **$"* But in the giving, offering, accepting or rejecting of
reasons, nothing is literally given, offered, accepted or rejected, let
alone entitles of which the word "reasons" could be the generic name, I
am in sympathy with Alan %hlte, when he writes*
"the words "reason", "motive", "cause" do not refer to anything
that could be a factor in an explanation of conduct, in the way
that an antecedent event, a feeling, a habit, or an instinct
could operate as such a factor* And this despite the fact that
there is a sense In which the agent himself can be correctly
said to "have" a reason or a motive. Reasons, motives and _
causes, unlike events, do not happen at particular times or places
37# Alan bhlte; Philosoohv of Hind (Random House, HY* 1967) p. 135#
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la spite of this, however, the idea that the mental interacts causally 
with the physical when a person acts intentionally admits of a_restatement 
This restatement, idiich I shall examine in the section which follows, 
involves saying not that the agent’s reasons are causes, but that the 
desires and beliefs of which the reason (purportedly) consists are the 
causes of action#
3$ CAUSAL INTERACTION BETWEEN THE MENTAL AND TBS PHYSICAL; (b) 
MENTAL STATES A3 CAUSES
The argument considered in the previous section relied to some extent 
on the importance of an alleged difference between operative and inopera­
tive reasons# This approach is not uncommon. Charles Taylor adopted 
it, and applied it to intentions and purposes, erecting the same distinc­
tion between operative and inoperative intentions and purposes as the one 
Davidson suggested for reasons. Indeed Taylor actually treats the 
presence of an operative or productive intention or purpose as one of the 
distinguishing marks of action:
"the distinction between action and non-action hangs not just 
on the presence or absence of the corresponding intention or 
purpose, but on the intention or purpose having or not having 
a role ia bringing about behaviour# Within action, we ml#t 
say, the behaviour occurs because of the corresponding intention 
or purpose; where this is not the case, ve are not dealing 
with action" 33
But I shall not rehearse fully my arguments for thinking this view defec­
tive, if it means that intentions or purposes are causes. It does not 
follow from the fact that the word "because" appears ia the situation, 
that there ia a causal link: and the distinction between operative and 
inoperative intentions and purposes is an illusion. And as is the case 
for reasons. Intentions and purposes are not events by any stretch of the
33. Charles Taylor: Exol. of Bdhaviour. p. 26#
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imagination* It follows that their role cannot he strictly causal*
But any argument of this type, whether couched in terms of reasons, 
intentions or purposes, can be given a restatement according to which it 
is desires and beliefs themselves, (or dtsirings and believinga, if this 
phrasing is preferred) which can be the causes of action. The doctrine 
that reasons, intentions, purposes (and things of this same peculiar logical 
type) can be causes drops behind with this readjustment, and the actual 
mental phenomena themselves come to the fore* The previous distinction 
between operative and inoperative reasons, for instance, becomes transposed 
into a distinction between operative and inoperative desires and beliefs.
In the next chapter I hop© to show how little evidence there is for 
supposing that there are any mental events in any strict sense, but the 
traditional assumption is certainly that there ere, so for the space of 
the argument I shall proceed aa if the traditional assumption was correct. 
Given this proviso, it seems to me that the main difficulty which the re­
stated view has to face is one of reconciling the necessity of locating 
event g as causes (as opposed to mental states and other phenomena) with 
the notion that the phenomena normally cited or referred to in explaining 
actions are not events at all.
Let me explain this problem in a little more detail by referring back 
again to Davidson’s theory that reasons can be causes* Davidson’s theory 
is that primary reasons are (or consist of) beliefs and attitudes. Now he 
appreciated that there might be an objection to the view that these primary 
reasons are causes, and he expressed it by saying that beliefs and attitudes, 
being states of mind, are not events - and hence not things of the right 
kind to be causes. He then attempted to provide a refutation of this 
objection; but the attempt was, I think, suspect.
Davidson Is one who certainly believes that causes have to be events; 
___________  and so it
,39
39* See his Causal Relations. JP 1967
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was incumbent on him to reconcile this assumption with the fact that many 
explanations which seem to be causal mention only the states of an object, 
Ha attempted to achieve this réconciliation by saying that wherever a 
causal explanation is conducted in terms of an object’s states, there must
always be an event "closely associated" with the state in question. On
the face of it, this can mean either the event of coming to bo in that 
state, or else the event which itself caused the object to be in that
state, or else some other event which caused the object-in-that-state to
behave in whatever way it did, Davidson applied this method of reconcilia­
tion to the case of primary reasons, as follows:
"In many cases it is not difficult at all to find events very 
closely associated with the primary reason, States and dis­
positions are not events, but the onslau^t of a state or 
disposition is, A desire to hurt your feelings may spring 
up at the moment when you anger me; I may start wanting to 
eat a melon just when I see one; and beliefs may begin at 
the moment we notice, perceive, leam, or remember something.
Those who have argued that there are no mental events to 
qualify as causes of action have often missed the obvious
Now in the first place it is hard to see how Davidson can both acknowledge
that causes must be events and continue to maintain that primary reasons
(beliefs and attitudes) are causes* For even if an event cloæly
associated with a primary reason was successfully located, then it would
be this, and not the beliefs end attitudes embodied in the primary reason,
which would have to qualify as the cause.
Let us examine the possibilities. As I said just now, there are
three possible candidates for the "closely associated event": either the
event of coming to be in that state, or the event which caused the organism
to got into that state, or else some other event which causes the object-
in-that-etate to behave in the way it does* And yet it seems that in
none of these cases could the event in question constitute the reason, or
even plausibly be cited in the giving of a reason. If the primary reason
40. Actions Reasons and Causes ,694.
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for taking the left-hand fork is that the traveller wanted to get to 
Katoandu, then ho winning to want to get to Katmandu, or getting into the 
state of wanting to get to Katmandu, are likely, if they provide reasons 
at all, to provide reasons which would rationalise some action other than 
taldng the left hand fork. These events m y  even have occurred long ago 
in tho agent’s past. The actions which "I wanted to get to Katmandu" is 
capable of rationalising are not necessarily the same actions which the 
expression "I began to want to get to Katmandu" is capable of rationalising • 
if there are any of these. Nor are we likely to rationalise the action 
which "I know he was depressed" rationalises with the expression "I learnt 
that he was depressed". Indeed, ©tateoents reporting the be^^nninfjs of 
mental states ere very seldom used ia rec.son-giving at all.
bhat about the event ^ioh caused the organisa to get into the state 
ia question - the event which itself caused the event of the organism’s 
coming to be in the state in question? Davidson says "a desire to hurt 
your feelings may spring up at the moment you anger me; I may start wanting 
to eat a melon just when I see one as if to suggest that his being
angered caused the nearly-simultaneous event of his beginning to want to 
hurt the other person’s feelings, or that h^s seeing the melon caused the 
nearly-simultaneous event of his beginning to want to eat it. If the 
caused event of those evont-pairs is supposed to be the cause of the 
ensuing behaviour, then the considerations of the last paragraph apply.
But the other alternative - that the causing event (his being angered, his 
seeing the melon) is the cause of tlie ensuing behaviour — cannot be correct, 
for the simple reason that the effect of those events has already been 
given, but not as the event of behaviour itself. Ex hypothosi, the effect 
of his being angered ia his beginning to want to hurt the other person’s 
feelings, and not the ensuing insulting action; and the effect of his 
seeing the melon is his beginning to want to eat it, and not the ensuing
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action of attempting to it#
In point of fact, vhea ve explain an action we very seldom do so ty
citing a mental event# And when we cite a state of mind (a mental state),
there is seldom a "closely associated ©vent" which, in the context,
occupies the right causal role in relation to the ensuing behaviour* If
the relevant state of mind itself explains the behaviour, then indeed it
is not surprising that no other phenomenon, however "closely associated",
does so as well, for In general different phenomena tend to explain
different things# So I conclude that even if mental phenomena themselves,
rather than reasons, intentions or purposes are put forward as the erolananda
of actions, thon there is little plausibility in the view that these play
a causal role in the production of behaviour# States of mind and mental
events do enter into explanations of behaviour, but not into causal explana**
tions* States of mind are of the wrong logical type to be causes, whereas
mental events, while of the ri^t logical type, never occupy the ri^t
causal role in relation to the behaviour itself#
A typical reaction to any argument which purports to ehow that the
mental does not causally interact with the physical is to protest that it
appears to support a view of mental phenome a end physical phenomena
according to lAich they occupy different realms end have distinct, althou^
may be parallel, existences# mental must affect the physical, Charles
Taylor appears to argue, for
"$.# how could we even exist as rational life if the realms 
of mind and matter functioned Independently of one another?"41
But that the mental does not affect the physical in anv sense only follows
from the fact that the mental does not causally interact wlt^ the physical
if several other promises are supplied; but these premises, if listed
41# The, |?Tplpjia.tloa _of_Behayjotir, p* 53,
carefully, canbc seen to have little plausibility# Per instance they 
must at least comprise (a) the claim that there is such a thing as the 
mental realm and such a thing as the physical realm, or alternatively that 
there are mental phenomena and physical phenomena# as well as (b) the 
claim that the only explanation of the word "affect" is in terms of a 
specific and restricted concept of "cause"# The first of these prmisoa 
needs spelling out end carefully examining (see Chapter III); and the 
second premiss is false* There are several types of relation between 
one kind of phenomenon andanothepwhich, idiile not equivalent to the causal 
relation# are quite sufficient to prevent the conclusion that the mental 
and the physical "function independently"# #he existence of even the 
weakest sort of explanatory relation between mental statements and physical 
statements is enough to show this# Another kind of relation which would 
falsify the strange parallelist view is that mental statements can play a 
classifying or taxonomic role in relation to the physical# Since I 
suspect that this is la fact the relation between a mental statement and 
a statement of action# in the situation whore the mental statement is the 
statement of the agent reason for his action, I shall end this section 
by saying a brief word about it*
Suppose that Eonry did something whoso intentional description is 
"Eenry poisoned hi smother"# Eow we can complete the story in any number
of ways, by imagining any of the following statements to be the answer 
offered to the question "what was his reason?"
1. He wanted some timo in jail 
; 2# He wanted to use up the poison
3# He wanted to harm the person he hated
4# He wanted to revenge for his father* a death
5# He wanted to obey K»s instructions
6# He wanted to indulge a momentary whim,
7# Eé wanted to end her unhappiness 
1* • Ho likes going to jail
2* • Ho didn’t want poison hanging about the house
5* • He hated her
4*# He believed eh© killed his father 
5*# He was instructed to by H*
6* m He W£u< subject to a momentary whim
?*• Ho knew she vas unhappy
Sentences 1-7 are quite different ; \ kind from sentences l*-7*s the 
former contain a reference to some future state of affairs which the 
agent wants to bring about, while the latter merely mention the agent* s 
state of mind. Gentencos of the first kind, it seems to me, have a 
central place among reacon-giving statements in general, which sentences 
of the second kind do not. : that seems to be generally true about sentences 
of the first group is this: that whon they are put forward by a speaker 
to an audience as reasons for an action A, they ar© put forward in a way 
which invites the audience, or makes it pos-ible for the audience, to re- 
describe the action in question as one seen by the agent as a moans to a 
certain end. This is possible, since the sentences used ; ^  mention a 
future state of affairs which the agent wishes to bring about ^  the 
action.
The invitation implicitly offered by the speaker to his audience is 
to re-doscribo the action in terms of the effect which the agent believes 
(hopes, espocts, etc,) it will have* The sentence "He poisoned his 
mother" names the same action as the sentence "He poisoned his mother to 
us© up the poison”, or as the sentence "He poisoned his mother to avenge 
his father's death", or the sentence "He poisoned hia mother to end her
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unhappineoG" # The sentences describe the same action, namely the thing 
the agent did, hut all except the first ("He poisoned his mother") ro­
de scribe the action in a way which displays the agent's purposes, hopes, 
or £oals#‘^‘* To this extent the renson-etatements of the first group have 
a classifying force: they enable the action they explain to be classified
in terms of the mental fact which the reason-statement gives. 3il8 is 
even a conclusion which is not wholly unacceptable to the causal theorists, 
for they can that a *'>ason-Gtater*ent enables a classification of the
action in question; but the difference of opinion emerges when the causal 
theorist goes on to eay that the reason^stateraent enables an action to be 
classified in the light of, or re-^  scribed in terms of, its cruse. This 
additional piece of theory is one for wîiich, as I have indicated, there 
exist only bad arguments*
If I am right, then we can see clearly the sense in which an agent's 
reason does explain his action. Tlie explanation provided is of the 
taxonomic kind; to illuainatin^y group an action with others, to place 
it in the category to which it belongs, is to explain it by displaying its 
links with its neig^ours, rather than by displaying its tmsporal antece­
dents* Taxonomio explanation may be explanation in a weak sense only, 
but it is this weak kind of explanatory connection which typically binds 
an action to a reason*
To sumiarise the main points of this section. Davidson's proof that 
some mental events are physical requires the premiss that causal inter­
action takes place between mental events and physical events. This 
prendss is a hypothesis which is also central to other theories of mental 
events, which is why I have chosen to be carefully critical of it. That 
mental phenomena in general have on essentially causal or productive role
42. Cf. îfelden: "citing a motive is giving a fuller characterisation
of the action" ?ro_c_ Action, p. 93
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l3 pcxt and parcel of tho view that montai pîienoaona are "inferred ent­
ities", a theory which relies upon a certain analogy with tho way objects 
are "posited" in the sciences; and an important part of the functional 
state theory is to advance the view that mental states are effective in 
causing certain actions when other stimulatory events take place. Hy 
arguments have been designed to show that if we take causality to be an 
extensional relation between events, then none of the ordinary cases where 
behaviour is explained by reference to the mental phenomena of the agent 
are at all appropriate to have this model of causality applied.
In fact, there are good reasons for suspecting that causality is 
massively more complex than this simple model suggests. If it is, then 
it remains to be seen vhothor the explan.lory connection between mental 
phenomena and actions can be assimilated to it. But all this is hypo­
thetical* I suggest that tho assimilation of explanation by reasons to 
the simple causal model involves an undue amount of adjustment in the 
actual facts of explanation as they occur in situations. Reasons cannot 
be causes because they ere of the wrong logical type; mental states 
cannot be causes because they are of tho wrong logical type, althou^ a 
different one; and mental events, are never, as far as I can see, involved 
in the ri^t way in tho business of giving primary reasons. Arguments 
for the pliysicalistlc conclusion will therefore have to come from a 
different quarter*
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Chapter III. Grammatical ahl Logical Complexities
1. Description of the problem
2. Events in generals the evidence from logic 
3* The ontology of the mental
4, Actions and causes again: some remarks on their grammar
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1. DSSCRIPTIOÎT OF TES PROBLEM
/
la the last chapter I discussed two theories - a theory about mental 
states and a theory about mental events — whose aim was to establish a 
physicalistio conclusion* The first theory aou^t to establish that mental 
states could be identified with sets of functionally equivalent cerebral 
states, and the second sought to establish that any mental event which inter­
acted causally with a physical event is Itself a physical event * Ky 
general strategy was to expose some of the weaknesses of the arguments which 
led towards these conclusions* From this point onwards I want to attend 
more carefully to the details of those conclusions themselves, and of those 
like them.
The kind of scrutiny which I believe all physicalistio conclusions 
deserve is from the general point of view of their intelligibility. By 
this X mean that considerations idiich can be broadly described as grammatical 
or logical must be brou^t to bear on the actual statements which physica- 
lists offer as the conclusions to their theorising*
This methodological point mi^t be expanded in the following way*
Host philosophers who seek to establish a physicalistio conclusion do so 
because they see a distinction, however unclearly, between physical phenomena 
on the one hand and mental phenomena on the other, and so the point of their 
theorising is to reconcile this appearance of dualism with a monistic view 
of the world which, usually for independent reasons, they find attractive*
One modem method of achieving this reconciliation is to identify mental 
phenomena with physical phenomena; in other words, to identify mental 
states with physical states, mental events and actions with physical events, 
mental processes with physical processes, and so on. How the plausibility 
of this "identification" approach has been the subject of endless discussion 
in the last decade or two, and most of the controversy has surrounded the
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question of whether, in accordance with the logical requirements of 
the properties possessed by phenomena on the mental side are possessed by 
phenomena on the physical side. Certainly questions of this sort have to 
be answered if they can be coherently posed; but the effect of the present 
chapter will be to suggest that very many prior questions of a quite different 
kind have to be raised and settled before the technicalities of Leibniz's 
law become relevant. To put it bluntly, we must take the utmost care in 
deciding first what mental phenomena there are — and this is partly, if not 
wholly, a semantical or logical matter.
For example, unless we introduce and understand the mass of complex 
semantical and logical evidence which bears on the question of whether 
actions exist as a category of individuals, I do not see how we can even 
entertain saying many of the things the physicalist does say* I do not see 
how we can assert either that there are actions, or that actions are identi­
cal to physical events, or indeed any other physicalistio doctrine of this 
sort • And unless we understand the referential mechanisms of mental 
language, X do not see how we can say (except in the same eliminable sense 
in which we say that there are reasons for action, or so many miles between 
here and some other place) either that there are such things as mental events, 
or that mental events are (say) identifiable with physical events. An 
understanding of these mainly semantical questions is not, that is to say, 
something with which physicalisa, if true, will provide us; for physicallfim, 
whether true or false, presupposes this understanding.
That this general problem is Important, and that the answers to it 
are not so far conclusive, can be seen from the bewildering number of 
suggestions idiich physicalists have actually made in the short modem 
history of the subject, This is not however to say that no progress has 
been made; Place's original 1956 vlew^ that consciousness itself was
1. ÏÏ. T. Placet la Consciousness a Brain-process? British Journal of 
Psychology, 1956.
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identical with a process or set of processes in the brain was replaced, or
2amended, by Gteart, who suggested that visual sensations, auditory sensa­
tions, tactual sensations, aches and pains, were all in their several ways 
identical with some brain process or other* But this idea of Smart's 
suffers from limitations of much the same sort as those which Place's theory 
suffers from* For while Place’s suggestion has to confront the fact that 
consciousness is in no intelligible sense an item or individual. let alone 
an Individual falling into the category of processes. Smart's own suggestion 
errs in supposing that individual aches and pains and sensations are them­
selves ontologically fit or appropriate for identification with physical 
processes in the brain* But they are not. The confusion is similar to 
that which is involved in supposing that thou#its, beliefs, desires and 
memories (etc*) are themselves appropriate for identification with physical 
events or states rather than that the events or states ere tdilch occur or 
obtain when people think that so-and-so, or believe or desire or remember 
that such-and-such* If a person thinks or believes that 2 * then in a 
loose and derivative sense we can speak of the thou^t which is thought (viz, 
the thou^t that n), or the belief which is believed (viz, the belief that 2) 
- but it makes a big difference to the intelligibility of the theory itself 
whether it is the objects of these psychological attitudes or the fact (or 
the event) of their being had which are the items which it is the purpose 
of physicalism to analyse* There is nothing to suggest that accusative or 
intentional objects like beliefs or thoughts themselves exist in any clear 
or serious sense*
Something even worse in Smart's suggestion is the fact that the central 
class of mental phenomena, namely those reported in speech by means of a
2* J*X* C* Smart: Sensations and Brain Processes* Philosophical
Review, 1959.
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psychological verb followed by an embedded proposition, are not considered
by him at all. What similarity la there to be found between whatever such
expressions as "I ache", "I am in pain" etc., con be used to report and
the goings on which prepositional attitude sentences can be used to report?
The problem at issue here, as I explained. Is to arrive at a clear
understandings may-be even by example, of what mental phenomena there
actually are; and to do this via inquiries of a grammatical or semantical
kind. Hagel eventually advanced a rather plausible-seeming adjustment to
the views of Place and Smart just mentioned when he wrote;
"Instead of identifying thou^ts, sensations, after-images 
and so forth with brain processes, I propose to identify 
a person's having the sensation with his body's being in a 
physical state or undergoing a physical process. Hotice 
that both terms of this identity are of the same logical _ 
type, namely ... a subject's possessing a certain attribute"
How an attribute, for Ha gel, is to be distinguished from what he calls a 
particular instance of an attribute. An attribute is "signified" by an 
open sentence with a free variable, and a particular instance of an attri­
bute is "signified" by the gerundive noun-phrase which is obtained by 
filling the variable of an attribute-specification and nominalising. So 
in general an open eentenoe like "x jô” specifies an attribute, and a noun 
like "A's jZUing" specifies an instance of that attribute. The open sentence 
"z is thinking about Vienna" specifies an attribute ; and the noun-phrase 
"the stone's thinking about Vienna" specifies a particular instance of it*
What the identity theory connects, for Sagel, are particular instances of
4attributes.
We mi^t want to ask whether the expression A's ^ing names a different 
attribute-instance from the expression A'sJ^ing at T. in the case where A
3. Hagel, Ihvslcalioa. In Borst (ed.) The Kind/Brala_ Identity Theory
p. 216.
4. ' Ha,gel, op. cit. fn. 13*, p. 220.
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does happen to ^ at T* Perhaps Hagel would say that either expression 
would do, providing the open sentence matches the gerund. But for our 
purposes it does not matter greatly whether Hagel would say that the Time- 
Specific Level (see Chapter I) is the proper level on which to assert an 
identity theory, or whether he would say that the Person-Specific Level is. 
For the factor of greatest importance concerns the general conditions under 
which particular Instances of attributes are identical. Ho answer to this 
vital question is forthcoming from Bagel* s own essay on the subject, and so 
this is another question which we must eventually explore for ourselves if 
we can.
There is a welter of "phenomena" whose ontological credentials we 
could discuss, and more than one way in which we could discuss them. Since 
my interest in this essay has focussed upon two categories only - the 
alleged category of events and the alleged category of states - it will be 
the evidence as it concerns these that 1 shall confine my attention to in 
this chapter. Moreover I shall divide the evidence into two kinds: one 
kind I shall call the logical evidence, and the other kind I shall call the 
grasBEatical evidence (though these are not independent of each other, as 
we shall see). In the sections which follow, I shall examine, in turn, 
the logical evidence as it effects events in general; the grammatical com­
plexities of mental events; and finally, though somewliat tangentially to 
the main theme of the essay, some of the problems involved in the ontology 
of action*
2. EVENTS IH GENERAL; TEE EVIDBHCS FROM LOGIC
We must examine the logical evidence for the category of events.
Others have discovered that the main task in doing so is, to give a pre­
liminary description of it, to adjudicate the logical priority of
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event-sentenoea over "categorial existential sentences beginning "ThOTe 
le/was an event which is/was ••••", lAere an ©vent-sentence is conceived 
as a sentence which can be used to answer a question like "What happened?" 
or "What occurred?", or alternatively, as one which can be ^ammtically 
joined with another sentence of the same type by temporal phrases like 
"before" or "after". According to some, an event-sontence itself, whose 
logical form only contains a variable for a material object, displays the 
meaning of a categorial^ sentence of the sort idiich begins "there is/was an 
event which is/was •••»"; while according to the converse view, the logic 
of ©vent-sentence3 can only be given in terms of such a categorialL sentence. 
The controversy as to the priority, in this logical sense, between evont- 
sentences and catégoriels sentences, really bolls down to this; given an 
©vent-sentence, do we need to employ a catégoriel sentence to display its 
logical fora, or is it enou^ to rest with the assumption that its logic 
merely contains a material object variable? Is a sentence of the form 
"A ^ *s" to be elucidiated logically as merely having the form
"There is an object x such that x is A and x /*b",
or as having the form
"There was an event © such that e was a /-ing of A"?
Geach once opted for the first alternative. He proposed that for
the most natural and primitive event-languags,
"we need to get events expressed in a prepositional style, 
rather than by using name-like phrases (what Kortarbinski 
has called onomatoids) •••• any sentence in which an event 
is represented by a noun-phrase like "Queen Anne's death" 
appears to be easily replaceable by an equivalent one in 
which this onomatoid is paraphrased away; we could use 
instead a clause attaching some part of the verb "to die" to 
the subject "Queen Anne" Cutting our onomatoids in this
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way, we get a manner of speaking in which persons and 
things are mentioned but events do not even appear to be 
mentioned 5
So for G each, a sentence like "A /-ed" is logically prior to the noun- 
phrase "A's /-ing" in as much as the elucidation of the truth^coaditions of 
"A /-ed" do not depend on there being an event-noun to fill the blank in 
an allegedly equivalent categorial sentence of the form "there is/Was an 
event which was
, Geach's answer to the problem of how a sentence is identified as
being event-reporting in the first place was also in terms of whether it
can be conjoined with other sentences with temporal sentence-conjunct a of 
the "before", "after", "happened at the same time as" variety, so that 
temporal relations between one sentence and another sentence, or between 
one sentence and a part of itself, are, for Coach too, the chief identify­
ing characteristics of those which are potentially event-reporting*
One of the reasons G each gave for his view was that
"nobody ever talked or is going to talk a language 
containing no names of people or things but only names
of events, and the claim that our language could in
principle be replaced by such a language© is perfectly
idle" 6
But obviously the question of how we decide to logically "ro^ gimeat" parts 
of our language is only partially dependent on what sentences people 
actually use in speech (although I shall argue that it is dependent, in a 
sense, upon what sentences people could use); and the point about the 
replacoability of English by eveat-language seems to me not strictly 
pertinent either. None the less, I still believe that Geach's general 
view of tho matter is defeasible* Cr if not defensible absolutely, then 
more defensible than its main rival, which is the doctrine espoused by
5* Geach; pone Problems about Time. In Studies in the Philosophy of 
Thought and Actlop, (ed* Strawaon) pp. 186-7*
6* Geach, op. cit., p. 186.
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Davidson, Wallace and ©there that senteacce of the sort which we have been 
considering are event-reporting sentences just because their logical analyses 
have to proceed in terms of an explicit reference to an ©vent# I shall 
now describe this rival doctrine, and then attempt to show its defects#
The rival theory was originally expounded as a theory of the logical 
form of eveat-sentences, and was then extended to sentences of action — 
actions, according to Davidson, being a species of events. It was Davidson's 
view that in order to represent the logic of sentences of action, variables 
had to be introduced to range over events, with the consequence that verbs 
normally thou^t of as n-place predicates became predicates of n+1 places, 
with the extra place occupied by an event-variable# The original example 
was the sentence
(l) Shorn kicksd Shaun
which became regimented under logical analysis as the sentence "there is 
an event ^  such that is a kicking of Shaun by Shem" « Ho singular term 
picking out an event is used in this analysis (aside from the variable) | 
althou^ an indefinite singular term does make an appearance in the 
predicate,
How although no definite singular term appears explicitly in the 
analysons sentence, the analysons sentence is none the less said to be 
true If and only if some individual event is such that it satisfies the 
open sentence is a kicking of Shaun by Shorn", Trivially the description
of this event is "the kicking of Shaun by Shem at t", where t is the time 
when the event took place. Or any other description would do, providing 
it satisfied the open sentence.
Davidsons The Lo^ d-cal F o m  of. Açtlon-smtences. pp, 81-95 (in 
?he l^ fdLo of. Decision and_Action, ed* N, Rescher),
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So Davidson's analysis proposes that the sentence (l) is true if 
sad only if there was (is) an event which was (is) a kicking of Shaun by 
Shea# la oj^ositioa to Geach's view, a sentence with a verb of action 
is thus ©aid to be logically nocterio?? to the noun-phrase which pieics out 
the event in which the action consists# There are reasons why X believe 
this analysis to be suspect as a general principle for the logic of 
event-scntences, and I smst now explain, or try to, what they are.
But in order to carry out this explanation, I rust Introduce two 
hypotheses about the general nature of logical analysis* Both suggestions 
concern tho constraints upon those things which s^ne philosophers call 
lo.d.cal..rerd.nentation3 of Eh^sh sentences. X cannot completely satisfy 
laysolf that my suggestions on the nature of logical analysis are final or 
absolutely correct, and indeed the literature on this subject contains 
several well-arguod proposals which are different from mine# Hone the less, 
I shall do the beet I can to state what seem to me to be two minimal and 
basio constraints on the programme of the logical regimentation of English# 
Fundamentally the issue is nothing other than the nature of gramar#
The first constraint is not controversial, and needs little explanation. 
It simply says that the regimenting sentence and the regimented sentence say, 
in some sense of the words, the ©am© thing# Moreover — and this is vital - 
this requirement must be satisfied other^ rise than by purely etipulativ® or 
definitional means# Suppose 3 is the sentence to be regimented and S* is 
the regimenting sentence* How if the requirement is satisfied, then S* 
means whatever S means# But the meaning of S' must clearly be spécifia- 
able in some other way than by alluding to the meaning of S; for if this 
were not a constraint, the hypothesis that S' does regiment S would be 
unfalsifiable# (The point here is that the Mgimmited and the regimenting 
sentence must, in the words of J. K* Hinton, "speak for themselves"). I 
call all this the samo-saytor yecuiroî^ enl.
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The second constraint Is presupposed by tho first, but it is one for 
%diich those philosophers who place heavy emphasis on the logical regimenta­
tion of ordinary English tend not to have a groat deal of sympathy. The 
constraint is this* the regimentation of an English sentence, the thing 
vliioh logically regiment a an English sentence, must itself be either a 
grammatical English sentence, or a string of symbols for vldch mechanical 
rules exist for reading it ^  a grammatical sentence of English. I call 
this requirement the requirement of rrnmmntlce.lity* It can bo illustrated 
in a fairly simply case, as follows.
Traditionally, logically regimentation transposes an English sentence 
into the terms of standard first order predicate logic, for this is a 
system within which an iterative explanation can be given of the truth 
conditions of sentences in terms of the satisfaction, by sequences, of the 
variables of quantification; and the point of the overall programme is to 
display in a uniform way the conditions under which sentences are true.
So for an ambiguous sentence like
(2) All girls love a sailor
there are two logical regimentations, namely,
(3) (x)((Ey)(x Is a girl. y is a sailor, x loves y))
(4) {Ey)((x)(x is a girl, y is a sailor, x loves y))
where the bracketing conventions indicate scope, or, in grammatical terms, 
the domination of some sentence-elemeuts by others. We could re-express 
(3) and (4) by tree-diagrams, thus;
110
(5)
5
/
5
/
V  P
Kf P
V
^  (U\ ^ C d s  K  jA r r t  0A*'Ur ^ X  U vrtJ ^
(6)
S« ^  ^
/
v PMP
N P
ni
Kow of course a large part of the purpose of bracketing or tree-diagram 
conventions is to express syntactical relations vithin the sentence 
this is an uncontroversial point which needs no emphasis. But what does 
need emphasis, and what indeed it is the point of the grammaticality 
requirement to emphasise, is that the string of terminal elements in (5) 
and (6), while not constituting _ sentances as they stand, can be so read 
as to constitute English sentences* The s^tences are "All girls are such 
that there is a sailor such that she loves him" and "There is a sailor such 
that all girls are such that she loves him". These are also the English 
sentences which (3) and (4} represent; and mechanical rules exist for 
reading (3) and (4) as such.
%  illustrative point is that if (3)# (4), (5)» and (6) did not 
represent sentences, then they would not be the sorts of things to which 
meanings or truth-conditions (in whatever terms) could attach; end if they 
are not the sorts of things to which meanings or truth--conditions can attach, 
then they cannot effectively regiment the ambiguous sentence "All girls 
love a sailor"# For it is in the nature of a hypothesis that this sentence 
has certain truth-conditions (and so, like all hypotheses, it must be 
falsifiable) • But this seems to entail that the diagram or string of
symbols which is said to reveal the logical structure of some English 
sentence must itself be sentential in nature, for, as X said earlier, 
sentences are the only things for which truth-conditions can be given#
This ml^t be thou#it to produce a paradox, or a circularity, in the
8
programme of regimentation as a whole. If regimentations are sentences 
(call them regimentation-sentences), then all we have constructed to
8. Cf. the point made by John Soarle in Chomsky*s Ei^volution in
Lin/yuistlcs (New York Review of Books, June 29 1972), in connection 
with the notion of a sesiantio paraphrase derivable from a sentence’s 
deep structure.
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exhibit the logical structure of any English sentence is another English 
sentence; so that the probl^ arises again of the logical regimentation 
of this - and so on. However there is really no paradox or circularity 
here at all. (The programme of logical analysis consists, in essence, of 
transposing each English sentence into a pre-logical or semi-logical but 
none the less sentential idiom which is itself part of English (or some 
language), and which consists of sentences directly accessible to a 
mechanical exposition of their truth-conditions; or which, we could say, 
wear their truth-conditions on their sleeves. For this set of sentences, 
couched in terms of phrases like "such that" and the apparatus of pronouns 
and/or variables, we have a direct end clear statement of truth-conditions 
in teims of the theory of truth offered by Tarski. But in the total pro­
ject of showing how the meaning of a sentence depends on the meanings of 
its parts and on its syntax, at least in the programme which consists of 
doing this via the notion of truth, the logical regimentation of ordinary 
English sentences into a system of regimentation-sentencea is only the pre­
liminary step. Only once this has been completed comes the enterprise of
q
connecting the truth-conditions of a sentence with its meaning. It is
with reference to this programme that my requirement of grammaticality is
to be defended against circularity.
Let me now return to Davidson’s #eory of the logic of ©vent-sentences.
Davidson himself tells us that he
"dreams of a theory which makes the transition from the 
ordinary idi(m to canonical notation purely mechanical, 
and a canonical notation rich enough to capture, in its 
dull and explicit way, every difference and connection 
legitimately considered the business of a theory of 
moaning" 10
9. See Strawson; Meaning end Truth for some preliminary suggestions.
10. Logical Form of Action Sentences, p. 115.
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I agree with the requirement that the transition be mechanical, but I do
not see how the canonical notation can capture anytdiing unless its
formulae can be read in grammatical English.
How in his exposition of the logical form of "Shem kicked Shaun”, it
seema quite clear that Davidson fails to meet the requirement of grammatic-
alityi for it is immediately obscure how the reglmmited version of "Shem
kicked Shaun" should be read in a grammatical way. Here la the relevant
passage from The Loricel Form of Action Sentences!
"I sug^st ...... that we think of "kicked" as a three-
place predicate, and that the sentence, i.e. Shem kidded 
can be given this form;
Kicked (shea, Shaun, x)
If we try for an English sentence that directly reflects 
this form, we run into difficulties. "There is an event 
2L such that ^  is a kicking of Shaun by Shem" is about the 
best I can do, but we must remember "a kicking" is not a 
singular term" 11
Davidson appears to treat the fact that there is no obvious English reading 
for LP^ as a peripheral difficulty, whereas I should prefer to emphasise 
it* Looking briefly at the ways in which the déficiences of LF^ ml^t be 
repaired will, I believe, lead us to my second point about Davidson’s 
analysis.
One of the problems with LF^ as It stands is obviously that it contains 
the word "kicked", whereas its English reading is said to contain the word 
"kicking". The presence of "kicked" se^s to be a hangover from the 
allegedly inadequate analysis of "Shorn klckod Shaun" as
LPg Kicked (Shem, Shaun)
11. Davidson, op. cit. p. 92,
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where "Kicked" is a two-place predicate, and where LFg is translatable 
into Sngliah In accordance with the following rule;
EIL For "G-ed(A,3)", take "A" ae the subject, "G—cd" as the verb, 
and "3" as the object. In other words, rearrange end dehte 
brackets, to get "1 G-ed 3".
the case of LF, the suggestion which obviously presents itself at this 
point is two-fold: that its word "kicked" be replaced by the word "kick­
ing", and that the resultant version of LF^ be associated with the 
following reading rule; *
Rig Regard "Ex (G-iag (A,3,r))" as being always equivalent to the 
sentence "there la something which la a G-iag of B by A".
How I mention this suggestion, not in order to appraise it immediately, 
but because it affords an opportunity to mention a set of problems which is 
purely grammatical in nature {end to which the nest section of the essay 
will be devoted). For we ml^t reasonably insist that a third important 
constraint on a regimentation is that its noun-phrase®, if any, correspond 
in their classification to the entities, if any, which the original idio­
matic sentence is "about". If the original sentence is about a material 
object, then any variable is the regimented sentence purporting to take 
the object aa value must be replaceable by a material-object noun. And 
similarly, if the original sentence is about an event, or if it reports an 
event, or the occurrence of ea event, then any variable in the regimented 
sentence purporting to take an event as value must be replaceable by an 
evett-noua. (This is a requirement on which we are entitled to insist if 
logical variables are likened to pronouns).
low the word "kicked" is not even a general term, and cannot be trans­
formed into a noun-phrase by attaching & determiner. Replacing "kicked" 
by the noun "kicking" satisfies the evident demand for a noua phrase, but
115
it raises an additional questions is it a noun which can be used for 
reference to an event?
We have now arrived at a purely graimatical question, namely: is
there a noun-phrace associated with the verb "kick" which we can use to 
refer to wîiat took place when Shorn kicked Shaun? There nay be plenty of 
perfectly good nominal expressions which can describe what took place — 
but that they are is partly a factual matter, for it depends on what actually 
took place. Perhaps an act of aggression or an act of retribution is what 
took place when Shem kicked Shaun; but now we are using nominal expressions 
which Identify acts, and which have no grammatical or logical link whatever 
with the Verb "Icick". I think we are now in a position to see what is 
wrong with the noun "kicking'*. The problem is that kicking is an activity, 
and it is an invariable feature of activity-words that the indefinite 
article cannot be prefixed. Activity-words are like mass nouns in this 
respect; the sentence **A kicking took place" is as grammatical as the 
sentence "A footifoar was donned" is - which is not at all. Amending both 
so as to get "A spate of kicking took place" or "An article of footwear 
was donned" has the effect of turning nonsense into sense, but only at 
the price of introducing totally new nouns.
So it is certainly open to question whether there are such things as 
kickings. What I have said shows how much I doubt that there are, since 
it seems that on the best interpretation of the word "kicld.ng", it cannot 
be grammatically preceded by the indefinite article, as Davidson’s analysis 
would in this case require.
I have discussed the grammaticality requirement as it concerns the 
single example of the logic of "Shem kicked Shaun" in order to illustrate 
the kinds of considerations about sense, nonsense, interpretation etc., 
which the application of that requirement suggests. The same sorts of
1X6
considerations are, by implication, just as important to any other example. 
But before leaving the case of "Shorn kioked Shaun", let me make one more
remark about it in the same vein.
Perhaps it will be suggested that the difficultiea surrounding the 
word "kicking'* can be avoided by introducing the word "kick" in its place.
This replacement would give a representation of (l) as
{?) Ee. Kick (Shem, Shaun, e)
But even if this analysis satisfies the grammaticality requirement, it 
does not quite succeed in satisfying the same-saying requirement. For 
(7) reads "there was an event which was a kick of Shaun by Shem". But
(1) says something subtly different, since the assertion that Shem kicked 
3iaun does not restrict Shem to having given Shaun just one kick. Two or 
more kicks mig^t have been delivered.
The further we discuss such matters the more obvious it becomes that 
the choice of nouns in the regimentation of any sentence is an important 
one. The difficulty however in passing from particular cases to some , 
general doctrine about this choice of nouns is aggravated, unfortunately, 
by the fact that English is not entirely systematic la the way its noun- 
phrases form; witness the analysis of
(s) The emperor died
Here, the right analysis would. I think, be
(9) There was an event which was a death of the emperor
which satisfies both the grammaticality as well as the same-saying requirement
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despite the fact that people normlly die only once* If we had failed to 
rem%iber this we mi^t have boon teiapted by "There was an evmit which was 
-thg. death of the emperor". Another clearly mistaîæn analysis would be
(lo) There was an event which was a dying of the emperor
It la mistaken because a dying is not anything we can easily make sense of 
at all (and a fortiori not as an event); and if %diat is meant is some 
dying* then the same-saying requirement lapses. (lO) would not then say 
the same thing as what (s) says, for it does not follow from the fact that 
there was some dying that someone actually died. % e  death ml#it have 
been prevented in the nick of time.
This example is thezreforo dissimilar to the kicking case, in as much 
as the language contains one appropriate noun. One suggestion in the 
general case is that when no appropriate noun is available, we are not 
entitled to postulate an event; for if making up new words was admissable, 
then all sorts of strange analyses could be proven. Another general point 
is that -in.? words are not invariably suitable for evenlwreference; but 
this is not to say that nominale not of this fora always are so suitable.
As I shall argue in the next section, they are clearly not. But if we 
are to have sentences which assert the identity or difference of events, 
then it seems to me that ultimately we must have noun-phrases. The tenor 
of my grammatical explorations here has been to suggest, paradoxically, 
that for many event-sentences, we cannot say that there Is. an event which 
the sentence reports, in the strictly ontological sense of the phrase 
"there is"; and that this is due to the probl^s of specifying the event 
in a suitable way. There may be events like deaths, flashes, bangs and 
births, for which Intransitive verbs are used in the event-sentence. But 
these, if they do exist, are about all there are.
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Brobleme encountered with the gs^mnticallty roquiroment ere not
only problems which aggravate tho analysis of sentences like (l). As
12
lîOEisae Clark has shown, the Bavidsonisa analysis as applied to the 
problems of predicatoMaodifiers of almost every sort give bisarre results 
both from the point of view of gramar and from tho point of view of same— 
saying, The sentence
(11) I flew my spaceship to the Horning Star 
for instance, is represented as
(12) (E‘e)(Flew (I, my spaceship, ^ ) 8<- To (the fioraing Star, -e))
which la said to read "there is an event ^  such that §,is a flying of my 
space-ehip by me, and ^  involved a motion towards the morning star". But 
something is clearly wrong here, since the truth-conditions of the last 
quoted sentence are not the same as the truth conditions of (ll)i not all 
objects towards which my cpace-ahip moves are those towards which I fly it. 
And some analyses, to labour the point, are just incomprehensible without 
a prior understanding of the analysandm sentence; witness the sentence 
Davidson proposed for
(13) Brutus stabbed Caesar in the back in the Forua with a knife
namely "there exists an evmt that is a stabbing l,of Caesar by Brutus event, 
it is an into the back of Caesar event, it took place in the Forum, and 
Brutus did it with a knife"^^
12. Romane Clark; Conccminfi tho...bo?lc_of,. Predicate. Ebdifiera mzus 1970,
13. Davidson; On Events._nnd (la 
ed, Hargolis) p. 84#
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This and other examples (see Clark, op. cit.) su^^est the analysis 
which depends on event-quantification to be wrong aa a general strategy. 
This is not to deny that there are ©vents, but it is to deny that a 
quantification over events is what underlies any and every event-sentence. 
On© final point ought to clinch the dispute in Geach*a favour. According 
to tlie view that the sentenoe-fora
there was an event ^  which was a V-ing by P
is logically prior to the sentence-form
P V--©d
in the sense that the truth-conditlons of the second sentence-fora are 
explained by those of the first (instead of by some object's satisfying 
the predicate ”.. .V-ed* ), it must be the case that the variable ^ in the 
first sentence form is replaceable by an event-noun which designates the 
event which makes the relevant event-sentenc© true. Suppose that diffi­
culties of the sort which I have been discussing were to be overcome, and 
that there was such a noun. Then the theory ou#it to be able to tell us 
under what conditions the noun in question does actually designate aa event. 
But it seems that the theory cannot do this, without renouncing one of its 
premisses. for example, it cannot say that "the emperor's death" desig­
nates an event if and only if the emperor died, since this would involve 
renouncing the view that the sentence is logically posterior. But what 
else could the theory say? I share with Geach and Homan© Clark the view 
that the sentence is logically prior.^^
The logical evidence for events as a general and comprehensive category
14. Clark, op. cit., p. 319*
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of individuals is, it soems, rather poor. This is not to say that there 
are no events, hut simply that attempts to formalise event-seatences by 
introducing an explicit event-variable in very many cases fail to comply 
with the constraints which govern what qualifies as an adequate regimenta­
tion. The simple case of "Ghea kicked Shaun", for instance, illustrates 
how, very often, the satisfaction of the granmaticality requirement will 
lead to a violation of the came-saying roquirementt and there are all the 
problems about adverbial modification idiich have been aired exhaustively 
by others. The requirements of grommticality and same-saying are stringent 
indeed; but the fact that they are so difficult to comply with establishes 
a presumption, at least, that Geach was ri#t in supposing that events are 
most naturally reported by sentences; or, as he put it, that "we nedd to 
get events expressed in a prepositional style rather than by using name- 
like phases
I next adduce extra evidence in favour of Geach* s view, but this time 
specifically as it concerns events which are mental. The arguments will 
proceed in a different way, althou(^ similarities will be noticed between 
them and some of the remarks made in the present section. But they con­
verge upon a similar conclusion, which is that the assumption that there 
strictly arc such things as mental events is extremely difficult to maintain.
3. TE3 CBTÜLOGT OF TH3
There are more ways than one in which to establish a presumption that 
there are objects of a certain category. One way Is to discover where 
the logeai variables fall in the formalisation of ordinary sentences into
14a. lîuoh of the material in this section is to appear under the title 
"Mental Events; Are There Any?" in the December 1973 issue of the 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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the canonical terms of some chosen logic* But this is not the only way*
A rather more basic, but no less intricate, strategy, is to examine what 
noun-phrases there are in the language, and, where they form Bystenatically, 
to ask wliat Mnd of object they can be used to refer to.
The mere existence of a noun is not, of course, always evidence which 
is relevant to ontology* JTovertheless, reference to an it^ is effected 
in many simple cases by the use of nouns or noun-^phrases, together of 
course with other particles; and so I think that ultimately It should 
seem unsurprising if some evidence relevant to ontology can be gathered 
from this qiuirter* A fact which is slowly emerging from the work of some 
linguists la that noun-phrases, althou^ extremely varied when taken as a 
single group, do fall into a number of distinct grammatical categorl s*
It cwjould clearly be convenient to be able to reveal the differences amongst 
these categories, and the parallel differences, if any, amongst the object- 
categories which correspond to them* Our interest in this subject is 
naturally aroused by questions of the following kind: does the noun
John’s thought
refer to an event or not, when appropriately prefixed to a predicate of 
the right type? And if it does, what does the noun
John’s thinking
refer to? Or to repeat a familiar question: do we refer to an event or 
a process or something else tdien we use the noun
the kick wMch he received
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Can we find any system in the way these noun-phrases form, or can nothing 
general he said about their relation to the verb? ¥ith these sample 
questions before us, let us investigate the ontological credentials of 
the language of "mental-events”*
It is an almost universal assumption in modem discussions of the 
mind-body problem that there are such things as mental events, and that 
these comprise noticings, perceivings, essumings, rememberings, judgings 
end the like. It is true that arguments are sometimes advanced in support 
of this assumption, but In the main it is thou^t to be too obvious to need 
any support at all. All the same, I believe that a number of arguments 
can be given which suggest that this ontological assumption ought to be 
regarded with considerable suspicion.
D. C. Dennett is almost alone among modern philosophers in having
recognised the great difficulties involved in arriving at a satisfactory
view of what "mental entities" there really are. In the first chapter of
15Content and Consciousness his counsel was for caution. He recommended 
a policy of "tentatively fusing" mental sentences, so as not to "assume, 
from the start....that....certain sorts of parities exist between physical 
entity nouns and mental entity nouns" (p. 16) - a policy which he adopted 
in order to by-pass the difficulties of both the identity theory and its 
denial, and in order to allow himself to concentrate instead on the question 
of whether mental sentences as wholes can be "correlated in an explanatory 
way" with physical sentences aa wholes. This replacement programme does,
I think, contain difficulties of its own. But the overall conclusion of 
the arguments I advance in this section is that these difficulties ou^t to 
be faced, for the arguments in question point to the conclusion that the 
cautiously sceptical posture which Dennett adopted In relation to the
15* Hew fork and London, 1969*
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ontology of the mental not only deaorvea to be adopted, but deserves to be 
adopted with greater confidence than Dennett himself thou^t was justifiable.
Ky method of argument le as follows. Outsldo the ontology seminar we 
happily and tnmisleadlngly talk as if there were such things as miles, 
propositione, thou^ dita, voices, numbers, and a whole array of other things 
which, when the seminar la in progress, we find it appropriate to doubt the 
existence of. Quine’s slogan "to be is to be the value of a logical 
variable" and its variante, whatever Its actual merits, is very often used 
in such situations as the tool or inetriment of doubt. My strategy in 
relation to the specific question of whether there strictly pro such things 
as mental events will be to employ three different, but related, devices.
The first device consists in examining whether the English language contains 
noun-phrase constructions of a sort which are appropriate, in a eon se I shall 
explain, for specifying mental events. The second consists in examining 
how, if there are such noun-phrase constructions, their referents are 
modified or qualified in actual speech. And the third device consists in 
examining whether there are any eentenccs in which pronouns or pro-noainal 
constructions appear in such a way as to either replace such noun-phrases 
or els% to repeat a reference originally made by one of them.
Each of these devices is obviously grammatical in nature. The reason 
why each of them Is appropriate to questions of an ontological kind derives 
from the fact that the very notion of an individual or range of individuals 
which cannot be described or momin&ted or specified in any systematic way 
at all is, on the face of it, just incoherent. The fact that there are 
such things are un&pecifiable numbers, assuming that it is a fact, has no 
real power to deflate this principle- C vtology as applied to mathematics 
is la a notoriously obscure state in comparison with ontology elsewhere.
And the general proposition that all things of the number kind are unspeci- 
fiable would, for comon-sense reasons, be hard to make sense of, unless It
124
waa understood aa an obscure way of saying that, strictly speaking, there 
are no such things.
Before turning to the grassaar of cental sentences, let me firstly re- 
explain which mental sentences I shall be concerned with, end let me re­
phrase the basic question which I shall be asking about them. We rou£^y 
demarcate ©vent-sentences as those sentences which can be grammatically 
joined with each-other by temporal phrases like "before" or "after"; or 
alternatively as those sentences which can be used to make a statement in 
answer to questions like "lihat happened?" or "khat occurred?". And we then 
re-phrase our basic ontological question by asking whether, for any or for 
every true mental event-sentence, there exists a way of specifying which 
event Is reported by the sentence as having taken place. By the ph ase 
"specify which event took place" I do not have in mind the type of specifica­
tion which is achieved by naming an event (thus; there occurred a certain 
event, namely E), nor the type of specification in which aa event is 
specified aa uniquely having certain properties (thus: there occurred the
event which is the , but the type in which an event is assigned to a kind 
(thus: there occurred an event of the P kind). The question now before
us is therefore v.hether, for any or for every true mental event-sentence, 
there exists a way of specifying which kind the reported event belongs to. 
Let us taka as an example of a non-mental ev©nt-sent©nca the sentence
(14) The star exploded
and let us taica as an example of a mental event-sentence the sentence
(15) John remembered that the ship was sinking
Evidence for the view that sentence (14) reports an event when used to make
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a true statement is that there exists a noun, namely "explosion", which 
can be predicated of an event in such a way as to specify which kind of event 
took place. There is a natural conversion of sentence (14) which reads:
(16) An explosion of the star occurred
Here, it seems, we have a natural relation between an event-sentence and an 
event-noun# Moreover, this natural relation is undisturbed when an adverb 
of manner - to take just one type of adverb — attaches to the event-sentence 
itself, as in
(17) The star exploded violently
for here we can change the adverb to aa adjective and attach it in predi­
cative position to the event-noun which appeared in the conversion of (14) 
to (I6)t
(13) A violent explosion of the star occurred
The existence of ouch sentences aa (16) and (18), and of their natural 
relations to sentences (14) and (17) respectively, is what strongly suggests 
that sentences (14) and (17) can be used to report an event ; and, when 
they are so used, that there is an event which each sentence respectively 
can be used to report, namely, in this case, an event of the, type explosion 
and aa event of the type violent exnloeion.
This ontological conclusion is also strongly suggested by the existence 
of sentences in which pronouns occur, for example;
(19) Tlie star exploded, and 11 occurred at noon
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(20) The star exploded violently, and we know what caused it.
where the plausible way of explaining the function of the pronoun "it", in 
each case, consists in supplying a description of the event itself* The 
question "What occurred at noon?" is answered by "An explosion of the star"* 
The question "Vdiat do we know the cause of?" is answered by "A violent 
explosion of the star". If the pronouns in (I3) and (20) do refer, then 
it seems clear that an event is the ri^t type of individual for them to 
refer to.
These grammatical patterns can be found in many, but not in all, event- 
sent enoes which are non-mental; and where they can be found they support 
the appropriate ontological conclusion. But the interesting fact is that 
non© of these patterns apply to event-sontences which are mental. Con­
sider sentence (15) • It mi^t be said that for the verb "remember" we 
have the noun "memory" ; but for the larger noun-plîrase which stands to (15) 
in the relation in which (16) stands to (l4), what do we have? We might 
try the noun-phraoe
(21) A memory that the ship was sinking by (of?) John 
but this, if we can make sense of It at all, like
(22) John’s memory that the ship was sinking
surely specifies the content of what John remembered, rather than any event. 
A similar interpretation has to be offered for the noun "perception", in 
relation to the verb "perceive"; %diile for other mental verbs there la no 
noun of this particular grammatical type - Chomslsy calls them "derived 
nominals"^^ - at all. (The verb "realise" has the noun "realisation".
(Footnote 16 printed overleaf)
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"acsm©" has "assumption", and "judge" has "judgement"; but what do the 
verbs "notice", "see" or "loom" have?)*
Our task is to discover how to specify the sort of event, if there 
is one, which would be reported by saying truly that (for example) John 
remembered that the ship was sinlcing. The derived nominal in this case 
specifies the wrong thing* Ilor can we specify the type of event in ques­
tion as "tliat type of event which is reported by saying truly that John 
remembered that the ship was sinking", because this answer merely prompts 
the "what type?" question all over again* Hgr, of course, can ve specify 
it as "that type of event which took place when, or as, John remembered 
that the ship was sinking", for tMs lets in any physical event which 
happened to taî'io place at the same time.
Eow then can appropriate specification bo achieved? It might be 
suggested tîiat our efforts to systematically specify mental events with 
derived nominals like "memory", "perception" etc., were misguided from the 
beginning, for the reason, firstly, that derived nominals in English have 
extremely irregular formation-pattems right across the board, for mental
(Footnote 16 brou^t forward from page 126)
Remarks on Moninalination* pp. 134-221 in Jacobs and Rosenbaum 
(eds.)i Readings in ian/rlish. Ihransformational iîraimar..
Apart from the derived nominal^ Chomsky describes the formation 
of "mixed" and "gerundive" ncmdnals. For a sentence liîse
John refused the offer
to take one example, the gerundive, derived end mixed nominals frrxa 
respectively as follows:
John’s refusing the offer
John’s refusal of the offer
John’s refusing of the offer
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as well as for nonHoental verbs,and that secondly, there la a different 
typo of noun, namely the gerundive noun, which forms In a perfectly regular 
way and which we just as veil use instead* There are several remarks
to be mad© about this suggestion* In the first place the apparent irregu­
larity of derived nominal formation might turn out to have a systematlo 
explanation when investigated fully# It seems to be a matter of controversy 
among linguists as to how likely this is.^^ Secondly, and more importantly, 
the positive suggestion that the gerundive nominal be used to specify 
events is, in point of fact, extremely important to assess; for several 
philosophers, following Engel's precept in Phvsicallsm,^^ have suggested 
that an identity theory of the mental and the physical can be best formulated 
by using nouns of just this type.
Gerundive nouns are those which form from any verb by the addition of
17* The nominals in the following list show clearly that a blanket 
interpretation cannot seriously be attempted (cf. Chomsky p* 189)
lau#ter (vt lau^)
marriage (vi marry)
construction (v: construct) 
belief (vj believe)
conversion ( v j convert )
Qualification (v: qualify)
house I vs house)
box (vs box)
conveyance (vs convey)
13. See Chomsky, op. cit., pp. 187-9*
"the semantic interpretation of a gerundive nominal is 
straightforwardly in terms of the grammatical relations 
of the underlying proposition in the deep structure*
Derived nominale $... are very different in all
(of these) respects. Productivity is much more 
restricted, the semantic relations between the associated 
proposition and the derived nominal ere quite varied end 
idiosyncratic, and the nominal has the internal structure 
of the noun-phrase. (These matters) raise the question 
of whether the derived nominals are, in fact, transforma­
tionally related to the associated proposition"
See also Chomsky, loo. cit., footnote 11*
19. Philosophical Review 1965
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"ing". But it is cloar that the type of cpocificatioa which they afford 
is different from the type discussed so far. The gerundive noun related 
to aa event-sent once appears not to specify a type of event, hut to provide 
a kind of description of the event Itself, with sona implication of unique— 
ness; and I suspect that those who advocate the gerundive strategy would 
say that since gerundive nouns always form, an evont-descriotion can be 
formed from any event-eentonce; so that for any true event—sentence (mçnital 
or physical) we can specify the reported event by using a gerundive des­
cription, and sajdng that an event having that description occurred. For 
instance, instead of converting eontence (14) to read "An explosion of the 
star occurred", we could convert it to read;
(23) Tîie star's exploding took place (occurred, happened, etc.)
It is certainly an advantage of this stylo of eveat-opecification that 
gerundive nouns can be formed in such a regular and mechanical way. However, 
there is an interesting and peculiar set of facts about tho gerundive con­
struction itself whicli suggests, I think, tliat the referential function of 
the gerundive noun is distinctly unusual, and that tho typo of specif lea tion
20. That is, it seems to be an exceptionless general truth about our 
language that any sentence of the active intransitive form
S V-ed
can be associated, via a simple transformation, with a noun-phrase 
of the form
S's V-ing
and that any active transitive sentence of the form 
S V-ed P
can be associated, via a similar transformation, with a noun-phrase 
of the form
S's V-ing P
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which it can be used to achieve is not event-specification at all. These
facts concern its internal structure. If we compare the internal structure
of the gerund with the internal structure of the complex possessive noun
("John's hat", and the like), we find differences which I think can only
mean that the gerund falls to operate as a raechanisn of reference in quit®
the same relatively straightforward way in which the complex possessive
noun does. The important difference can be eiaimarised by saying that
while a complex possessive noun of the form P's ? has an internal structure
which can be represented as the F which is P's or the F which belongs to P
(where the qualified phrase the ? serves to identify the kind of thing
eventually desi^mted), the gerundive noun does not.
21Let me now explain this difference more fully. bhile a gerundive 
noun has the superficial appearance of a complex possessive noun, its under­
lying structure cannot be the same. Any sentence containing a complex 
possessive noun can be re-phrased without loss of meaning with the possessive 
noun unravelled, so that for instance
(24) John’s hat is dented 
can be re-phrased as
(25) The hat which is John’s is dented
In addition - this is a second feature of possessive nouns - any sentence 
of this latter form can usually bo existentially generalised, so that from
(25) we can infer
21. See Chomslqy, loo. cit., p. I38ff.
131
(26) A hat vidoh is John's is dented
By contrast, your average gerundive noun will not unravell; and nor» as a 
consequence of this, will the sentence which would he said to unravell it 
cuhmit to existential generalisation, in the manner in which (25) did to 
yield (26), Both these failures beset mental as well as physical gerunds. 
Tabs the sentences;
(27) (The star's exploding) G
(2a) (John's remembering that the ship was sinking) E
where "G" and "F* are predicates. We cannot, with any confidence, re­
phrase these sentences to give;
(29*) (The exploding which is the star's) G
(30*) (The remembering that the ship was sinking which is John's) H
for very real and reasonable doubts can be entertained as to whether these 
sentences are well-formed; and the same goes for the sentences which would 
be said to follow by existential generalisation from these, namly;
(31*) (An exploding which is the star's) G
(52*) (a remembering that the ship was sinking Wiich is John's) H
X think we must say that the^ last four sentences, unless invested with
22
meaning by pure stipulation, are literally speaking deviant. Perhaps
(Footnote 22 printed overleaf)
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their deviant nature can best be appreciated by looking at parallel oases 
which contain the gerundives corresponding to the verba "to be" and "to 
have"# If we do not count
(33*) The being in pain which is John's
(34*) A being in pain which is John's
(35*) The having of a toothaclie i^ch is John's
(36*) A having of a toothache which is John's
as deviant, it is difficult to see what deviance is#
I shall later suggest what conclusions should be dra*«m from the fact 
that complex possessive nouns have a different internal structure frosn the 
gerund, and i^t the referential function of the gerund exactly is, I 
want now to examine the two other grammatical phenomena which I suggested 
were relevant to the ontological question about mental events. We saw 
that there were patterns of adverbial modification for non-mental event- 
sentences in which the thing modified was some event; but when we consider 
how adverbs attach to mental sentences, it is hard to escape the conclusion 
that the thing modified is always something other than an event# It is
Footnote 22 brou^it forward from page 131#
This fact would have to be i^iored by anyone who thought that the 
logical foiTO of "John remembered that the chip was afloat" con­
tained a logical variable for an event; for the regimenting 
sentence would be "There was an event which was a remembering 
that the ship was afloat of John's", which 1 would maintain is 
deviant# (Cf« previous section) # And again, if It was stipulated 
that it had the same meaning as the regimented sentence, then of 
course the hypothesis that the second sentence does regiment the 
first would be unfalsifiable#
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difficult ta argue decisively about a subject which Is still being explored, 
but the mala ways la idiich adverbs invade mental evoat-sentences can, I 
think, be tentatively laid out as follows.
The first pattern is where tho modifier in fact modified the agent, so 
that s sentence of the foim^^
P Adj-ly V-ed that p 
can be explained as having the form
It was Adj of P to T that p
(or perhaps; It was Adj of P that P V-ed p). This is the pattern which 
adverbs like "perceptively" and "thou^tfully" fit, together with "inten­
tionally", "deliverately", "mlstalmnly" or "clumsily", as these occur la 
sentences of intentional action (supposing these sentences to be mental).
It is obvious that if John noticed perceptively that the ship was sinking, 
the item"perceptive" qualifies is not some event, but John himself.
The point here is not that "John was perceptive" is entailed, for as a 
remark about Joha-in-gonersl this mi^t well be false - but that "It was 
perceptive of John to notice that the ship was sinking" is.
The second main pattern is that whereby
P Adj-ly Y-ed that p 
must be explained as having the form
23* Here I use the shorthand of Adi for an adjective, Ail-lv for an 
adverb, %for a verb, and ^  for a person-name.
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It was Adj that P Y-©d that p
(or perhaps: That P Y-ed that p was Adj), This is the pattern which
pertains to adverbs employed in a "factive" sense, "Alarmingly", "sur- 
prisin^y", "predictably", "annoyingly" etc., can have this role,^ *^  If 
John surprisingly noticed that the ship was sinking, then it was the fact
that he noticed what he did that was surprising, and not some noticing-
event#
A third pattern is exmplifled by sentences like 
v^ividly')
(37) Ee reaeaberedyvaguely V that the building collapsed
(jdinly J
but here the Item which was vivid or vague or dim was not some rememberiag- 
event, but the memory itself*
There are other adverb patterns apart from these which can be 
interestingly investigated in the same groundmlevel way* Ho special 
expertise in the sciences of linguistics or logical form is needed to see 
that none of the eentence-pattems in which an adverb occurs in a mental 
event-sentence Is such as to eu^st that underlying the sentaace itself 
is aa event-description which the related adjective has the force of 
qualifying# The moral which emerges fr<%m these investigations is that 
althou^ we can and do say such things as that John suddenly or surprisingly 
or perceptively or vaguely or predictably remembered (or noticed, etc#) 
that such and such is the ease, it Is wrong to infer that there must be
24, The example of "surprisingly" shows that one and the sane adverb can 
on different occasions have different roles. "It was surprising of 
John to notice that the ship was sinking" (pattern one) means some­
thing different from "It was surprising that John noticed that the 
ship was sinking" (pattern two).
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events of a mental sort on the grounds that the adverbs In question have the 
role of saying how they occurred, or what they ware like# The most 
cursory examination of the meanings of the relevant sentences shows that 
they do not#
Let us finally consider whether any conclusion can he drawn from the 
most ordinary patterns of pronominal occurrence in mental ev@at-sentenoes # 
Pronouns, it seems, very often have a rof^ential function# Very often 
we can expand a sentence which already contains a referring phrase la such 
a way that a pronoun occurring in the added part repeats a reference made 
in the original# Indeed the role played by a pronoun in the expansion of 
a given sontonce can often be helpful in deciding just idiat phrases of the 
non-expanded sentence are being used referentially# This is not always 
the case, for wMle it seems to hold for a sentence like
(58) I picked up my hat and put ^  on the peg
where there is little doubt that "it" refers to whatever "my hat" refers to, 
it cannot be said to hold for a sentence like
(59) John shut the window upstairs and Peter did downstairs
where it seems that "it" has the function of replacing the phrase "something 
of the kind which John did" rather than referring directly to idiat John did# 
But despite these variations, there is still an argument which is of rele­
vance to our ontological question about mental events, for we can surely 
m y  that If there strictly are such things as mental events, then there 
will exist possible expansions of mental event-sentences that contain back- 
war dly referring pronouns. 53ie existence of such expansions would support 
the ontological hypothesis that mental events occur, while the absence of
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such expansions would support a contrary hypothesis*
In fact there seeia to he no convincingly grammatical examples in which 
a pronoun in an expanded mental event-sentence does have this event- 
referring polo. The nearest we can get is, I think, a sentence like
(40) John noticed that the ship was oinking, and it surprised (shocked, 
startled) us
However, the pronoun "it" in this example, if it hackwardly refers to 
anything at all, can only be taken to refer to a fact, namely the fact 
that John noticed that the ship waa sinking#
I shall say more about the difference between facts and events later* 
The negative conclusion that has emerged up to this point is this; not 
one of the three types of grammatical phenomena which I have considered 
provides any evidence for the supposition that there is such an ontologicsl 
category as the category of mental events# Indeed the evidence can be 
taken to suggest the opposite* Admittedly, the case has been argued for 
the category of propositional mental events - those purportedly expressed 
by a sentence of prepositional attitude - but it would be surprising if 
similar arguments could not be extended to mental sentences not of the 
propositional attitude form.
Before closing this section I must wphasise again that nothing I have 
said up to this point suggests that there are no events at all# It is 
obvious that there are; for apart from explosions, which I mentioned and 
recognised earlier, It seems pointless to deny that there are also events 
which are bangs, flashes, collapses, marriages, deaths, births and ©o 
f o r t h . T h e  conclusion to which the grammatical evidence points is not 
that there are no events, but that not every sentence properly described
25# Cf* Strawson: Individuals, Ch# I.
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as an event-sentence is such that there is an event, or type of event, 
which, when used to make a true statement, it reports. The argument has 
been that mental event—sentences which are of the propositional attitude 
form are of this type. For these, Geach*s view that events must be 
expressed in a propositional style rather than in nouns holds good.
Probably the most interesting and important group of grammatical 
facts that has come to li^t so far concerns the gerundive noun# Its 
interest lies in its un-noun-like structure ; its importance derives from 
the use to which it has been put in recent discussions of the mind-body 
problem. Eagel once tried to make use of the fact that every English 
sentence has a gerundive noun corresponding to it to avoid an objection to 
the theory that thou^ts, beliefs, pains and sensations could be identified 
with physical processes in the brain or central nervous system. The objec­
tion was that physical processes or activities in the brain had spatial 
location, whereas neither thou^ts nor beliefs nor pains nor sensations did.
In recognition of the importance of Nagel's ingenious way :out„of the difficulty 
I quote his statement for a second time:
"Instead of identifying thou^^ts, sensations, after-images, 
and so forth with brain processes, I propose to identify a 
person* s having the sensation with his body* s being in a 
physical state or undergoing a physical process. Notice 
that both terms of this identity are of the same logical 
type, ... namely, ... a subject's possessing a certain 
attribute" 26
(iihere in general an open sentence like specifies an attribute, while 
a gerundive noun like "Üs j^ing" specifies an instance of that attribute).
But I need hardly re-emphasise how Important it now becomes for îfegel's 
approach to physicalism to contrive identity-conditions for instances of 
attributes. When is A's j^ing identical with B's -ing, and when
26. Nagel, Physicalism (in C. V. Borst, ed. ; The Mind/Brain Identity 
Theory) p. 216.
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distinct? There is one possible answer to this question whose defects I 
think it is instructive to have clearly before us# For it sliows what is 
wrong with Nagel's proposals for interpreting the gerund, and thereby leads 
us to see what entities his version of the identity theory really coaooms# 
Suppose we were to say^ that particular at tribut e-instance A's i^ -ing is 
identical with particular attribute-iastanc© B's -ing (where /-inf? is a 
mental word and is a pliysical word) if and only if both
(i) A a» B 
and (il) ^iag « y^-ing
or, perhaps even more fundamentally, that particular attribut e-instance A's
^ing at T^ is identical with particular attribute-lnstance B*b Ÿ  at
Tg if and only if
(1) A « B
(ii) /-ing » Ÿ'
(ill) « Tg
low there are a number of things wrong with an answer in those terms# The
first is that it makes the identity of particular attribute-inetances 
dependent upon the identity of attributes themselves (clauses (id)); whoreas 
tho theory wliich seeks to identify each instance of Tom's being In some 
psychological condition with an instance of Tom' s being in some physical
27* An ans^ rer very similar to the one 1 criticioo was given by J. Kim 
( On the Povcho-Thvslcal Identity Theory, American Philosophical 
(Quarterly 1966), who suggested that an event a's boln,? ? and an event 
b's beln? G are the same event iff either n is, and b is g are 
logically equivalent, or else iffa « b and the property of being F 
(F-ness) » the property of being G (G-ness)# My criticisms do not per- 
tain tptii© logical equivalence condition#
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condition is eupposod, end rl^tly, to be lens ambitious than a theory 
which seeks to identify each psychological condition with some physical 
condition. To take the case of pains it is rightly supposed to be 
easier» or less ambitious, to establishIho truth of statonents like
(iv) P's being ia pain at t » P's y<-ing at t
for some P and for eome t, tiian it is to establish the truth of statements
like
(v) ?'s being ia pain «* P's y -ing
for eon© P; end easier la turn than to establish that
(vi) being in pain ^  y  -ing
But if the identity of attribute-instarices is made to depend upon the 
identity of attributes themselves, then the order of difficulty is reversed^ 
Me must insist in other words that
(vii) Tom' s being in pain » Tom' s ^  -ing
does not entail that
(vi) being in pain <  ^-ing
on the grounds that, if it did, thm the truth of
(viii) î^ôd's being in pain » Fred' s [ -ing 
(where ^ -ing is different from vjr-ing) would entail that
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(ix) being in pain « £ -ing
which would conflict with (vi)# This shows that conditions (i) and (ii) 
above ere not necessary for the Identity of A's /-ing with B's -ing.
An additional difficulty is that it makes many events which are pre­
sumably Identical Into distinct ooourrences. Preouoably Caesar's death is 
the same event as Caesar's assassination? but thee© can only be the same 
event, by Kim's standard, if and only if Caesar » Caesar and dying ** being 
assassinated* But clearly the latter statement is identity is false*
Counter-examples can be multiplied with ease# On the assumption that 
Caesar died at noon, and given that Caesar died only once, it would be 
surprising if "Caesar died" and "Caesar died at noon" did not describe the 
same event * But this is only possible on Kim's analysis if, apart from it 
being true that Caesar « Caesar, it is also true that dying » dying at noon* 
Since this cannot be the case, either the two quoted sentences must describe 
different events (countor-intultively) or else Kim's analysis must be wrong.
Evidently there are grave difficulties in devising identity-conditions 
for attribut ©-instances. The trouble is, I believe, that the whole termin­
ology of attributes and attribut ©-instances is a mistake. It leads us to 
expect that attribL^^a and attribute-instances are related in a certain way, 
and yet when we come to examine the matter we find that they are not. But 
there does fortunately exist a way in thich this philosophy of attributes 
can be corrected.
Nagel's torminology of attributes and attribute-instances introduces 
an interpretation of the gerundive noun. Whereas those who have the con­
viction that events ore ubiquitous, on the other hand, would be inclined to 
say that a phrase of the form "John's noticing that the ship was sinking" 
specified aa instance of an event-attribute, or alternatively a particular 
event. Either of these interpretative views would be simply as good as
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each other, or as any, in the absence of any positive clues as to how these 
nouns do in fact operate; but there ere positive clues, which both Nagel 
and the event-theorist a seen to have over-looked# These lead to a quite 
different view of the role of the gerund*
In the first place, wo have the clue unearthed by Chomsky that gerundive 
nouna have aa internal structure which is strikingly different from that of 
the possessive noun (althou^ their superficial appearance is the same)? 
and secondly, there la a certain amount of evidence that the correct inter­
pretation of the gerund is factive* Gerundive phrases like
John* s being in pain 
John's believing that p 
John's wanting Q
can, when ia subject position, be freely interchanged with the correspond­
ing phrases
that John is ia pain 
that John believes that p 
that John vaui,. Q
which in turn can bo freely interchanged with the corresponding phrases
the fact that John is in pain
the fact that John believes that p
23tho fact that John wants Q
Footnote 23 printed overleaf
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It is not an objection to this view that
(41) Els singing was annoying
can be said to have a different meaning and a quite different set of truth- 
conditions, from
(42) The fact that he sang was annoying
For what we have aa the subject term of (4I) Is a phrase which is ia fact 
ambiguoust it can either be the gerund from "He sang", in which case (41) 
and (42) do share their meanings and truth-conditions, or els© it can be 
the mixed nominal from "Ho sang", in which case it refers to something like 
a process or activity, so that (41) records something equivalent to
(43) His actual singing was annoying^^
Footnote 23 brou{^t forward from page 141
But this intercliange cannot take place where the phrases occur as 
grammatical objects, as ia
E© *••• that p
and Ee «#*« the fact that p
Her© there is non-equivalence when is filled by exclainod* said,
thought. etc.
But it is a distinctive and revealing mark of the gerundive nominal 
that its sentence-forming complement can always be prefixed to the 
sentence from which the nominal is derived, with the introduction of 
a "that". Thus;
(1) John's riding his bicycle bothered her 
(il) It bothered her that John rod© his bicycle 
(ill) His working out the problem astonished us
(iv) It astonished us that he worked out the problem
etc, Cf# Bruce Fraser; Some Renarke on the Aotion-üoialnalisatlon in 
lunrlish (ia Jacobs and RosenWua pp, ' 34ff )
29# Distinct of course from (i) Hi® actually singing was annoying
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It i® only (41} in this second sense that makes it distinct from (42); 
but tho ambiguity ia phrases like "His /-lag" is only to be expected where 
the main verb of the ©eatence has no grammatical object, for it is the 
relation of the grai3m:tical object to the subject which standardly enables 
us to distinguish the nixed nomainal from the gerund, la examples in tdiich
the gerundive end mixed forms do diverge, as la
(44) Eis singing the song
(45) His singing of the song 
which both of course come from 
(45) Ha sings the song
it is clear that factively understood adjectives do attach to the gerund, 
but not to the mixed nominal* Further examples of adjectives normally 
used in a factive sense are "pleasing”, "annoying", "surprising", 
"predictable", "strange"; while further examples of adjectives normally 
understood in a nou-factive scnso are "araipid", "sudden", and "perceptive"» 
An additional morsel of evidence for the view that gerunds refer to 
facts is that in those cases in which the grammatical distinction between 
gerund, derived and mixed nominal is clear (i*e* where ambiguity doesn’t 
arise), the sentence-forming complements attachable to aominals othpr 
than gerunds are quite clearly of a sort which, from their meaning, are 
true of entities other than facts. Me cannot predicate of the two nouns
(47) John’s refusal of the offer
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(4B) Joha*8 refiising to the offer
a conploaent having a factiv® neaalng:» To take two instaaceo only# wo 
jmturally cay things like
(49) Jo2m*o refusal of the offer was the second of the day
(50) John's refusing of the offer was a tedious process
So it is not truo simply that gerunds ^  take factive predicates; it is 
also true that nominals other than gerunds only take predicates of a non* 
factiv® îdLnd, or which have a non-factiva interpretation#
50# The arguments for the non-existence of mental events can he extended 
without difficulty to answer the Question of whether mental entities 
of other categories exist* I shall now hriefly indicate how this 
Is done for the category of mental states* Sentences which are 
alleged to describe mental states are of the following sort# preposi­
tional and non-propositional# respectively:
(i) Jolin believes that spring is already here 
(il) Tom wants his toa
for which the gerundives respectively are
(Hi) v’elm's believing that spring is already here 
(iv; Tom'® wanting his tea
Again# it seem® rl#t to interpret these nominal® as fact-referring 
noirinals, approï^iate# as before, to complémentation by such 
predicates as asiounde,!us# M s  broth^ ei;., and the like,
which can be construed as BentenceMsodifier® and prefixed accordingly# 
The mixed iwminal® for the sentences (i) and (il) however# are clearly 
not acceptable ( » John* s bel levin,? of the fact that snrin.? is already 
hpre. *Tom* b h S  And as for the derived nominals%
(v) John's belief that spring is already here
(vi)^Tom's want (of?) his tea
we have# in (v), a noun which specifies only the content of what John 
believed; and la (vi)' merely a nonoense-phrase#
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ïlo'Â it m j  voll b@ tho casa that the un-ncun-lik® structure of
gorundiv® nouaa io actually connected with their factive cense; for
tlioro is more than a hint of complcmentsrity between tho idea that gerunds 
txo unlike nouns, on tho one hand, and the idea that facts are unlike things, 
on tho other* (A fact, after all, can ho minimally described as what a 
sentence, wTien ur»ei to make a true statement, la used to state)* But whore
do00 tills leave the efforts of Ilagol an.d t!io event-thoorists to construct
aa idoatity theory of tho mental with the physical?
It leaves thorn in a very peculiar position. If gerundive nouna can 
only be used to specify facts, and if facts are merely true statements 
state, then by nooinalising a sentence to obtain a gerundive noun in Kagel' a 
Style wo achieve nothing more than a way of saying, at beet, auch things 
as tîie following* Bvery mental fact Is Identical with a physical fact; 
or; sons mental facta gta Identical with physical facts; or; no mental 
facts are identical with physical facts, and so forth, A phy^icallst can 
say such things if he choose3 to* But in doing so, ho will only bo saying, 
in & roundabout but none the loss poroissoble wa^ ', that true mental 
ecntenco::; and true physical sentences, tal:®n in their appropriate pairs, 
bear a certain kind of (precusahly strong) rslationsMp to each other* As 
Bennett recogniseu, tho noint of identity thoor? would then be suW
otantially loot.
To eunoarise this argument; there is little grarsmtioal evidence for 
supposing that there is such an ontological cate^ry as the cate.gory of 
cental events. The favourite ways of trying to specify events involve 
the use of the gerundive noun, but it soems that the only things which 
these can be used to specify are facts* Allowing that there are cental 
facts while suggesting that there are no mental events is not, it must be
51# Content and Consciousness, footnote to p* 17,
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Raphaelsed, merely a matter of returning with one hand what was taken away 
with the other; because facts cannot ^  events, and nor can particular 
events b^ facts (although it may of course be a fact that a particular 
event occurred). If the arguments here expounded are correct, then the 
conclusion mist be that a physicalist who hankers after an identity theory 
has no option but to turn hie attention to mental facts, or, if be chooses, 
to true mental sentences. These seem to be the only two coherent alt©3>- 
natives he has; althou^ ho will do well to remaaber that the completely 
ubiquitous connection between the sentence and the gerundive noun in 
English shows that, between them, there is nothing to choose,
4* ACTI0S3 AND CAUSES AGAIN: S0M3 RS2L\H1C3 ON TH2IS GlAieiAN
Finally I append some considerations of a similar sort about actions 
and causes, She question to wiiioh I shall address myself is whether there 
are actions, in any sense other than that ^hlch is implied by the existence 
of sentences of action. In fact my aim will be to express doubts as to 
whether there are. Some of the considerations relevant to this question 
have been aired in previous sections, so rather than involve rpself in 
repetition, I shall proceed at once to discuss what seams to me to be one 
crucial question, which can be expressed like this: does it follow from
what is called the causal analysis of actions either that actions are events, 
or that there are such things as actions? To probe this problem we 
naturally need to satisfy ourselves of the plausibility of tho causal 
analysis of actions, and having done that, we need to see what its 
implications are,
What I mean by the causal analysis of actions can be best expressed by 
saying that action-verbs are causal verbs, or, rou^ily speaking, that verbs 
of action can bo analysed grammatically as having tho form cause S, where 2
1
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Is a sontonce or sentence-like element* A causal analysis of actions has 
been implicitly expressed in the philosophical literature (notably by 
Davidson)as saying that for every action except a basic action, we 
can consider it aa sot.®thing which causes ao-and-eo to happen*
This doctrine does hand in hand with a certain view of the identity 
of actions* In order to see this, consider the following case. Suppose 
that there is a physical event describable as the movement of my rigjht arm 
in a downwards direction (at a certain time); and that in the situation 
there are various other sentences which could be given in answer to the 
question "what did Taylor do?"* Eere are just a few:
Dl* E© pressed the plunger down
D2* He caused the bridge to blow up
D5, Ee intentionally caused the bridge to blow up
D4* He blew up the bridge
D5* He sprained his wrist
D6* Ee damaged the Plunger mechanism (by pressing too hard)
D7* He killed the sentry who was on duty on the bridge
With the exception ^or the moment of D3# we can suppose that each of these 
sentences describes or reports something that happened* Davidson, I think, 
would assert that each sentence describes the same event ; the event 
specified, perhaps, by "my rij^t arm's moving downwards"* He would also 
assert that what makes these descriptions descriptions of an event which 
is an action, is the presence in the list of the description D3*» for 
according to him an event is an action when it has a description in terms 
of the agent's intention*
31a* D. Davidson: Agency
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But it nicht appear that the way in which causality eaters this action- 
eltuatioa in fact contradicts the view which says that all the B-senteaces 
specify tho sane event* For instance, it mi^t he said that Dl* and D4* 
crust apply to, or report different ©vents, on the grounds that (i) pressing 
the plunger down ocv.upiss a differont tiae-span from blowing up the bridge, 
and tliat (ii) pressing the plunger down causes the bridge to blow up, and 
must therefore be regarded as a different ©vent from it*
But tills conclusion is avoidable* We can avoid saying that Dl* and 
D4* describe different events, while at the earn© time agreeing with facts
(i) and (ii). The confusion which would tempt someone to conclude that 
they wore different events lies in thinking that tho bridge* s blowing up 
is the same event as his blowing up tho bridge* But tho supporter of the 
causal analysis can reply that the bridge's blowing up is an event which 
has something he did (pressing the plunger) as its cause, while this is not 
true of his blowing up the bridge* His blowing up the bridge is an action 
of his, and is analysable by saying that something he did caused tho bridge 
to blow up; but it is ob.iously false that his blowing up the bridge can 
be analysed in terms of something he did causing his blowing up the bridge - 
for this would involve one of his actions causing another. Ba when we 
say that he blew up the bridge, at least according to the theory, we mention 
something he did, but we do ao in a way which has reference to an effect 
of some more basic action of his (in this case; his pressing the plunger); 
which is to say that in describing him as having blown up the bridge we 
describe his pressing the plunger down in terms of something it caused - 
the bridge's blowing up. AlthoUi^ his pressing the plunger down and the 
bridge's blowing up occupy different time spans, his pressing the plunger 
down and his blowing up the bridge do not. And, consistently with this 
analysis, although his pressing the plunger down causes the bridge's 
blowing up, it does not cause his blowing up the bridge* To describe an
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action in torma of its effects is not, on this view, to doscribe other 
actionc as well, but simply to describe the same event - the event which 
was his action - in different ways.
This is how the causal analysis of action can be expounded as part 
and parcel of a certain view about the identity of actions. In the context 
of this analysis, actions are named by phrases like "his blowing up the 
bridge", "his pressing the plunger down", and it is euggested that tho 
relation between the things which these doocripticna name and the things 
which descriptions llko "tho bridge's blowing up" name can bo one of event- 
causality.
Of course, if we accept that his blowing up the bridge can be analysod 
in terms of his doing something which caused the bridge to blow up, then 
we are forced to concider, in the same way, whether the something he did 
can be analysed in terras of a more basic action still, which, when described 
in terms of its effect, is his doing that something. The possibility of 
a regress to ever more basic actions and ever more basic descriptions seems 
to offer itself here. But we heed not conclude that the regress goes on 
for ever, for we can almys point to some tiling an agent did which is not 
euch that he did it by doing something else, and this we can call the action 
which is most bacio to the situation - perhaps it is an action of moving 
one's limbs in a certain way. (As Davidson's radical suns:ostion does:
our primitive actions, tho ones we do not do by 
doing something else, mere movements of the body - these 
are all the actions there are. We never do more than 
move our bodies: the rest is up to nature" 32)
whether this view of basic actions is correct I do not know. For the
moment, however, the point is this: that just because some actions
consist in doing something more basic which has an intended effect, we
32. Davidson: A'-encv, p. 22.
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need not conclude that basic actions are analysable in tho same way*
V/hether there have causes, say in tonas of mental antecedents, is a 
separate question.
Go what I have been referring to as the causal theory of actions — 
the theory that all actions except bacic actions are analysable in terms of 
deeds which caused something, does not suggest a proliferation of different 
actions for every single thing the agent does, but tiany different descrip­
tions of the same action (descriptions which mention different effects of 
the single thing the agont did) ; not a different action for each descrip­
tion* It would also be denied that an event like my putting poison in 
his drinl: lasts a different length of time t'l an event like my killing him, 
in a situation in which I kill him by putting poison in his drink* For 
suppose the poison takes a long tine to do it's work. Then when I've 
finished putting the poison in his drirk, the theory would say that I've 
findeed killing him - even thou^ he does not actually die until later*
The temptation to say that I haven't finished killing him even thou^ the 
poison has been put in his drink arises, I suspect, because there can be 
no certainty in such a situation that the effect of the poison's having 
been put in his glass will actually come about as planned* Until he 
actually dies, the possibility remains that he will vomit the liquid up and 
survive* But such an example only shows that we cannot describe an action 
in terms of its effects until the effects actt.ially come about - and not 
that there are two actions. So the theory would say*
The theory therefore is that an actioa-sentence is analysed as one 
which is equivalent to one which contains two verbs, and the word "cause"* 
But it is important to bear In mind at this point that tho causal analysis 
is not ontological so much as grammatical. The causal analysis by itself 
does not imply either that there are actions, or that there are none, since 
it only gives the grammatical form which sentences of action have. Such an
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analysis is not wholly irrelevant to the ontology of action, however, as my 
subsequent remarks will show*
Support for the grammatical causal analysis of action-verbs can be 
found in Lalroff'o The !T?.titro of Evntnctic Irrcn'O.rrttv*^^ Lakoff* s proposal 
was that the derivation of (5l) could be represented as (55), via the inter- 
r.ediato fora (52) - (here I leave out considerations of tense)
(51) John opened the door
(52) John caused (the door open)
(53) John caused (the door bo open)
The sentence **1h.e door be open" of (53) combines with an abstract element
Inchoative to form the verb of change "open" which appears in (52) ; and
which in its turn combines with on abstract element Causative to form the 
transitive verb of causation "open" which appears in the surface form (5l)# 
This analysis of transitive "verbs of causation" is allegedly supported 
by the ambiguity of sentences whore a verb of causation is formed from an 
adjective capable of cither comparative or positive degree, e.g.
(54) John hardened tho metal
which, meaning either "John made the metal herd" or "John made the metal 
harder", is said to be derived from (56), via the intermediate form (55)
33• Lakoff ? The Haturs of Syntactic Irrcrularltv, In TIathcmal
limi?tic? end Autoratjlc Translation. Report no. Computation
Laboratory of Harvard University, 1965*
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(55) John eau soi (the metal îiarden)
(56) John canoed (the metal he hard(or))
where the o~.iblgulty of (54) is adequately explained in terms of the under­
lying form (56) vlii-fi uses the contained sentence to represent the two
*54alternative readings#
A controversial feature of Lelcoff's proposal is the syntactical 
derivation of words from phrases, in contrast to finding their synonyms in 
the lexicon# The general form of this lexicanization transformat ion is, 
according to Lakoff* s idea.
34. Support for I^koff's analysis is also supposed to derive from the 
occurrence of "pro-forms" such as the "do-eo” construction, or the 
ordinary grammatical, pronouns, in sentences like
(i) John hardened the metal but it surprised us that it
would do EO
(ii) John opened the door but it took him a long time to 
bring about
where the "do-so" phrase refers to the metal's becoming hard, and 
where the last prono m  of (11) refers to the door's beconing open#
Ly own attitude to such "pro-form" arguments Is that they ou^ dit to 
be handled with great care (Cf # my previous section) ; it is not 
at all certain that all occurrences of a pro-form refer to material 
contained in the sentenco in which they occur# If
(ill) John :’arri©d Ikry although it surprised us that she 
went through with it 
(iv)? John married ICary thou^ di it surprised us that she 
did it#
(v)? John resembled Kary but it surprised us that she 
did#
are all grammatical, which is doubtful, it seems aoi"© plausible to 
explain the reference of the final pronouns as a reference to an 
innliod sentence; in these cases the eymetrioal sentence "Hary 
marriod John"# Sentences like (i) and (ii), in other words, may 
owe their apparent grammaticality to a reference to an implied 
sentence: "the metal became hard(er)" end "the door became open"
respectively# A theory which actually represented all the im­
plication 3 of a sentence in its deep analysis would make the argument 
from pro-foKis more acceptable as a general strategy - but so far as 
I know most of the current generative theories of s^ nitas fail to do this#
35# Criticised e.g. by Fodor: Three Rea00:13 for not Deriving "33L11" from 
"Cause to Die" Linguistic Inquiry, I, 1970.
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"Cause to V- . " — > "V " Intr Tr
Perhaps Lakoff'ô analysis can he brought more directly into line with the 
Davidsonian analysis of action-sentences if we represent (5l) as derived 
from (53) via (57) :
(57) John did something which caused (the door open)
(53) John did something which caused (the door be open) 
and if we represent lexicalisation as permitting not
but
"Do something whidi causes to
I do not intend to go into the merits and de-merits of this revised 
wording of tho lexicalizatioa transformation. Of greater interest is to 
notice a certain difficulty about verb-modification. For whether ve 
phrase the analysis of D.4. He blew un the brld.'-o as
(53a) He caused the bridge to blow up
or
(59b) He did something which caused the bridge to blow up 
a difficult problem will arise as to how to transfer any modification
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vliich might attach to tho single verb in D.4. IVhlch verb does it attach 
to in the underlying sentence? Or, to pose the converse question: when
the two verbs of the underlying sentence are both modified, one by one 
modifier and one by another, how are they both accommodated by the single 
Verb in the analysandun sentence? To make the point specific, consider
(60) Peter blew up the bridge on Sunday
Does this have the structure
(6l) Peter did something on Sunday which caused the bridge to blow up 
(on Itonday?)
or the structure
(62) Peter did something (on Saturday?) which caused the bridge to blow 
up on Sunday
A somewhat similar argument, put forward by Fodor,^^ is to the effect 
that the Davldson-Lakoff proposal would result in some underlying forms 
having nonsensical surface forms. Fodor cites the case of
(63) Floyd caused it by Adv
The glass malt on Sunday Floyd heat the glass on Saturday 
or in other words
(64) Floyd caused the (glass to melt on Sunday) by (heating it on Saturday) 
which would, on application of the "Cause to — ^ ”^Tr” produce
36# Fodor, op. cit., p. 433*
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(65)* Floyd melted the glass on Sunday by boating it on Saturday
These are difficult problems. The only conclusion to draw is that they 
must be given solutions before the causal analysis can expect to find 
acceptance. "
Having expounded the main aspects of the causal analysis of actions in 
the grammatical sense, we must now go on to deal with the ontological ques­
tion of whether there are actions in some sense other than that implied by 
the existence of action-sentences themselves. Let me quickly summarise 
where we have got to so far. The grammatical analysis says that an action- 
sentence typically contains a causal verb; it can be grammatically analysed 
roughly according to this schema;
Schema 1. A V-s 0 — > A[+Cause][^ 0 V
thus John grows tomatoes—»  John [+Cause][^Tomatoes grow]^
The grammatical analysis is designed to reveal the fact that action-verbs 
are typically (but not always) of the causative type. This only suggests 
that one action-sentence may be construed, from its context, as a sentence 
about an action which caused an event, and this again, perhaps, for the 
same reasons, as a sentence about a more basic action which caused an event 
which caused it. On one theory, basic actions are movements of the body 
(as Davidson puts it; "All I ever do is move my body; the rest is up to 
nature"). But this causal analysis of action-sentences in terms of the 
events which more basic actions cause does not remove the need for a 
logical analysis of action-sentences generally. Whether we are treating 
of "John blew up the bridge" or "John did something which caused the bridge 
to blow up", we still have a sentence about John's actions, and one which 
stands just as much in heed of ontological analysis as the original.
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By analogy with what I said In the last section, it seems to me in 
this case, that if th©p© are actions, in a sense over and above that 
implied by saying that there are sentences of action, it must be possible 
to find nominal 9 to name or refer to them in speech# There are only 
actions in the strict sense if we can frame statements which assert that 
one action is different from another, or that one action is the same as 
another; and either of these types of statement, it seems, require " 
noun-phrases of a type suitable to pick actions out# Tho noun-phrases 
standardly used to nominato actions are of grammatically gerundive type, 
i#@* phrases like "his blowing up the bridge", "his pressing the plungsr", 
etc# But if this is the only way to nominate actions directly, we shall 
again have to question, in view of (a) the close relation between the 
gerund and the sentence, (b) the peculiar internal structure of the gerund 
and its factive sense (see last section), whether the gerundive construction 
really does provide a way of referring to actions, as thecausal analysis 
seems to pro-suppose#
What other types of nominal might do the trick? ¥e have at our 
disposal, to repeat, at least three grammatical types of nominal expression: 
the gorund, the derived, and the mized# Vith a sentence like
John refused the offer
these are respectively
John's refusing the offer 
John's refusal of the offer 
John's refusing of the offer
Now Chomsky has made an observation concerning the derivation of derived
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nominale which is ©xtraoôly relevant to the ontological analysis of event 
and action-sentences. Kis observation is that where a verb is a causal 
verb, there is no derived nominal. The sentence
(66) John grows tomatoes
contains a causal verb, at least according to the view which gives its 
grammatical analysis as
John [4Cause][^ the tomatoes growj^
but we find that only the gerundive and mired, but not the derived nominal, 
can be formed i
(67) John's growing of tomatoes (gerundive)
(68») John's growth (of?) tomatoes (derived)
(69) John's growing of tomatoes (mixed)
It is of interest to see intuitively how generally this failure occurs. 
It occurs for the sentence
(to) John blew up the bridge
where the verb is also allegedly causal, for the three nominals in this case 
would bet
37# See Remarks on Nominalisation, pp. 192-3<
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(71) John's blowing up the bridge (gerundive)
(72») John's blow up of the bridge (derived)
(73) John's blowing up of the bridge (mixed)
And it occurs, perhaps more significantly, for the explicitly causal 
sentence
(74) John caused the death of Herbert 
for here we have
(75) John's causing the death of Herbert (gerundive)
(76») John's cause of the death of Herbert (derived)
(77?) John's causing of the death of Herbert (mixed)
Vitliout fathering the complexities of the derivation of these sentences, 
the hypothesis seems worth entertaining that where we do have a causal
verb, we cannot form a derived nominal*
38
Carlota Smith invites us to reconsider this hypothesis, for she 
thinks that counter-examples can be found* Her suggestion is that many 
causal verbs (e.g. "convert", "accelerate", "expand", "conclude" "alter", 
"rotate", "terminate", "submerge", "assassinate") have derived nominal® 
just like "refuse" does# To take two examples; for the case of
38# Carlota Gmith: On Causative. #z^Æjmd^erivod Nomin&ls in Btwtlish. 
Linguistic Inquiry, I, April, 1972, pp. 156-133.
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(73) John accelerated tlm car 
ve have
(79) John's accelerating the car (gerundive)
(80?) John'o acceleration of the car (derived)
(8I) John's acoelerating of the car (mixed)
and for
(02) John expanded the metal 
we have
(03) John's expanding the metal (gerundive)
(84?) John's expansion of the metal (derived)
(35) John's expanding of tlie metal (mixed)
and 80 on. Smith's hypothesis is that causativo verbs which take a 
noainaliging suffix of Latin origin ("-tion", "-al", "-mont") do have a 
derived nominal, while other verbs (e.g. "change", "turn", "stop", "kill" 
"raise", "end") do not. Phrases such as (80) and (84) ere acceptable in 
her view, while phrases like
{06») John's stop of the car (derived)
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(87*) John's end of the meeting (derived)
are not# But this is barely convincing# I seriously doubt whether many 
people would unhesitatingly accept (30?) or (34?); and quite apart from 
this intuitive matter, it is hard to explain why the presence of Latin- 
based nominalising suffixes should make any difference* X think therefore 
that we can accept Chomsky* s suggestion that derived noainals cannot be 
formed from causative verbs*
Now mixed nominals for causative verba, althou^ they form in a quite 
regular way, almost certainly name processes, and (again from an intuitive 
point of view) not actions at all. This leaves us with the gmmd. But 
if all ve are left with by way of a referring phrase for actions is the 
gerund, thon conclusions similar to those derived for the case of mental 
events have to be accepted. The nature of action, that is to say, lies 
in the nature of facts. There are no actions in & strictly ontological 
sense, but only fact-reporting nominal® and the sentences which are trans­
formationally related to them.
X6X
Chapter IVs Prospects for an Identity Theory 
X# Introduction
2. The Truth-Value of Physicalisa 
3# The Mental and the Physical
Anpendi^: Identification and Explication
162
1. INTRODUCTION
la this last chapter I chiefly want to sccoœplieh two things; the 
first of which is to finally assess whether or not there is a version of 
phyaicalism which is likely to be true, and the second of which is to 
discharge the obligation I described near the beginning of Chapter I to 
accurately describe how the mental is distinguished from the physical.
The results of these projects turn out to be inter-dependent, in the sense 
that what I shall surest to be the most accurate description of the mental- 
physical distinction goes part of the way towards explaining why some forms 
of phyaicalism are necessarily false tdiile others are not. Those two 
projects occupy sections 2 and 3 of the present chapter respectively.
I shall argue that physicalisa does have a certain formulation which, 
in all likelihood, makes it true. I shall approach my discussion of this 
topic via a brief summary of the main arguments and conclusions of the 
essay so far. In Chapter I (sections 4 and 5} it was explained that 
physical!Stic hypotheses taken as a group could be divided into reductive 
hypotheses on the one side, and non-reductive hypotheses on the other.
The difference between these was a difference of generality contained in 
their statement; identifying a mental property with a physical property 
or identifying a person's having a mental property with a person's having 
a physical property are reductive identifications which require bridge 
laws to establish them, while identifying mental "particulars", taken one 
at a time, with physical "particulars" taken one at a time, would be a 
non-reductive hypothesis, and ipso facto one which requires no bridge laws 
and which has no scientific confirmation or falsification. Since there is 
no generality at this non-reductive level, there is no possibility that 
counter-examples to such a hypothesis could be discovered by science.
NOW as far as the meanings of these hypotheses are concerned, the
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most important contention advanced in the intervening discussion is that 
phrases having the forms "A»s jZ5-ing" or "A»s jZLing at T", which find their 
place in identity theories at the Time-Specific Level and the Person- 
Specific Level respectively, are most probably only suitable for the 
specification of facts. The argumentation which led to this conclusion 
was as follows.
We saw that in order to avoid the difficulties surrounding the spatial 
location of things like thou^ts, beliefs, pains, after-images and sensa­
tions, Nagel proposed that things like a particular person's having a 
thou^t, a particular person's having a sensation or being in a state of 
belief etc,, should be what any plausible identity theory of the mental 
should analyse in physical terms; and he called things of this sort 
"instances of attributes", I explained in the last chapter how it was 
possible to regard "instances of attributes" like John's believing that 
p, Fred's desiring that q, and so on, as instances of mental states, - 
for nothing more substantial is involved here than a change of terminology. 
And I also explained how things like John's noticing that p, Fred's 
remembering that q, and so on, mi^t accordingly be regarded as particular 
mental events - or, to use the "attribute" terminology, instances of 
mental event-attributes. I suggested that the general idea behind Nagel's 
proposal was one which we should accept. But having accepted it, we had 
to face the problem of spelling out the conditions under which attribute- 
instances are the same and when distinct. When we tried to answer this 
question, we found that the most obvious answers fail; and I tried to 
explain how some 1 of the puzzlement which surrounds this problem can 
be traced to the peculiar internal structure of the gerundive nouns which, 
again to use Nagel's terminology, we get from filling the variable-place 
of an at tribut e-specification and nominalising.
The question which we had to ask ourselves at that stage, was this:
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if a philosopher were to propose an identity theory of the mental# on 
either the Time-Gpecifio Level or the Person-Gpecifio Level (described in 
Chapter I), then what would his identity-etategaents be saying# if they con­
sisted of gerundive nouns flanking the *»• sign of identity? Or in other 
words# what do nouns of this sort typically desigmte? Or in other words 
again: d^iat general category of objects is there# which contain the items 
which the nouns of these identity statements designate?
The fact that standards of identity for the so-called attribute- 
instanoes could not be found# and the manner in which these failures pre­
sented themselves, lead us to question whether there were any such things 
as attribute-instances at all* I concluded that there were not# and that 
gerundive nouns should# by contrast# be interpreted factively* Not only 
did this conclusion seen to be suggested by the grammatical evidence# but 
it also provided an explanation of why the "at tribut e-instance" interpreta­
tion of those phrases lead to so such difficulty in the first place*
The corresponding problem about the identity-conditions for facts is# 
as is usual with such questions# not without it's difficulties* But 
gerunds are tied in a certain strict way to sentences: every English 
sentence converts by a standard transformation to a gerundive noun, and 
every gerundive noun converts, by the same transformation in reverse, to a 
sentence.^ It would be counter-intuitive, I think, to suggest that gerund A
1* This theory that gerunds can be put in one-to-one correspondence with 
sentences actually requires a small - but not serious - amendment* 
This is due to the fact that gerunds# unlike sentences, are without 
tense; the sentences
P was about to go
P is about to go
for instance, both transform to give a single gerund:
P's being about to go
But we can always extract the tens© of a sentence and nominalise the
(Footnote continued overleaf)
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names the earn© fact as gerund B If and only it the true sentence to which 
gerund À is transformâtionally related is the same true sentence as that 
to which gerund B la transformationally related. Perhaps a better sugges­
tion is this: gerund A names the same fact as gerund B if and only if the 
true sentence to which gerund A is transformationally related can be used 
to make the same statement as the true sentence to which gerund B is trans­
formationally related.
It is difficult to decide, however, whether this is the best answer#
But whatever the answer, the hypothesis that gerunds must be factively 
interpreted remains. All in all then, and to summarise the Interpretations 
put on physicalism at each of the three levels of generality, we have the 
following types of item to analyse in physical terms# On the Property 
Level we have mental properties like being in pain, noticing that p, etc.; 
on the Person-Specific Level we have mental facts like John's being in pain, 
Joe's noticing that p, etc.g and on the Time-Specific Level we have mental 
facts like John's noticing that p at T, Joe's being in pain at time T', 
and so forth. We must now turn for the last time to the question of 
whether the doctrines of physicalisa, at each of these levels, and under­
stood in these ways, mi^t be true.
Footnote 1 brought forward from page 164
result as usual, so that the sentences
It was the case that P about to go
It is the case that P ig, about to go
correspond respectively to the distinct gerundsi
Its having been the case that P about to go
Its being the case that P Jj, about to go
where underlined "is" is tenaeless. With this amendment gerunds 
and sentences can be matched one-to-one without exception.
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2* THE TRUTH-YAUrS OF FHI3ICALISH
As for as tho truth-valuo of those doctrines is concomed# the con­
clusions we have arrived at so far can he eusanarised ss follows;
: First» that a reduction at the Property Level of mental properties 
to behavioural properties is ruled out on empirical grounds (see Chapter I, 
section 3) # Second, that a reduction of the mental to the behavioural at 
the Person-Specific Level is also ruled out on empirical grounds (see 
Chapter I, section 3)î and third, that a reduction at tho Property-Level 
of mental properties to cerebral properties is, as î^tnaa observed, ruled 
out on empirical grounds providod that the cerebral properties thmsselves 
are given a detailed enou^ kind of physico-chemical description.
This leaves various possibilities to be considered* The first is 
whether a reduction of the mental to the cerebral at the Property Level is 
possible under certain less detailed descriptions of the cerebral side of 
the equation; or alternatively, whether there exists scee type of cerebral 
description which would make a reduction at the Person- Spécifia Level 
possible* It will be remembered that Putnam rejected both of these 
possibilities, on the empirical grounds that two psychologically identical 
organisms could have brains ccKsposed of different types of material, and 
also that the same organism could be in a psychologically similar condition 
on two occasions in his life history althou^ t W  material "hardware" of 
his brain mi^t, between these occasions, have changed* In the section of 
Chapter II in which I first discussed this matter, I expressed agreement 
with Putnam on these facts, while suggesting that further argumentation 
mi^t reveal a level of physical description which would anull such 
differences and provide a sense in which the psychologically identical 
could be the physically identical, either at the Property Level or at the 
Person-Gpeoific Level.
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I BhaXl embark on this argumentation shortly* Before doing so, how­
ever, I laxist say something of another possibility that resaains to be 
considered. This is the possibility of a non-reductive theory et the 
Tlme-Speoific Level. When explaining the details of this level in Chapter 
I, I emphasised that no bridge law or nosological statuent could be 
advanced in direct support of such a theory, that it was open to falsifica­
tion in the way an ordinary scientific hypothesis was, and that for these 
reasons it was best regarded as a philosophical or metaphysical view.
Indeed this is just what is meant by saying that a theory on the Time-
Specific Level ia non-reductive.
It has been customary in recent years to suppose that a physicalistio 
theory on this Tiae-Specifio Level would concern either the connection 
between mental ©vents and physical events, or the connection between mental 
states and physical states* My suggestion has been that mental facts and
physical facta form the subject-matter of such a theory; the questions now
therefore are two-fold: the first concerns the r?eneral conditions under 
which a mental fact like John's noticing that p at T would be identical 
with a physical fact like John's )6-ing at T, where "j^ing" is some cerebral 
term; and the second concerns whether these conditions are such as to 
make this identity impossible*
Now this is not an easy question; nor is it one which has received
the benefits of philosophical exploration. liy tentative remarks (in the
last section) as to the first question were to the effect that gerund A
names the same fact as gerund B if end only if the true sentence to which
gerund A is transformationally related can be used to make the same state-
2
meat as the true sentence to which gerund B is transformationally related.
2* An alternative suggestion, %Mch I reject, is that Fact A is identical 
with Fact B if and only if they have the same explananda and the same 
explanantia. Or in symbols;
(Footnote 2 continued overleaf)
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Applied to tho question of tho mental and tho physical, the problem can now 
bo illustrâtod by tho following example* Suppose John does notice that p 
at T, and suppose that John does at T; are tho two sentences
Joïin notices that p at T
John ^ *s at T
such that they can be used to imlce the same statement?
This is a question typical of those upon whose answers the truth of 
Physicalisa at the Tiae-Specifio Level depends* There are two circum­
stances, as I sea it, ia which the answer to this exemplifying question 
would be afflmatlvB# % e  first, briefly, is this: if the spealser of
the first sentence intended the mental verb "notices" to mean what the
physical verb s" means, and if his audience, on,that occasion of speech, 
understood him to be intending this, then presumably we can say that the 
first sentence is being used to make a statement of the same fact as that 
which the second sentence could be used to make* Or the situation could 
be reversed. The speaker of the second sentence could intend (etc., etc.,) 
that his physical word be taken by his audience in the same sense as
that in which the mental word "notices" is normally taken* But this would 
be a trivial way of getting an affirmative answer*
A second circumstance in which the answer would be affirmative, and a
Footnote 2 brou#Lt forward from page 167
» Fg <-> (f)(f expl f ©xpl &  F^expl f<-^F^ expl f)
Wiere is fact A, Fg is Fact B, where "expl" reads "explains",
and where the quantifier ranges over facts. I reject this suggestion 
on tlie grounds that whether or not a certain specified fact does 
explain ss well as Pg is something which itself is liable to
depend upon whether F^ is identical idth Fg. % e  su^estion is, to 
that extent, circular*
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leas trivial one, is there does exist sons truth at a hi^er (and 
reductive) level of generality# either to the effect that the mental 
property of noticing that p is identical with the physical property of ^ingj 
or else to the effect that John’s noticing that p is identical with John’s 
^ing. Such truths have to be established by science and not by philosophy* 
But were they to have been established# at the time T at which John both 
notices that p and /’s, then wo would have a situation in which a reductive 
theory would support a non-reductive theory: truths established at a more 
general would support a truth at the least general# Tiae-^pecifio Bevel.
Thore is not space in this essay to elaborate any further on those 
brief remarks. I hope to have suggested the direction in which the 
truth-value of physicalicn at the Timo*-6pecifio Bevel mi^t be sou^^tj 
we must now turn to inspect the matter at the other levels.
We want ultimately to consider whether for each mental property thore 
mifdit be a physical property identical with it. Dut let us approach this 
question by considering something woaîcor# via. whether for each mental 
property-word there ni^t bo a cerebral property-word idiich is co-extensive 
with it.
In the case of belief# this amounts to considering whether every 
particular belief p might be such that
A. (x)(p)(Ss)(x believes that p == i is in cerebral condition s)
 ^If such a thing were true# it would mean# to take one instance# that the 
propertywword ^Believing that swans fly” would be co-ertensive with the 
property-^word “being in cerebral condition S”; but not that believing 
that s'»mns fly ig, being in cerebral condition S for which a proper state** 
ment of law would be required.
Can we make intelligible to ourselves the situation in which proposl:^®^
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&  would bo true? Th& first thing to observe in this connection is that 
for the case of a belief which is eo obvious or fundamental that every 
minimally conscious person has it# there is little doubt that there does 
exist a corebral condition which obtains in such a person when but only 
when ho has the belief perhaps the state simply described by saying that 
the cortex is active. Then it would be true# for this belief# that whom­
ever named, tlie ©tatemeats "P believes that p” and ”?*s cortex Is 
active” are equivalent in truth-value. This is a situation which not 
only can we imagine to obtain, but which# in all likelihood, does obtain 
for eaao beliefs of this fundamental or obvious kind# However it would 
require a sociological or cross-cultural survey to make sure that everybody 
in a state of minimal consciousness did in fact have such a fundamental 
belief — the belief that day follows ni^t mi^t be a candidate#
But being able to imagine situations of this sort does not settle our 
questions regarding proposition 4  ^  general. This is because, in general# 
beliefs are neitlier fundamental nor obvious; and so some more refined 
physical condition would have to be found for these, such that any 
organism was in that refined condition when and only when (extensionally 
speaking) he had one of these non-obvious beliefs. In thei case of the
belief that time is cyclical# for instance# our task is to guess as to
whether there is some corebral condition £# such that anyone happens to 
have that belief when and only whoa ho is in that special cerebral condition. 
In this situation it is no longer sufficient to pick on a condition as loose
as havin T^ an active cortex, since the belief# not being fundamental or
obvious, is not automatically held; many persons with fully active cortices 
no doubt believe the opposite# and many more have no opinions on the 
subject wliatsoever. It scorns clear that the physical condition found to 
be associated with this belief would have to be specific in a h i ^  degree; 
and moreover# that a similar thing would have to apply to beliefs in general#
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BO that (with one mall exception) each different belief-state would have 
to bo associated with a different cerebral state. That this sust be so 
is easily seen from the following eimplc argument; if the state of belief 
that p was found to be associated with the presence of cerebral condition 
^  and if the state of belief that q was also found to be associated with 
the presence of cerebral condition Sj then it would be impossible for 
anyone to believe p and not believe q, since not only would the truth of
so-and-so believes p
have to be accompanied by the truth of
so-and-so is in c
but the falsity of
so-and-so believes q
would have to be accompanied by the falsehood of
so and so is in o
(this is wliat material equivalence moans)* But this last fact would of 
course conflict with the fact that tlie person in question believed that p* 
So in other words, it seems that if proposition 4. is to be true, then it 
must be true that each belief-state happens to be present when and only 
when a certain cerebral state happens to be present, and in such a way that 
variations in belief are closely attended by variation in cerebral condi­
tion. The reservation I mentioned concerns pairs of beliefs, if any.
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which either because of their logical equivalence or for some other reason, 
must be hold or abandoned togothor# In these cases we mi^t wish to 
reserve a distinction between the beliefs (we count them as two) while 
only needing a single cerebral state to accompany them both; so that in 
such oases a difference between the beliefs would not be zsiirrorred by a 
difference between two corebral conditions - as is true in the general case* 
To say all this is to minimally describe the situation which would 
have to obtain in order for proposal A to be true* liost Importantly, 
perhaps, is the fact that there need be no conflict between this kind of 
situation and Putnam’s observation that psychologically identical organisms 
can have brains made of different t^ »po3 of stuff. It is of vital 
importance to see how such a conflict can be made to disappear. The 
essential point is that the cerebral conditions (or configurations, we 
mi^t call then) could be described, presumably, without any reference to 
the actual kind of material in which they appeared, and yet without the 
use of mental or psychological language. There are ssany ways of giving a 
physical description of a mechanism? one is in terms of the molecular 
composition of tJxe material out of which its parts are constructed; one 
is in terms of the sizes and strengths of the component mechanical parts 
of the mochanisa; another lo in terms of how those parts function in 
relation to one another; perhaps another is in terms of the flow of the 
"input” throu^ the mechanism, the manner in which it is processed by the 
mechanism before issuing in "output" (Freud’s early hydrological model of 
tlie psychical processes is perhaps an example). Given these different
modes of pliysical description, it is not difficult to appreciate that two 
mechanisms which are dissimilar when described in molecular terms mi^it 
easily be similar when do scribed in mechanical terms; that two mechanisms 
which are dissimilar when doscribod in mechanical terms mi^t be similar 
under a description in functional terms; and that two mechanisms which
175
are dlssisdlar under a functional description ml^t be eiiailar, eonosivably, 
under a "processing” description* Only under the extremely dubious assump­
tion that the only way of providing a physical description of a mechanism 
is in terms of the actual type of material of which It is composed does 
Putnam’s observation entail that mental property-worda could not be co­
extensive with physical property^ords*
¥o can surely envisage the discovery of a pattern of cerebral organisa­
tion which was such that the matter of the brain happened to become 
differently configurod with the arrival or exit of a new belief or desire. 
The hypothesis requires that for each mental change there is a physical 
change - but not vice-versa? it also requires, as I have suggested, that 
any particular parcel or cerebral matter (any brain) la capable of assuming 
as many configurations as there are sentences which can report what that 
particular subject believes, fears, etc* These need only be finite in 
number, in spite of the fact that the number of propositional-ettltude 
sentences in the language is infinite, since any organism obviously has 
no more time in his life than for a finite number of attitudes. ¥e are 
dealing with his performance at this point, we mli^t say, rather than with 
his competence*
In order to explain in a more detailed and unambiguous way what this 
system of cerebral configurations would be like. It is Instructive to con­
sider a more general hypothesis* The idea that there is a system of 
cerebral configurations such that a different one obtains when and only 
when the agent is in a different particular mental state seems, on the 
face of it, the some idea as that which says that the details of a persons 
successive mental states are written in the material of his brain in such 
a way that we could find out what a person’s beliefs or memories were by 
inspecting his cerebral matter directly. How there is indeed one sense 
in which this equivalence obtains. But the idea that mental states have
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en Internal representation in tîiô person’s brain or nervous system is one 
which must be treated with the utmost care# for in fact there are several 
different forma whidi it can take, each differing considerably la 
ere lib ill ty from the others* It la for this reason that the least 
plausible formulations of the "brain-writlag" hypothesis must bo carefully 
stated and rejected* Doing tîiia will also servo to sharpen tlie details 
of the particular version of the brain-writing hypothesis which I want to 
suggest is probably correct*
One thoroughly implausible version of the notion that a parsons mental 
states have an internal representation has been advanced by J# Sonaa# and 
exposed to justified criticism at tlie hands of D# 0* Dennett.^ According 
to 2omaa# the brain contains a system of "universal writing” which "says" 
or exiilbits exactly what the montai condition of tlio subject is# and 
which will eventually be laid open to inspection and made "readable” by 
the relevant sciences of the brain* But as Dennett points out, the 
postulation of such a system of brain-writing involves a clear committal 
of wliat is known as the hoziunculus fallacy* For in order for a of
brain-writing to be a system of writ in in the ordinary sense of the word, 
a writer must also be assumed; and to assimxe such a writer is to assume 
an agent who moans something by producing the various pieces of brain 
writing he does produce. To write is to act in a certain linguistic way; 
and to act in tîiis linguistic way is, among other things, to have certain 
intentions towards an audience. So postulating a system of brain-writing 
cannot explain the mental states or capacities of the agent whose brain it 
is, because tîio postulation involves postulating a separate internal person,
3* J. Zeman: n^forr.iation and the Bre.in, in 2Î. wieser and J. P. Scheie
(eds.) TIerve, Brain and Femory Ko del s. H.T. 1965» See Dennett » 
Content and Consciousness p. 87 for the reference to Zeaan and for 
Dennett’s criticisms.
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who G© mental states and capacities clearly etand in need of the same kind of 
explanation. The threat of regress is obvious*
The notion tlmt tlie brain contains an independent system of writing, 
which inscribes the relevant mental information about the person concerned 
in his cerebral matter, is tizerefore the wong notion to entcartaia* An 
apparently more plausible idea is tlmt true information about a persons 
mental life is somehow renrogontod or stored in his cerebral natter; so 
that if a person desires or believes something, the desire or the belief 
is somehow contained in his brain* This is not to suggest that the informa­
tion is written there; but tlmt it is so to speak lodged in tlie matter of 
his brain in much the same way that the information in a book is contained 
in a library when the book is given a place on one of its shelves*
This is a much more complicated suggestion than Soman’s hypothesis, 
and its critical assessment depends to a large extent upon what kind of 
representation or store is envisaged# If it is envisaged that mental 
information is represented or stored in sudi a way as to mako it retrievable 
by other mechanisms of bohavioural control and eventually used as ono of 
the determinants of belmviour, then two things become clear* The first 
is tlmt the system of representations must, in all likoliliood, be generative 
in the way that a generative grammar is, for the reason that, if tlois were 
not 60, there could not exist a retrieval mechanism which could select the 
appropriate information at the appropriate time, and extend its retrieval 
capacities to new information in future cases. Moreover if the representa­
tional system was noa-generative it would be unleamable by a human observer* 
Tliat is to eay, it would only bo possible to learn and understand the 
representational system if one knew how a finite stock of sub-repreisentations 
combined to make up the representation of a complete piece of information.
It may be baffling to imagine what such a generative representational 
system would look like physically, but it is likely that unless it did
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contain gonorativo foaturos of the OOTt currently attributed to a language- 
eysten, tho retrieval mechanism would not have sufficient material to work 
on ©uccoosfully. (It would be unable to distinguish the agont’o belief 
that John is easy to ploaso and the agent’s belief that John is ea,*^ r to 
please as being grainmtically different kinds of beliefs) «
l/hother or not the fact that the roprssentational eysten must be 
goncrativo Involves this brain-writing h^qjothosis in the homunculus fallacy 
ell oyer again depends upon whether the postulation of a generative repre­
sentational system requires the additional postulation of an internal agent 
having linguistic intentions of its own# I am not completely sure whether 
this is m , calthou^ the content of my first chapter perhaps suggests tlmt 
it is# But in any case, it is clear that the kind of brain-writing syst«a 
now under consideration involves a committal of the homunculus fallacy for 
a different reason# For in order for the stored or represented information 
to be used by tîm organizxi (via the operation of a retrieval mechanic) in 
the dotersination of its behaviour, something very much like another 
internal agent has to be postulated as that mechanism whose operations are 
effective in both putting the bclief-infonsatioa to work, and in assessing 
its compatibility with newly-acquired beliefs# Hot only would wo have to 
postulate a mechanism which knows which situations are appropriate for 
retrieving a piece of belief or memory information and putting it to work, 
but the mechanism must play th*e role of rational assessor, refusing to 
©tore two blatantly inconsistent pieces of belief-infonmtion and 
cataloguing the collections between one piece of belief-lnformation and 
another# And hero the regress sets in again, for the rational assessor 
will need a store or library of his own in which to lodge his own proce­
dural principles*
Those or similar considerations appear to affect any brain-^writing 
hypothesis wiiose point is to explain how belief and memory inforciatioa can
mbe stored and used by analogy with a libi’ary and a retrieval device* (it
is worth adding tliat, as such, they affect the methodology of a long 
tradition of sciontific rooearch into the location of the msxr.ozy store in 
the brain) • But the version of the brain-writing hypothesia which I began 
to explain, and which I want to defend, is not affected by considerations 
of this îdLad. This voralon is arrived at by dropping the idea of an 
information store altogether, and giving a different interpretation to the
proposition t’lat mental information can be fenresentod in the brain* It
says simply tlmt for each mental state or condition of the subject, a 
certain cerebral configuration might be located such that the subject was 
in that montai state or condition when and only when the cerebral con­
figuration obtains* This "when and only when" clausa is extensional, 
and so understood, the hypothesis cays no more tlum that the relevant 
mental state and the relevant cerebral configuration accidentally co-exist* 
I W  I think there is an important observation to be made about this 
version of the brain-izriting hypothesis, and tMs is that there seems to 
be an acute psycliological difficulty in Imagining that a corebral coz>- 
figuration, czid a montai condition may always occur together without at 
the same time ima^ jining the co-occurrence to be law-like, or nomological, 
in îdlnd. Ucre we to discover that a person believed that p when and 
only when (extensionally epeaîdng) his brain was in a particular configura­
tion £, then it would be hard not to suppose that various subjunctive 
statements, of the sort #lch law-statomenta license, wore also true. It 
would bo hard not to suppose that were the person to believe that p, his 
brain wepld be in configuration or that if the person’ a brain wore not 
in configuration £, he would not believe that p, and so on* It is for 
this reason that it seems pointless from a practical point of view to 
distin^guish the hypo tlie sia that cerebral configurations ha^ r>en to co-occur 
with specific mental conditions from the hypothesis that they do so in
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acoordanoe with a law# In other words, the hypothesia that Is being 
defended is that there is no a priori reason for supposing psycho-cerebral 
laws to be impossible*^
It is interesting to notice what could be said about the meaning of 
cerebral configurations, if there actually were any law-statements connecting 
the psychological and the cerebral* The usual method of attacking the 
argument that psycho-cerebral laws are possible consists in pointing out 
that there is no way of framing such laws which does not re-introduce 
psychological or intenslonal concepts on the physical side of the equation# 
This line of attack is admissable and powerful, and Indeed I have been 
using it myself to show how the more ambitious forms of the brain-hypothesis 
are ruled out (Zeman’s method required an internal agent or homunculus with 
mental capacities and conditions of his own, and the representational or 
storage method was eventually seen to require something like the same 
thing) * On my hypothesis, according to which a cerebral configuration 
could stand in a law-like relation to a mental condition, these objections 
are avoided, but a different kind of meaning enters the situation# For 
although each one of these configurations is without sentential meaning in 
itself, anyone who know which mental state was nomologically associated 
with it could, by ascertaining that the configuration obtained, thereby 
ascertain which mental state obtained; and this allows us to say, I think, 
that the obtaining of each particular configuration has a kind of non- 
sentential significance for the observer#
5
In his original paper on Meaning, Grice introduced a terminology and
4# In spite of Putnam’s observation (see Chapter 2) that different
organisms can share mental attitudes although their cerebral matter 
may be of a different sort# The kind of difference which Putnam 
speaks of is on the level of the tvne of matter of which their brains 
are composed; but I have already suggested that the configuration 
system which I have supposed to exist can be described independently 
of the sort of matter of which any actual brains are made.
5. Philosophical Review, 1957, pp« 377-33#
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and a typography which exactly suits the job of explaining this point#
The sense of the word "means" which occurs in statements like
Those spots mean measles
The thunderclouds mean rain
'
he identified as the natural sense; while the sense in which the word occurs 
in statements like
P’s statement "A" means that p
he Identified as the non-natural sense - the two sensesto be distinguished 
from each other by the use of the words "means^f and "means^" respectively. 
This is just the contrast which I myself want to employ; for instead of say­
ing that a particular cerebral configuration has a non-sentential signifi­
cance for the observer, I could equally have said, in Grice’s typography, 
that the configuration meanSg that the subject has such-and-such a mental 
state.
It is worthwhile to notice that whenever we have a law-like relation 
between two types of phenomena, we can always speak of meaning^ - at least, 
whenever the law in question is a natural law, a law of nature. It is 
because the relation between spots and measles is law-like, and because the 
relation between thunderclouds and rain is law-like, that the presence of 
the first-mentioned phenomenon means^ that the second-mentioned phenomenon 
is (or will be) present* In the mental-physical case too, of course, it 
is because the relation between cerebral configuration and mental states 
is law-like that we can say, having observed the cerebral configuration, 
that it means^ that the subject is in the related mental state. There need
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be nothing eesentially linguietio about configuration syetems, and no
question of the systemsbeing a coda or anything else about which questions
of meaning and translation would arise. Just as you cannot ask what a
sound pattern means or what language it is in, so there is no room for
questions about what a cerebral configuration means (in the non-natural
sense), or about what language it is in,
The hypothesis that there can be psycho-cerebral laws is not yet
completely free from philosophical difficulties, however, for there is a
different line of argument which attempts to show that there can be no
laws of any kind which connect the mental and the physical. This line of
argument proceeds by suggesting that there can be no law-like connections
between mental phenomena and behaviour - with the implicit suggestion that
the same considerations apply to attempts to construct law-like connections
between mental phenomena and cerebral phenomena. However, I think it can
be shown that none of the factors which make it impossible to obtain nomo-
logical connections between mental sentences and sentences about behavioural
motions apply to the "centralist” hypothesis now under consideration. It
can be shown, that is to say, that the mental is not totally irreducible,
but only irreducible when the physical phenomena selected are behavioural
motions. Let us appreciate why.
A typical explanation of why there can be no psycho-physical laws of
a kind which connect the mental with the physical motions of behaviour
comes from Davidson:
"Any efforts at increasing the accuracy and power of a 
theory of behaviour forces us to bring more and more of 
the whole system of the agent’s beliefs and motives into 
account. But in inferring this system from the evidence, 
we necessarily impose conditions of coherence, rationality 
and consistency. These conditions have no echo in 
physical theory, which is why we can look for no more than 
rough correlations between psychological and physical 
phenomena." 6
Psycholo^ as Philosophy, p. 4.
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Now I think there ere really two parts to this explanation. One consists 
of the fact that we cannot point to a sinvie state of desire for a certain 
object (to take a specific example) end find a specific kind of physical 
change in the world which the agent initiates as a result, because the 
agent who has that desire will initiate different changes - or none — 
depending upon what his other beliefs, intentions and fears are. To say 
this is port of what is involved in saying, as we did in Chapter 1, that 
what the agent who has that desire will do depends not upon what his 
environment is like, but upon what he believes or .iudves his environment 
is like. The second feature of this explanation consists, in Davidson’s 
own words, of "emphasising the holistic character of the cognitive field"; 
and what Is specifically meant by this, is that our theory of the total 
mental state of any particular subject is underdetermined by the evidence. 
We can, while saving the phenomena, adjust and revise our theory in some 
places, if we make compensatory adjustments and revisions in other places. 
Vo can re-interpret what a man means by uttering certain sentences, to 
take one clear case, providing that wo make reasonable compensatory adjust­
ments in our theory of vdhat he intends or believes. These two features 
of the explanation are, I think, distinct from each other. The first 
emphasises that a man’s behaviour depends upon more than a single isolated 
facet of his total mental state; and the second emphasises how under­
determined by the evidence our third-person view of another persons mental 
life is.
I doubt whether the second feature actually pulls much wei^t in the 
explanation. ÎSnny theories in the sciences are, if we believe Quine, 
underdetermined by the evidence, eo that two theories can account for all 
the evidence and yet be formally incompatible with each other# The degree 
of underdeterminedness in the physical sciences may be smaller; but it is 
there. While the constraints on a theory of behaviour are coherence,
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rationality and consistency, as these apply to the beliefs (etc.) which are 
supposed to be held by the subject, the constraints on a theory of physical 
phenomena are logical, coherence, and formal consistency. I should like to 
add that even if we can mutually adjust our judgements as to a persons 
mental states, this does not entail that the subject has anything but a 
fixed view of them. It merely indicates that, pending the opportunity to 
inspect a man’s brain to find out what he believes, people other than the 
subject are relatively badly off when it comes to knowing what his (the 
subject’s) mental states are. Vhat the subject means or intends by utter­
ing a certain sentence is perfectly available and determinate to him, that 
is to say, since he does not leam about his mental life in the way we 
observers do, by inspecting what he does or listening to what he says.
The first feature of the explanation, therefore, does most of the work 
in effectively explaining why psycho-physical laws are impossible in a 
theory of behaviour. But this feature has no application to the problem 
of psycho-physical laws where the physical phenomena are cerebral. For in 
this case the laws are not causal, as they are in a theory of behaviour; 
they do not try to assert what will happen as a result of a subjects possess­
ing a certain mental state. The problem of representing the subjects 
procedure of decision in the li^t of his own (possibly conflicting) beliefs 
and fears has no counterpart in the case of psycho-cerebral laws. These 
therefore are not in the same boat as psycho-physical laws which purport 
to connect a subjects mental state with his behaviour.
In this section I have tried to defend the view that psycho-cerebral
laws are possible, which is to say that the mental is not totally irreducible
to the physical, as is generally supposed. Whether there are such laws,
and what they are like if there are, are of course separate questions?
althou^ the progress of research into the workings of the brain does seem
7to suggest that such laws will eventually be uncovered. However if the
Footnote 7 printed overleaf
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considerationa advanced ia this section are correct, then it follows that 
the neurophysiologist’s investigations are likely to be piecemeal, of 
necessity, in the sense that peydtio-cerebral laws would only be discover­
able; singly, For only if the system of cerebral representations was 
generative, in the sense I explained earlier, would he be able to predict 
the details of some psycho-cerebral laws on the basis of his knowledge of 
a handful of basic ones, in the way a generative gramaarlan can make pre­
dictions about the structure of some sentences on the basis of his 
investigations into the structure of a quite small chosen number of others.
The fact that the most intelligible system of cerebral representations is 
not generative means that the neurophysiologist will have to proceed step 
by step. The practical reduction of the mental to the cerebral may be 
difficult; but it is not, if I am rii^t, an enterprise which is by any 
means philosophically unintelligible,
3 ,  TM tlSNTAL AND THB PHX3IGAL
It would be unsatisfactory to end an essay on physicalisa without some 
remarks on the meanings of the words “mental” and "physical”. The question 
of what distinguishes these meanings, as I remarked in the section of Chapter 
I entitled The TTeed for Mental Terms.::Is a question which lies at the centre 
of the subject; but althou^^ philosophers since Descartes have been convinced 
that there ia a clear difference, its exact nature has been a matter of 
considerable dispute.
Footnote 7 brou^t forward from page 162
There are already plenty of negative law-like connections between the 
mental and the cerebral, of the form: "if the brain is in such-and^
such a state, the subject will not feel (hear, see, etc.) anything". 
(See also the Guardian newspaper, 28th June, 1972, p. ^ , which
contains an interesting report to the effect that "specific aspects 
of behaviour, such as fear of the dark, can be permanently induced 
by chemicals".)
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Two methods of tackling this question must bo distinguished; one method 
is ontological, in as much as It concerns the phenomena themselves, while 
the other is linguistic, in as much as it concerns the difference between 
mental and physical language. This difference corresponds, of course, to 
two of the senses in which the words "mental" and "physical" are in fact 
employed: for sometimes philosophers speak of the differences between
mental and physical phenomena, and sometimes they speak of the difference 
between mental and physical terms or centonees. I shall briefly mention
the ontological approach, then I shall mention a method which is partly 
ontological and partly linguistic, and then I shall embark on an explanation 
of the difference of my own, which I believe is almost totally linguistic.
Those who adopt the ontological approach to the distinction often 
argue as follows: they say that the distinctive features of mental
phenomena - those features which distinguish them from physical phenomena - 
provide us with an explanation of why it is that mental phenomena and 
physical phenomena cannot (logically cannot) be connected in a statement 
of natural law, or else identified as the same thing. Indeed, once some­
thing has been found which adequately distinguishes mental phenomena from 
physical phenomena, little more needs to be said to justify their non­
identity and their non-reducibility.
Descartes, for instance, thought that mental phenomena could be dis­
tinguished from physical phenomena on the grounds of the non-spatiality of
g
the former. If this is correct, then it follows at once that mental 
phenomena cannot be physical phenomena, at least if Leibniz’s Law ia
8. Descartes: Meditations
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constitutive of identity. Or again, some modern philosophers^ believe 
that mental phenomena possess the property of Intentionality, while 
physical phenomena do not. Again, the conclusion of non-identity must 
follow if these philosophers are correct.
How in point of fact, this ontological approach to the question of the 
meanings of the words "mental” and "physical" is altogether wrong. In the
first place, philosophers who argue in this way do so without taking any 
notice of the difficult semantical question of whether there are any mental 
phenomena, or whether there ar§ any physical phenomena, in the strictest 
sense of these existence-asserting phrases. Given a sentence like
(l) Harry believed that the moon was made of cheese
it is not a matter of arbitrary choice to divide the referring terms from 
the predicates, as my previous chapters will, I hope, have made clear.
And yet to say that what the sentence is about is Harry’s belief, and to 
go on to speak of its non-spatiality, as Descartes would have done, carries 
with it a theory of the semantics of the sentence which must be properly 
argued for, and not just assumed to be true without argument. The Cartesian 
can of course point to sentences in which the phrase "Harry’s belief" actually 
occurs as a subject, or even to sentences having the phrase "Harry’s believ­
ing" as subject. But if they assert that these sentences contain references 
to entities of a sort which can be spatial or non-spatial, then they will again 
have made semantical assumptions, or assumptions about interpretation, which
9* 3.g. H. H. Price Some Objections to Behaviourism in Hook (ed.)
Dimensions of Mind (pp. 79-^j* Price's view is an extension 
of Brentano’s theory that "...intentional inexistence is 
exclusively characteristic of mental phenomena. Ho physical 
phenomenon manifests anything similar. Consequently, we can 
define mental phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena 
as include an object intentionally within themselves" (From The 
Distinction between Mental ^  Physical.Phenomena. )
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stand in. need of defense* Indeed the reaeon for my own disagreement with 
the contentions of Descartes and those who agree with him on this subject# 
is that the semantical assumptions implicit in the doctrine of non- 
spatiality are wrong# îîy arguments in the last chapter were designed to 
chow that what such a sentence as (l) is about# ia the strictest sense# is 
not Harry’s belief, or even Harry’s believing# but Harry* Boreover any 
sentence in wliich the phrase "Harry’s belief” actually occurs as logical 
subject will only be about what Harrv thou^t ; and any sentence in which 
the phrase "Harry’s believing" occurs as logical subject will be about the 
foct- of his believing* None of them are about any well-defined entity or 
particular such as a particular event or state.
Tot another reason for disagreeing with Descartes’ notion of non- 
spatiality as a criterion of the mental is simply this: Harry’s belief# 
like any other persons thou^ts or memories# would, were it xo exist as 
an entity or some kind# be spatial or non-spatial to no greater extent 
than anything else of a logically similar (but clearly non-mental) kind# 
like Barry’s stumble# Harry’s haircut# Harry’s hei^t or wel^t# Barry’s 
burial# and so forth# And if Harry’s believing could be shown to be a 
state of affairs# then its location in space is easily identifiable as the 
location in space which Harry himself occupies.
As for H* E. Price’s idea that mental phenomena are distinguished from 
physical phenomena by having the property of Intentionality# much the same 
arguments can be made to apply* Suppose it was said that Barry’s belief 
has the property of Intentionality# in the sense of being "about” some non­
existent state of affairs - his being irresistible to women, ©ay - then we 
need only observe that a sun-flowers need can be Intentional in just the 
same sense# when the object of its need was the substance water in a world 
which for some cosmic reason had de-hydrated* Surely no-one would assert 
that the sun-flower’a need for water was anything but a purely pliysical 
affair? A quite different approach to the probl«a of distinguishing the
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meanings of the words "mental" and "physical" is to coacontrato attention 
upon the language, opecifically sentences, by which the phenomena are 
described, rather than on the properties of the phenomena themselves*
The classical answer to the question about the distinction between the 
mental and the physical, that of Brontano and Chisholm, is in point of fact 
partly linguistic, in so far tlmt mental phenomena are specified as those 
which must be "described" by the use of intenslonal language* Adding 
the doctrine that intonsional languago is, in a sense, irreducible is then 
eaid to secure the overall view that mental phenomena themselves are not 
reducible to non-cental phenomena* Before exposing what I take to be 
the shortcomings of this programme, let us be quite clear of its aim. Its 
aim is eventually to cliaracterise mental phenomena, but to do so in a way 
which ia partly linguistic. Chisholm’s plan, as I said, is to accompli^ 
two things* First, to characterise Intensioaal sentences; and then to 
demonstrate that in order to describe a mental phenomenon you muct use such 
a sentence* So this, the classical metliod, incorporates both the onto­
logical approach to the mental/physical distinction as well as the linguistic 
approach. It not only attempts to characterise the difference between 
mental end physical phenomena; but its method of doing eo is to elucidate 
differences in the language with which these phenomena must be described* 
Chisholm’s original opinion (which has subsequently undergone some 
modifications) was that a sentence is intensional if it has any of the 
following logical properties: that its truth is not dependent upon the 
truth of a contained embedded sentence; that its truth is not dependent 
upon whether its contained nouns all refer; and (thirdly), that substitu- 
tivity of identity in an embedded sentence fails to preserve the truth-valuo 
of tîiô whole. It ia not to my purpose at this particular moment to 
emphasise how murkyüi© concept of an intensional sentence Is. The point 
to be observed is that an intensional sentence is defined by Chisholm as
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one which has any one of ©everal features. Let tia next observe how he
takes sentences of tliis sort to be linked to the mental ;
”»e do not need to use intensional sentences when we 
describe non-psychological phenomena #.## But whoa we 
wish to describe perceiving, assuming, believing and 
other attitudes, then either (a) wo must use sentences 
which are intensional, or (b) we must use terms wo do 
not need to use when we describe noa-psychologlcal 
phonoEona" 10
Vo need to understand wîiat Chisholm means by saying that we need to use 
intensional sentences in order to describo mental phenomena# (2!y own 
preference would bo to understand by this that we need to uso intensional 
sentences in order to predicate apsychological phrase of a person). It 
could mean either that no intensional sent once has a non-intencional logical 
equivalent, or that no intensional sentence has a non-intensional nomological 
equivalent. The first disjunct, if true, would prevent a noa-intensioaal 
qnalvsis of an intensional sentence (assuming that the aim of analysis is 
to provide logical equivalents); and the second disjunct, if true, would 
prevent a non^intensionsl nonological equivalent being found for an inten- 
eioaal sentence. But notice now that to assert the first disjunct is only 
to deny the doctrine of lo.Tical behaviourism, the doctrine that sentences 
containing mental verba have logical equivalents which do not; but the 
falsehood of logical behaviourism must be obvious anyway, since sentences 
containing mental verbs cannot mean the same as sentences not containing 
mental verbs. As to the second disjunct, it can either mean that there 
are no psycho-behavioural laws, or elso it can moan that there are no psycho- 
cerebral laws. From the examples in Chisholm’s tezt,^^ we must assume that 
he means the former. But we saw the evident plausibility of this doctrine 
(essentially Brentano’s) in Chapter I; whereas we saw more recently how 
implausible it was to assume for similar reasons that there are no psycho-
10. Chisholm; R>rgeivln/y« p. 172# My underlining.
11. See fercoiyinr. Chapter 11.
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cerebral laws. One of my complaints with Chisiiolm’e statement (as expressed 
and intended by liisa) is that it amounts to no more than a denial of two 
positions which are, respectively, evidently false and evidently Implausible; 
the position of logical belmviourism end the position of reductive, or 
nomologioal beliaviouriaa» It does not affect tlie more plausible version 
of materialism which asserts a nosological link between the ps^ '^ chological 
and ti e cerebral*
A second, seemingly less central feature of Chisholm’s proposal is his 
use of the phrase "describe psycliological phenomena”* I have already said 
that I sliOuld prefer to phrase things differently; but ti^ point is not 
simply terminological, because it affects the coherence of the idea that 
describibility in intensional terms la a distinguishing feature of mental 
phenomena* I have been stressing throu^out the latter part of this essay 
how important it is to obtain a correct (or defensible) view of what psycho- 
logical phenomena there actually are* To obtain oucli a view involves 
answering many complex questions about the logical form of sentences con­
taining mental verbs (defined by ©numeration (see below)); or, in Dennett’s 
12words, it involves developing a theory as to which of the terns of these 
sentences are referential. !T2io conclusion to my own investigations into 
this question was that, at least for event-sontences like "John noticed 
tlmt the ship was sinking”, no event whatever is ia fact "referred to”*
This is one instance in which a lack of a semantical theory might lead one 
to say that some mental phenomenon had been described, whereas a critical 
view of the logic of such a sentence would suggest the opposite* Chisholm 
ml^t better have said that we need to use intentional sentences when we 
wish to predicate a psychological phrase of a person*
A formally decisive reason for saying that mental sentences do not
12* Ceo Content and Consciousness, Chapter 1*
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"descfribo psychological phenomena" derives from the fact that they are 
often intensional* Anyone who supposed that a phrase like "Galileo’s 
noticing that the earth moves" describes an individual w)uld automatically 
invite the response that substituting fcxr "the earth" a different noun for 
the same object ml,^t turn, the complete description into one which is true 
of notliing. Thiè would happen if Galileo did notice that the earth moves 
hut did not notice that the planet formerly thought to he at the centre of 
the universe moves* That is, the formula
I X is Galileo’s noticing that the earth move3^
does not detemdne a well—iefined entity*
I can now bring into prominence a doubt wMch I earlier laid aside*
Even if Chisholm was strictly correct in supposing that a sentence con­
taining a psychological verb "described a mental phenomenon", and even if 
he was also ri^ dit in supposing that sentences containing psychological verbs 
ere intenslonal; and if he used these t-.;o facts to infer the conclusion 
tîiat intensional sentences described psychological phenomena, then several 
gaps in his tlooory would still remain* In the first place, it would remain 
totally obscure as to vrhv Intensional sentences should be so peculiarly 
appropriate for describing mental phenomena* The point here is that 
Intenslonal sentences are classified as those which fit into various 
patterns of inference* And yet why, should sentential features of this 
logico-granmmtical or syntactical kind bear any relevance to the kinds of 
thin? which those sentences described?
(A connected puzzle (and this is the last thing I shall say about 
Chisholm’s proposal) concerns the concept of intensionality itself. 
Intensloiiality, aa predicated of sentences, is not ia fact a unified 
phenomenon at all, in aa much as its definition consista of disjoining
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three seeraingly unrelated Inf eron co-feature a. Admittedly, Intendonality
is in some eonee tlie opposite (i*e* the failure) of estensionality; but to 
dofino intensionality like this ia no help at all, for in order to get a 
fully adequate theory of extoneionality, some theory must be evolved as to 
what substitutions do fall under the general heading of "the substitution 
of identically referring expressions" • Do phrases other than proper narties 
refer? In what sons© do predicates refer? In wlaat circumstances can one 
predicate be substituted for another? And so on. Intensionality and 
extonsionality are not quite the clearly exclusive concepts that philosophera 
like to imagine. Until a theory is produced which incorporates a sense 
in which they are exclusive, and clearly exclusive, our understanding of 
what it is, for a sentence to be intensional, and everything that depends 
on that understanding, must remain obscure.)
I now tmnt to move on to malce some tentative suggestions of my own 
about the mental-physical distinction. I cannot claim finality for my 
suggestions on this immensely difficult subject, and indeed I shall spend 
a good deal of time in considering objections; but I do claim for what I 
shall say that it has the virtue of bringing into prominence a feature of 
the mental which is not sufficiently stressed. For what I wish to suggest 
is that there is on essential connection between the mental and ono type of 
self-consciousness, which is of such a type aa to be sufficient to provide 
us with an adequate way of making the distinction between the mental and 
the physical. Explaining this suggestion in a completely unambiguous and 
clear way is no easy matter, however, and there ore several difficulties 
in doing so which I cannot pretend to have seen clearly how to overcome 
satisfactorily.
One of the major difficulties is to give an adequate description of 
the kind of self-consciousness which, as I shall argue, any person must 
have towards himself if a mental sentence is to be true of him. iFor
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Tidiat X want to suggest is that, aa a matter of fact, mental sentences are 
all and only those which cannot be true unless there is a certain reflexive 
attitude present on the part of the subject of that sentence; and that 
nental sentences are distinguishable from physical sentences ia just this 
respect* To be a little more exact: my suggestion is that this reflexive
attitude, this Id^ nd of consciousness, must be directed by the person con­
cerned towards himself ^  the subject of the sentence in question. That 
is to say, the subject of a true mental sentence must be conscious of 
himself ^  subject of the sentence concerned.
Now, of course, any fact at all concerning a person can be one which 
the person in question can ia principle be conscious of; but my suggestion 
is that the mental facts are just those which cannot ^  facts unless the 
person in question is conscious of them ^  facts. For instance I can be 
conscious of myself as having an ingrom toenail or a bruised forehead, 
but it can be true that I have an ingrowTi toenail or a bruised forehead 
even if I am not conscious of mvself under those descriptions. Those 
facts - the fact that I have a bruised forehead and the fact that I have 
an Ingroim toenail - aro physical facts; the sentences which express them 
can be true ifithout any consciousness on the part of the subject that they 
are true.
Examples of this Idud perhaps lend a certain initial plausibility 
to my method of drawing the mental-physical distinction; but other matters 
must be discussed before the account can be considered complete. For 
instance there are so many different senses to such words as "conscious", 
"aware", etc., and so many difficult and subtle distinctions to be 
drawn between one sense and another, that it is essential that a careful 
description be given to the particular attitude I have in mind. This 
descriptive task is the first to which I sîmll address myself. I shall 
then try and explain the importance of this reflexive attitude to the
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conditions under which mental sentences in general aro true# ■ And then 
finally I shall make some suggestions about the relevance of this method 
of drawing the mental-physical distinction to the theories of physicalism# 
In one sense of the word "conscious”, a person is conscious of 
Bonething if he is fully aware of it, in such a way that, when the person 
is a human being with a cormand of a language, he could express the fact 
that he is conscious of it, either to some other person or to himself#
It ia only essential to this rather full-blooded concept of consciousness 
that its oimor could thus express himself linguistically, if he chose to - 
not that he actually doos# There is hovîevor a much less full-blooded 
concept of consciousness - and a rather more ubiquitous one - according 
to which a person can be conscious of a thing even thou^ he is not con­
scious of it in the former, full-blooded, sense# If a person is looking 
at a photograph, say, and attending to or focusing his attention upon one 
particular part of it, then he will very lilcely be conscious of other 
details in the photograph in this second, weaker sense. If the photo­
graph were to be snatched away from him suddenly, and if he were asked 
about the photo^rnph aa a whole, tlien very likely he would not be able to 
say what the peripheral details were• Tliis fact, if it were a fact in 
any situation, would show tlmt Idie person liad no consciousness of the 
peripheral details in the first sense of the word "conscious"; and yet 
more likely tlian not he would have been conscious of those peripheral 
details in the second sense of the word. The evidence for this, and 
what I think is the kind of evidence which is essential to this concept 
of consciousness, is that he could be reminded wîiat those peripheral 
details were liko; and that if they were eho^m to him, they would seem 
familiar. I shall argue that it is consciousness of the sort exemplified 
in this example which, in a reflexive form, is the kind which is aa 
essential concomitant of the mental. In other words, I shall argue 
that a mental fact cannot exist unless it
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itself ia the object of this of corisciousiiesa on tiie part of the person 
%/liose mental fact it is#
Up to tills point in riy explanation I have been mainly concerned to 
make it seem plau&ible that there Idjid of coneciouaness of things 
and/or facts which is distinct from the Idlnd of consciousness which is 
often referred to as ’’full awareness”, and vliich I earlier called ’full- 
blooded consciousness”# The next step is to advance some positive reasons 
for fî'upposiîis that this weal'rer type of consciousness is wîiat distinguishes 
the mental from the physical# and that it does oo not simply bv acconnanylnR 
the mental fact# as a vague intransitive bacrcgrouïid attitude# but by being 
transitively directed onto the mental fact itself# I shall persist in 
referring to the stronger# full-blooded consciousness, with the description 
"full-blooded consciousness"# while reserving tlie unqualified term "con­
sciousness” for the weaker variety of the attitude of that name# The ter: s 
"fully self-conscious" and "self-conscious” are used accordin^y#
The next task before us is to rougl*ly delineate which sentences are 
intuitively accepted as the mental sentences, for :iot until this is done 
con VO begin to assess any theory as to what charactorises thorn# Again, 
this is no easy matter, for the reason that intuitions about the content 
and the structure of the category of the montai are likely to differ from 
philosopher to pîiilosopher# and it is hard to see exactly how such 
differences mi^t be reconciled* irgxients mi(jit conceivably arise, for 
instance, as to whether such words and phrases as "stupid”, "clumsy”, 
"ignoræit”# "deprossod”, "is in pain", "had a sensation” are part of tlie 
mental vocabulary, and, if they are, as to whether they are more or less 
fundamental than the concepts of belief or thou^t or imagination# However# 
I shall assume that the verbs "think”, "believe”, "desire”, "seem to see”, 
"fear” and "expect”, at the very least, occupy a place at the centre of the 
concept of the mental, and that verbs like "know", "learn", "see”, "notice”.
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"remember” do also; and I ©hall say that the verbs of the first group are 
Category A mental verbs, and that verbs of the second group are Category B 
mental verbs, These assumptions are made on intuitive grounds; no one is 
likely to dispute the member#lp of the listed verbs to the mental vocabularyi 
however disputable the membership of words like "stupid", "depressed",
"clumsy" and so forth mlg^t be. Perhaps another justification - thou^ 
this is not a formidable piece of argument ^ la that where the route 
throu^ an argument is unclear, it Is generally a prudent policy to choose 
one direction rather than none, and see what results.
Having very rou{dily identified some central mental verbs, I next define 
a mental sentence as one which either has the following structure, or is 
clearly convertible without loss of meaning into one which does;
Person name + Mental verb + Houn-phrase
where the noun-phrase place can be occupied by a noun-phrase of any kind 
whatever# Notice that according to this epecification, s<me mental 
sentences will be intensional ("Galileo believed that the earth moved"), 
while some will not ("Galileo saw the sun"), Intensional or not. It is 
mental sentences thus specified that I suggest cannot be true unless they 
are at the same time objects of a true sentence beginning "so-and-so is 
(weakly) conscious that where "so-and-so" is the name of the
subject of the contained mental sentence, This, then, is the theory I 
wish to defend,
My method of defending this theory will be to answer the several
objections that will very likely be brou^t against it* Some of the
objections, it must be admitted, do look powerful; but I think that all
of them can either be answered directly or else defused, and in such a way
15as to provide indirect support for my contention, The objections are
Footnote 13 printed overleaf
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not related to each other in any very clear way, eo rather than try and 
provide a epurioua continuity to the argument, 1 shall simply list them, 
together with their answers, one by one.
The first objection concerns mental sentences containing Category B 
verbs. While conceding that the theory looks acceptable for sentences 
containing Category A verbs, the objection says that a sentence which con­
tains a Category B verb can be true althou^ its subject is quite ignorant 
of its truth, and is, hence, not conscious in any sense that the sentence 
"fits" him. Sentences containing Category B verbs are those which require, 
for their truth, the truth of the contained sentence: P cannot know that p
unless p, P cannot learn or notice or see that p unless p, and so on. The
*
objection says that it is this fact, the fact that a person's knowledge is 
not wholly a condition of the person but also a condition of the world, 
which allows the mental sentence to be true even in cases where the 
subject of the sentence believes it to be false. The following "situation" 
illustrates this argument more fully. There is a fly on the window pane;
Footnote 13 brought forward from page 195
Quinton has raised a problem which does not fall into this category. 
Considering the theory that "everything mental is an object of 
consciousness" (Mind and Fatter, p. 226) » he says that the theory 
precipitates an infinite regression, since it entails that "every 
act of consciousness is an object of consciousness (but) ,
If X is an act of consciousness then it must be the object of a 
further act of consciousness y which itself is the object of s and 
so on" (pp. 226-7; my emphasis). His point here - in my terms - 
is that since "is conscious that is itself a mental verb, it
cannot form a true sentence unless it is itself embedded in a larger
"is conscious that . proposition, and so on ad infinitum.
But in point of fact it is only grammar that produces the 
illusion that every act of consciousness needs a further act of 
consciousness, for an act of consciousness by a person can be its 
own object. The situation is similar to looking at oneself. With
the aid of a mirror, P can look at himself looking at himself, and 
if he does so, then we can expand the story and say that P is looking 
at himself looking at himself looking at himself looking at
himself etc. But here it is only the narrative which
is potentially infinite, and not the number of lookings. Grammatical 
objects are embedded in grammatical objects, but that is all.
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P, glimpsing something out of the comer of his eye, cornea to believe that 
there la a fly on the window pane, in such a way that it is the fly's being 
on the window pane which produces this belief. Here P's belief is true; 
it is not "accidentally" produced, as in the example Grice gives in The 
Caufial .Theory of Perception^^ of the clock on the shelf, and yet F would 
deny that he knew that there was a fly on the window pane, on the grounds 
that he thinks it possible that what he saw out of the comer of his eye 
might have been a smudge of dirt and not a fly at all. The situation is 
one in which ^ allegedly - P has knowledge that there is a fly on the window 
pane (conceived as non-accidental true belief that there is a fly on the 
window pane), and yet P himself is disposed to deny that the knowledge is 
his. She mental sentence is true, but the subject dissavows it, (The 
example can be re-formulated so as to apply to noticing, learning, hearing, 
remembering, etc.)
But this objection, and the others it can be made to generate, is not, 
it seems to me, at all conclusive* It is not conclusive because it does 
not seem at all plausible to ascribe knowledge to a person in a situation 
of the kind described. Even if knowing that p does require non-accidentally 
coming to believe truly that p, It is doubtful whether this is everything it 
requires, and this is a fact which (as I see it), the described situation 
has the merit of showing. Our concept of knowledge is more adequately 
filled out by saying, in addition, that if one person correctly ascribes 
another person with knowledge that such-and-such, then some implication is 
contained that the ascribes can and does assess himself as the possessor of 
that piece of knowledge. (This is clearest of all when a person correctly 
ascribes himself with knowledge that such-and-such, for in this case he 
obviously cannot do so unless he is in a position to assess himself as the
14 Grice, PASS 25.» 1961. In Warnook, ed., The Philosoohy_of,Perception. 
(Oxford 1967), The relevant example appears on pp. 103-4«
193
possessor of that knowledge. The assessment and the ascription go hand-in- 
hand) • Bather than deflating our theory, the objection merely has the 
effect of bringing to light one respect in which the theory that is knowl­
edge is non-accidental true belief is incomplete.
It is clear that any fact or situation offered as a counterexample 
to the theory under consideration must, to succeed as a counter-example, at 
least be more credible than the provisions of the theory itself. The 
counter-example offered in the most recent objection failed to fulfill this 
requirement. On the face of it, the next two objections to be considered 
seem better placed in this respect. ühey belong together. The first 
concerns psycho-analysis, and the second concerns "subliminal perception".
Remember that the thesis to be defended is that In order for a mental 
sentence to be true, the person whose name occurs as its subject must think 
of himself, or be conscious of himself in the relevant sense, as a person 
of whom that mental sentence i^ true. Now someone ml^t object that this 
is tantamount to a denial of most of the things said by Freud. Central to 
any psycho-analytical account of people's behaviour is the idea that many - 
indeed perhaps most - of the facts about a persons mental life are com­
pletely hidden from the person himself, so that, to revert to philosophical 
terminology, a mental sentence about a certain person can be true even 
though the person in question has no consciousness of its truth. Indeed, 
according to soma school» of analysis, it is precisely because of the fact 
that people are "unconscious" of such truths about themselves that the 
phenomena which those truths report can be so painfully effective in 
structuring their behaviour.
. Although it may seem conclusive, this objection is, in fact, difficult 
to assess. In the first place it is a matter of extreme and urgent con­
troversy whether Freud's account of the mind is to be taken as a work of 
science, to be validated or invalidated by the usual procedures of test and
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confirmation, or whether It should be seen in some other way. And secondly 
(a point which is more relevant at this juncture) there is the problem of 
deciding exactly what sense to attach to Freud's word "unconsciaus"♦ Pre­
sumably it signifies a lack of consciousness, in one of the sense of 
"conscious" which X elucidated. But which? It is difficult to be sure 
that we have the correct answer to this question, but it seems rather 
plausible to think that the word "unconscious" in Freud's sense signifies 
only a lack of consciousness of the full-blooded sort, and not a lack of 
consciousness of the weak sort; so that my suggestion that desires, 
intentions and thoughts, etc., are necessarily the objects of consciousness 
in a weak sense is not at all incompatible with the Freudian idea that many 
desires and thou^ts etc., are held unconsciously, if this word is under­
stood as signifying a lack of consciousness of the strong, "full-blooded" 
sort.
The reason why it is plausible to say this is that one of the features 
of objects of weak consciousness is that they can be brou^t into full 
focus either by reminding the person in question, by pointing it out to 
him, or by enabling him to discover it for himself. I said that if a 
person is conscious of a fact about himself in the weaker sense, then that 
fact can be elevated into an object of full-blooded consciousness by one 
or another process of this latter kind. And the point here is that uncon­
scious thoughts, desires, beliefs, etc., in the; psycho-analysts* sense, 
are supposed to have precisely this feature. It would be fair to say that 
the entire institution of psycho-analytical practice presunposes that just 
such a process is available; that mental states and attitudes at one time 
labelled "unconscious" are of such a kind that they can be lifted into the 
full-blooded consciousness of their owner. Their range of efficacy then 
clianges, of course, but this fact need not make any difference to the 
fundamental idea that mental states and attitudes which are unconscious in
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the p^cho-onalytical sense are "present" to the mind at some level, before 
the analysis begins to lift them from It,^^
So the Freudian objection, when understood, appears to have the surpris­
ing effect of endorsing my own suggestions about consciousness. The next 
objection is eimilar in this respect# It concerns cases of habitual or 
learned behaviour# In these cases, the objection says that it must 
presumably be true that w© notice, see and hear things as part and parcel 
of performing the behaviour which we have learned or become habituated to, 
without having any kind of awareness that we do notice, see and hear the 
things we do. Indeed this seems to be part of what it means to act with 
accomplishment or skill, when the exercise of the skill is beyond the 
learning phase. In riding a bicycle or driving a car, for instance, we 
do not have to continually adjust our behaviour in the li^t of what we 
notice or perceive in the way we did while learning; and yet without our 
actually noticing or perceiving the relevant obstacles or obstructions we 
could hardly ride or drive successfully, i.e. without accident. So here 
it seems is another case in which mental sentences become true of people 
without their having any conception of themselves as being the subjects of 
those sentences.
In considering this objection we must of course leave out of account, 
if we can, the fact that, largely due to the nature of the tasks in question, 
we do not have to store the information gathered in perceiving and noticing 
things for a very long period of time. Althou^ this is true we must leave 
it out of account, because the objection to be considered is not that we
15. In his essay on the theory of the emotions, J-P. Sartre rmarked that 
"unreflective conduct is not unconscious conduct". (Sketch for a 
Theory of the Emotions, Methuen, 1962, p,6l). Nor, obviously, is 
it reflective conduct. In analagous terminology, my suggestion as 
to the distinguishing feature of the mental mi^t be supported in 
large measure by saying that mental activity is that activity a 
condition of whose occurrence is that the subject undertakes or 
undergoes it unrefleotively (thou^ not unconsciaualy).
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"forget" or cease to have any long-term use for the knowledge we acquire 
in this typo of mental activity, but that the acquisition of this knowledge 
takes place, whenever It does take place, without any awareness on the part 
of the subject that It is taking place# Uq are not being asked to con­
sider the objection that the subject cannot testify as to his noticings 
and perceivings some time after they have taken place, but to the objection 
that however soon after they took place the subject simply has no conception 
or reflexive awareness that they are taking place "to" or "in" him.
Perhaps the paradi^ case of habitual or learned behaviour where there 
are mental occurrences (to put it uncritically) of which the subject has 
no conception whatever ia the case of speaking. I do not mean uttering 
or babbling. When we speak, at least according to Grice and the "oomunica- 
tion theorists" of meaning, the speaker must be accredited with a complex 
and interconnected set of linguistic intentions, such as the Intention to 
produce a belief of a certain kind in his audience, or the intention to 
get his audience to recognise a certain intention of his (the speaker's); 
and yet any adult or reasonably skilled user of the language has no con­
ception of himself, at the time at which he speaks, as being the owner of 
any of them. Confronted with these cases, how can the thesis that the 
relevant kind of Bolf-sonsciousness by the subject is a condition of his 
mental sentences' truth possibly be defended?
Again, this Bema on the. face of it a powerful objection; and yet I 
think that there ere various defenses available. Some are better than 
others# The first, which I merely mention without using, says that sub­
liminal perceptions and unrecognised intentions can only exist because 
non-eublininal perceptions and recognised intentions exist; so that 
elthou^ there are cases of perceiving and intending where the subject has 
no awareness of himself as someone who jjO perceiving or intending, these 
are strictly dependent upon the cases where the subject does have tîmt
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îdlnd of self-conception. (Acting with skill is dependant upon having 
leaxnt the sld.ll). So, subliminally perceiving and intending without 
recognising are cases developed from the central cases by extension.
But even if this were true, it would not provide the defense which my 
proposition needs, since what that proposition says is that reflexive 
conscious is present in all cases in which a mental sentence is true of 
him, and not just in the central cases.
The second defense is designed to support that exceptionless piNjposi- 
tion. It is similar to the one deployed against the psycho-analytical 
objection.
In order to make it credible that there ia a sense in which a person
who subliminally perceives things is conscious of himself as the subject
of those perceptions, it is only necessary, I think, to bring into promi­
nence the differences between a person subliminally perceiving something 
and a person in a state of complete coma. Consider a very familiar and 
mundane situation in which a series of subliminal perceptions might occur; 
the activity of bicycle riding. Someone who has learnt to ride a bicycle,
and who is competent in doing so, will normally deploy the various skills
needed without being fully conscious of the fact that he is deploying them. 
The individual motions of his body which are necessary to balance the 
machine successfully will not have to be initiated by him In quite the 
self-conscious way in which they had to be while he was learning to ride. 
Indeed it is well known that too much attention to the various necessary 
motions is likely to cause the skilled cyclist to lose his balance. It 
has to be admitted that in this sense the skilled bicyclist sublimates 
his perceptions of his own balancing movements; and doubtless too he 
sublimates many of the perceptions he makes of the various obstacles in 
his path. But on the other hand his cognitive attitude towards these 
perceptions is not at all like the attitude of one who is bicycling in a
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coma, who la perching on the saddle and avoiding crashing just by good 
luck» It ia not the case, la other words, that he has ^  cognitive atti­
tude towards them.
It is upon this relatively uncontrovorsial point that the evidence 
for his having some kind of weak consciousness of his perceptions is based# 
The arguaeatation la the same for the case of the euppooedly unrecognised 
intentions which are said to attend the ordinary coiamunicative use of 
language» Probably no one except the most expert philosophers of language 
have any very clear idea of the different and Interconnected intentions 
which attend the various types of speech behaviour* And yet someone who 
uses language effectively Is not at all like the person who utters 
sentences in his sleep or under an anaesthetic. As part of their attempt 
to describe the difference between the two types of case, philosophers have 
suggested that an account of the various intentions vhich attend the 
ordinary speech situation gives "an order which is there", Those (like 
myself) for whom this roimrk fails to provide a very satisfying description 
of the situation will, I suspect, prefer to say that such Intentions, 
thou^ not present to the full consciousness of their owner, are none the 
less objects of that weaker attitude of consciousness for whose existence 
I have been trying to expound the evidence.
li’inally mention a more general objection to my suggestion about 
mental sentences. It runs as follows. It cannot be the case that, in 
order for a mental sentence about ? to be true, P must see himself as being 
the subject of that truth, because he cannot see himself in that way unless 
the mental sentence is in fact true. Rather than it being a condition of 
the mental sentence's truth that the subject recognises its truth, the 
situation is quite the reverse, in as much as its truth is a condition of
1$. Ansconbe: Intention (Oxford, 1957), p* 80
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hia being able to recognise it as true# (sdiat this objection has the 
effect of making clear, however, is not so much a defect in my suggestion 
as an Interesting and (I suspect) important similarity between mental 
sentences end sentences containing "performative" verbs# In both classes 
of cases, one condition for a sentence's truth is that the subject of the 
sentence thinks of himself, or is conscious of himself, as having that 
sentence true of him. If someone says "Jonas promises that p", than in 
order for his statement to be true, i.e. ia order for it to be true that 
Jones does promise that p, Jones must be conscious of himself as the bearer 
of the predicate does promise that p". It is especially clear that
this is the case when the speaker is Jones himself. If someone says "Jones 
believes that p", likewise, then in order for his statement to be true, i.e. 
in order for it to be true that Jones does believe that p, Jones must be 
conscious of himself as the bearer of the predicate "... does believe that 
p". Again, this is most clearly true in the case where Jones himself is 
the speaker. In both examples, Jones must be conscious of himself under 
the description in guest ion in order for the description to fit him.
The discussion of this objection brings my remarks on the distinction 
between mental end the physical sentences to an end. Uere I to have 
defended my proposal simply by trying to abolish the most obvious counter­
examples, I should probably have failed to make out a convincing case for 
it. What I have attempted to do, by contrast, is to discuss the various 
counter-examples in such a way as to gradually fill out the description of 
that kind of consciousness which, as I have proposed, the subject of any 
true mental sentence has towards himself the subject of such a sentence. 
In this proposal, althou{^ the terminology is different, there is more than 
an echo of that passage in Locke's Essay which says;
"....Such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, 
reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings 
of our own minds; — which we being conscious of,and 
observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our
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understanding as distinct ideas as we do from bodies 
affecting our senses* This source of ideas every man 
has wholly in himself? and though it be not sense, as 
having nothing to do with external objects, yet it la 
very like it, end might properly enough be called 
internal sense" • 17
The proposal about the distinction between the mental and the physical 
which I have just defended is of relevance to two other theses which I have 
defended in this essay* Ihe first is that the mental is irreducible to 
the behavioural (where behaviour is conceived as mere motion) ; and the 
second is that the mental is in all likelihood reducible to the cerebral, 
either at the Property-Level or at the slighly less general Person-Specific 
Level. The demonstration of this relevance will bring the essay to a 
close.
To say that the mental and the behavioural cannot be connected in a 
statement of natural law is to say that it is not possible for a mental 
sentence and a behavioural sentence to match in truth-valu© ia every 
physically possible word. And to say on the other hand that the mental 
and the cerebral can be connected in a statement of natural law is to say 
that it is possible that a mental sentence and a cerebral sentence are so 
connected — i.e. that it is possible for a mental sentence and a cerebral 
sentence to match in truth-value in every physically possible world. Up
to this point little has been said to explain why this should be so. But
we are now in a position to do just this. For the characterisation of the 
mental wMch it has been the purpose of this section to recommend would, 
assuming it to be correct, have the natural consequence not only that the 
behaviour which attends any specific mental condition varies from one 
occasion of the mental condition to another, but also that the cerebral 
condition which attends any specific mental condition is not likely to very
17. John Locke, Essay _Concemin.T Human Understanding, ed* A. C. Fraser, 
(Oxford 1394), Bk, II, Ch. 1, Sec. 4.
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in the same way at all* .Because any given mental condition, while there will 
be a range of possible behaviour available, there will be no variability
at all in the subject's cerebral condition.
In what sense are these consequences natural? I advanced the idea 
that any mental sentence always requires, as one condition of its tiuth, 
an additional truth to the effect that a certain kind of self-consciousness 
is present in the subject, whereas physical sentences are those which never
require this. I am presently contending that the nature of this reflexive
consciousness explains why a behavioural sentence and a mental sentence 
will never match in truth-value, and that it does so in the following way* 
While to be conscious (ia my sense) of a mental condition of one's own is 
not necessarily to have it "in focus", to be fully and explicitly aware of 
it, or to be able to express it linguistically - these are the features of 
what I called "full-blooded" consciousness - it is to be in such a state 
that one can bring it into focus and full awareness, or have other people 
do it for you under the right kind of manipulation. And the importance, 
in turn, of the ability to selectively focus upon one's own mental states 
is that it is just this ability which underlies people's capacity to behave 
as people! that is, to adjust and decide their actions in the light of 
the whole range of their present desires, thou^ts, beliefs, and other 
mental conditions.
Indeed a strong case can be made out for saying that we are persons 
to just the degree to which we selectively focus upon our thoughts and 
desires, etc., mutually adjust them vhen they conflict, alter them in the 
face of reasonable persuasion, open ourselves to rational criticism and 
moral evaluation, and, finally, cite them in explanation of the very 
different actions which we initiate. All this is to say that consciousness 
of one's own mental condition, in the sense of my exposition, is part and 
parcel of being able to behave as a person.
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Tlois, very roug^y, la the way in wîiich the presence of the relevant 
typo of Gonocionsnosa of one's own montai condition explains the variation 
which is found in the behaviour, if any, which those same mental conditions 
can be uood to explain - the variation which, as we saw ia Chapter I, 
directly spells the failure of any mental-to-behavioural reduction. And 
on til© other hand, it séma clear that this type of self-consciousness of 
one's own mental conditions need have no analagous effect upon the cerebral 
conditions which accompany them. By contrast, if a person were an auto­
matic mechanism of a sort such that any specific mental condition directly 
caused a certain specific type of limb-ciovenent, then no doubt a behavioural 
reduction would stand the same chance of success as a cerebral reduction 
now stands. But this is manifestly not what a person is.
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Appendix 
IDENTIFICATION AND EXPLICATION
In the section of the Chapter I entitled "Alternatives to a Behavioural 
Reduction" I nontioned an analytical device employed by Quine (and by those 
who follow him) wldch* though neither reductive nor non-reductive in the 
senses there distinguished, merits serious consideration on the grounds that 
it supposedly provides a way of analysing the mental in terms of the physical. 
Applied to a range or class of individuals, the device is normally called 
"explication"; while applied in particular instances it is more ordinarily 
called "identification" or "identification with *♦."*
Examples of explication and an explanation of the method in ancrai.
If in a chosa game I replace the black king with a button, for instance, 
then we can say that for the duration of the game the button Ig, the black 
king - or, to use a different terminology, that the black king has been 
Identified with the button. This device of "identification with" has 
nothing to do with strict identity or Leibnis's lav, as Quine's example of 
the ordered pair shows; in this case either or
# ^z,yjj or 2^ or 3 can be identified with the ordered 
pair ^x,y^ , wiiile they are all clearly distinct from each other.^ There 
ia even a difference in ordinary speech corresponding to the difference 
between this sort of identification and cases of "strict" identity. In the 
former case we speak of identification wit^. and the latter case we speak of 
identification the anall boy who identifies himself with Dan Dare is 
just being playful, but if he identifies himself jg^  Dan Dare then he needs
1. Word and Object, paras. 53» 54.
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psychiatrie counsel.
In Chapter I we saw some more systematic cases of "identification with",
which involved the introduction of classes. Glasses very often play the
key role; for Bloomfield, for example, phonemes were to he identified with
classes of phones, morph^es with classes of phonemes, and sentences with
classes of morphemes. And for Fodor, as we saw, mental states were to be
identified with classes of neurological states. Quine* s own le^cy from
the Blooiafieldian tradition in linguistics is considerable; we find him
saying in Uord and Object that phonemes
".... aro aometlBies construed as the classes of their 
approximations. In representing them rather as segments 
of norms I stress the qualitative clustering about statistical 
norms, and minimise the suggestion of an enclosing boundary.
But we can still think of each norm as the class of the 
events that are occurences of it" 2
and later in the book the method is extended to those abstract object
sentences* in a way which Bloomfield himself might have done;
"A sentence is not an utterance event but a linguistic form 
that may be uttered often, once, or never; and .... its 
existence is not comprœaised by failure of utterance. But 
we must not accept this answer without considering more 
precisely what these linguistic forms are* If a sentence 
were taken as the class of its utterances, then all unuttered 
sentences would reduce to one, viz. the null class; .....
Nor should I like to take a sentence as an attribute of 
utterances .... But there is another way of taking sentences 
and other linguistic forms that leaves their existence and 
distinctness uncompromised by failure of utterance. ¥e can 
take each linguistic form as the sequence* in a mathematical 
sense, of its successive characters or phonemes. A sequence 
*l**2*'"*"^n explained as the class of a pairs 1^ ,
^©2,2^ ...... ^a^,n^ • Wo can still take each component
character a. as a class of utterance events, there being here 
no risk of non-utterance" 5
As a matter of fact this procedure fails to provide for the distinctness of
different sentences, even when elaborated to this extent; for example.
2# Word and Ob.lect* pp. 89-90.
3. Word and Object, pp. 194-5»
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(1) I©t the Eioat ooolc
(2) Let then eat cook
would by Quine* o standard be the same sent once. However my purpose ia 
quoting those examples of identification with is only illustrative; the 
©SDontial component of this method, and the one we must concentrate on, is 
to hit on an effective function which associates with oach member of a 
certain category of objects some other construction — ia practice usually 
set-theoretic - such that the arguments ere mapped by the function onto 
its values in such a way as to preserve, among the value-objects, all the 
important differences which obtain among the argument-objects.
It may be difficult to grasp the exact purport of this abstract state­
ment; but the procedure can be explained more fully as follows - and I 
continue to take the case of senteacea (which are abstract objects) as an 
example. You start from a ncxainalistio premiss, to the effect that some 
objects are "concrete" and "simple" while some are abstract. You then 
explain or in a sens© define an abstract object as being a class whose 
members arc specified by an open sentence, according to this edicsmi
Abstract object 0 ia the class whose membera are all the simple 
or concrete thing© z such that .z......
So for instance the abstract object Redness might be introduced like this:
Redness is the class whose members are all the things z such 
that X is red.
and in the case of sentences, the geneiul formula would be;
ai
Sentence la the class of things such that z^
la the 1th character of 3 and such that y. is the nizaber 1»n X
where in addition, we explain a cliaracter and a number In set-theoretical 
terms so aa to expand the definition to;
Sentence is the class of things 7^^ such that z^  ^is
the ith character of 3^ and such tîmt is the number 1, where 
the ith character x^ of is the class of things w such that
w is an utterance-event of z^ and where the number 1 is the
class of things z such that z is an ordered 1-tuple of objects*
Such effective functions aa this - assuming that this is an effective 
function - are called by Cuine rroxv functions. Before we try to fathom 
the efficacy of this method in general, let us see how it would specifically 
be applied to the mental* Roughly, the idea would be to consider sentences 
like
(3) John believes that swans fly
(4) The cat wants to be on the roof eto
as relating John or tî>@ cat to a class of possible worlds* The preposi­
tional attitude sentence (3) would, if true, relate John to the class of 
possible worlds in which swans fly; while the egocentric attitude 
sentence (4), if true, would relate the cat to the class of possible worlds 
in which it is on the roof* A possible world would be a kind of four- 
dimensional version of a possible world state - where a possible world state
is a class of ordered triples of natural numbers, each triple of which
4identifies a matter-occupied point. 3o la this case we start with points
Footnote 4 printed overleaf
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of snattor-occupicd ©pace aa the basic Individuals, and with the ordered 
triples of natural numbers which identify them. Then once having 
elaborated the notion of a possible world, we say that a class of possible 
worlds is to be identified with the object of aa organisms want; the state 
of affairs which his having a certain attitude relates him to. The theory 
would finally be elaborated, perhr.ps, (and here I take leave of Quine) in 
the following way* fenultirate ct:3: complex objects like wanting to be
on the roof or trying to get onto the roof, believing that svama fly, etc., 
would each be identified with an ordered pair of classes consisting of the 
class of organisms who have that attitude to that state of affairs, and the 
relevant class of possible worlds. Even more complex objects, finally 
(this is the ultimate eteo). like the cats wanting to get onto the roof, or 
John's believing that swans fly, would perhaps be identified with an ordered 
pair having the cat or John aa first member, end the previous ordered pair 
as second member.
This is the kind of elaboration which Quine's method Lsuggests — j for 
explicating mental entities. Fodor* s method of identifying mental states 
with classes of neurological states is more straiglitforward, in that it 
does not go as far as to invoke the complex apparatus of poosible worlds.
I now list three defects in ascending order of generality. They all 
pertain to Quine* 3 possible-worlds analysis; the third, which is the most 
general, should trouble Fodor*a proposal as well.
Footnote 4 brought forward from page
In discussing the example and explaining this system la Pronositional 
Objects (Ontological Relativity pp. 159-160), Quine gives this pre­
liminary notion the following refinements. In order to accommodate 
rotation of the number-oxes, a possible world state is first explained 
to be the class of classes of ordered natural-nunber triples which 
identify conrruent matter-ocounied regions. In order to accommodate 
different measuring systems,© possible world state is then explained 
as: a class of classes of ordezrod natural-number triples which
identify geometrically similar matter-occupied regions. See Quine* s 
essay for other refinements.
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Defects:
1# For the prepositional attitudes - but not for the egocentrio 
attitudes — the nethod fails to distinguish (say) believing that swans fly 
and believing that members of the sort Cygmis Anstidae fly; for the possible 
worlds ia wîiich those situations obtain are the same, although not every 
organism who has the first belief has the second* At least eo we are prone 
to say* Quino aclnxowledges this difficulty: it is peculiar to the
poosible-worldo explication of attitudes which are propositional*
2# For egocentric and propositional attitudes alike, the method would 
fail to reveal the difference between (say) wanting a certain thing and 
fearing it, ia the case where all the organisms who want that thing just
to fear it as well* It is quite possible tlmt they ni^t • and yet 
the method of explication would (at the penultimate step) decree them to be 
identical* A fortiori the cats wanting to get onto the roof and the cats 
fearing to got onto the roof would (at the ultimate step) be the same*
This difficulty is not peculiar to the mental: it is the familiar diffi­
culty which arises with any sot-theoretical or ordered pair analysis of 
relational expressions* Objection %  is completely general*
3* VJliea the method of identification - or explication - is used, the 
object to be explicated (the esplicandum) is usually not a class, whereas 
tho explicating object (the ozplicans) almost always is* And since alter­
native classes are available as the explicans, we cannot say that the 
ezplicans and the explicandum expressions are ii any sense co-extensive*
To talce Frege's explication of numbers as a simple example ; it just makes 
no sense to say tîmt the expression ”3” io co-extensive with the expression 
" I % is a triple^ "* Ib:plication is, on the other hand, "elimina­
tion" (aa Quino puts it, Nord and Object* p* 264); or in other words, as 
V© could say, on explication which is systmatlo is an ontolo/dcal reduction* 
I strongly doubt whether the word "reduction” is appropriate here: neither
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it nor its complement seems to fit well. But explication ia mid to effect
an elimination, or aa ontological reduction, ia the following way, Quine
oays that a theory G is reduced ontolorically to a theory 4* if we
"specify a function, not necessarily in the notation of 0 
or 0*, which admits aa arguments all objects ia the universe 
of G and takes values in the universe of G*, This is the 
proxy function. Then to each n-place primitive predicate 
of G, for each n, we effectively associate an open sentence 
of G* in a free variables, in such a way that the predicate 
is fulfilled by an n-tupl© of rrgunents of the proxy function 
always and only when the open sentence is fulfilled by the 
corresponding n-tuple of values" 5
Effectively and truth-proeervingly mapping the closed sentences of G onto
the closed sentences of G* is no good by itself, Quine reminds us, since
any sentence S of G can be associated with a sentence "zT" with x as the
GSdol number of S and T the truth-predicate of G, thus trivially reducing
any theory whatever to a theory of natural numbers. And an effective
association of predicates of G with predicates of some theory G* is no
good by itself either — since the Ibwenheia-Skolem theorem says that any
theory whatever can be modelled in the natural numbers. It was these
trivialisiag results which prompted Quine to say that an extra condition
has to be met - this being the specification of a proxy function, which
effectively assigns each of the objects of the reduced theory G to some
particular object of the reducing theory G', The LSwenhein-Skolœa theorem,
by contrast, contains no proxy function; it does not determine whic^
numbers ore to be associated with the objects of the theory to be reduced.
Now my previous examples of identification, or explication, are
examples in which proxy functions are supplied, %  third criticism of the
entire programme - to come to it at last - is that proxy functions are
bound to be either non-effective or else circular. So if I am richt, the
apparatus of explication is useless as a device whereby to analyse the
5, Quine, Ontol.&gjgal Reduction an.d.._the, îlorld of JWhara, p. 205
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mental in terms of the physical. And the criticism entails that in the 
general ca©o there is no such thing as ontological reduction in Quines 
sense of the phrase.
I shall now explain these criticisms. The first thing to notice is 
that it is always possible to state any proxy function in a circular way? 
for instance you can say that
F*(number H) *» the class of all N-monbered cl&ssos 
or that
F”( sentence 3^) » the class of t h i n g s y ^ s u c h  that is 
the ith character of etc. (See above)
or# to cite Quines own example la "Ontological Reduction and the World 
of Numbers"# that 
F(n®0) « n
For the case where "E(x#n^C)" says "the temperature of x is n degrees 
centigrade"; where "Ec(x#n)" says - equivalently - "the temperature in 
degrees centigrade of r is n"; and where the problem is to try and 
eliminate impure numbers (e.g. five degrees centigrade) in favour of 
pure numbers (e.g. five) only. But the important question is whether a 
non-circular statement exists in each case, which still preserves the 
effectiveness of the function. In the number case, according to Russell,
g
at least, such a non-circular statement does exist; but the other cases are, 
I maintain, more doubtful. Consider the case of sentences* Not every 
sequence of characters ia a sentence; indeed it seems to me that the only 
way of isolating the relevant (i.e. sentential) sequences of characters is
6. Russell, Introduction to Mathemtical. Philosouhy, Ch. 2
2XS
by be;ginning at the outset with a knowledge of what aeatences. there ere*
And it is clear tliat unless there is an independent way of sorting the 
sentential sequences from the ixon-sentontial sequences, there is no way of 
epoeifying aa adequate proxy function which does not directly rely, in 
tho process of assigning values to arguments, upon the very notion to be 
analysed, (the term mentioned ia the value-position being contained in the 
term mentioned in the argtmjeat-posifcion) •
%ls is even more obviously the case with the function ?(n^c) « n, 
of the temperature ezanplo* And ia tho case of a proxy function for 
mental entitles, tho situation is the same* ¥e have to say that complex 
objects like having a certain attitude to a state of affairs takes as 
values of the function an ordered pair of classes consisting of the class 
of organisms who have that attitude to that state of affairs* Any effective 
assi^ pinent along these lines will hove to proceed, I thiaîc, by Invoking, in 
the process of specifying the assigned concept, the concept to idiioh it is 
being assigned* (The problem ia just the same with Fodor's proposal that 
mental states are to be identified with classes of functionally identical 
neurological states* For here, in the case of any specific mental state, 
the shared function which the relevant neurological states have would be 
specified by roference:, to the mental state in question, in just the same 
way, if we are to take Fodor’s "caaoliaft analogy" seriously (see Chapter H), 
tliat the chared function of those modianisms which are to be identified with 
a valve-lifter is specified as that of lifting: valves) •
Indeed, I think it is rather likely that the problem runs even deeper 
than this* For In order for values to be assigned to arguments, there 
must ^  both the objects which are arguments as well as the objects which 
are values* But then in what sense is anything eliminated? (Explication 
is elimination, according to the slogan)* The temperature example makes
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thia genial paradox clear* Either there are impure numbers or there are 
7
not* If there arc not, then "E(x, n C)** fails to represent logical
form of "the temperature of x is n degrees centigrade", and there is no
function (therefore) which can begin "?(n^C)=.,. But if there are
impure numbers, then the proxy function F(a°c)=n only succeeds in effectively
assigning impure numbers to numbers by assuming impure numbers to exist,
and by associating pure numbers with them on that very basis. Curiously,
Quine admits this defect, when he says
"I must admit that iny formulation suffers from a conspicious 
element of make-believe.*.,. I had to talk as if there were 
such things as I C" 3
But I cannot myself see how the defect can be admitted seriously, without
at the same time admitting that the analysis deserves to be renounced*
This is indeed an instance of the paradox of analysis: if objects like
sentences, impure numbers, or having an attitude to a state of affairs
are arguments of a proxy function, then their existence and the clarity of
their distinctness conditions must be assumed in advance* And in the
li^t of this consideration tho idea of eliminating certain objects ia
favour of certain others begins to look some#at absurd#
Final Remarks
The analysis by explication of such things as numbers, sentences, 
impure numbers and mental entities is a questionable procedure, because, 
as I have argued, the goal of analysis itself becomes opaque to understanding 
when it is realised that assumptions have to be made about the existence 
and identity of the analysandum objects In order for the analysis itself to 
get under way*
7* I assume at this point tlmt not both. "Il(x, n^C)" p M  "H^(x,n)" 
represent the corroct logical form of the aentonce la question*
3* C,uijic. Ontological Reduction* Tho World of Numbers, p. 206*
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Quine himself, of course, sees it differently* Eo considers that an
analysis by explication is motivated in the first place by the fact that
the analysandum objects do not, have clear existence-conditions:
"Wo have, to begin with, an expression or form of expression 
that is eoîüehow troublesome* It bohaves partly like a term 
but not enou£li so, or it is vague in ways that bother us, or 
it puts kinks in a theory or encouragea on© or another con­
fusion. But also it serves certain purposes that are not 
to be abandoned* Then we find a way of accomplishing those 
same purposes through other channels, using other and less 
troublesome forms of expression* Tho old perplexities are 
resolved’* 9
Philosophers interested in nominnlistic analyses have a partially 
similar view of tho process of analysis: some sentences can be easily
formalised in predicate logic, and these describe concrete individuals and 
perhaps single events; while others resist the formalisai and describe (or 
purport to describe) abstract objects or objects whose existence is less 
fully intelligible* The problem for them, again, is one of effectively 
devising a substitute, from the easily formallsable part of the language, 
for the recalcitrant terms or expressions. Now even if it were possible, 
devising such a substitute for a recalcitrant term - either to "eliminate” 
or to "introduce" it - would not, in any case, add to the predictive or 
explanatory power of the easily formal!sable theory, tho theory whose terms 
describe simple or concrete objects; since as Putnam one© suggested, 
Gddol’s proof of tho completeness of predicate logic ensures that all 
implications exprestibl© in the nominalistic language can be proved ia 
that language however many new set-theoretical constructions are introduced 
via proxy functions - or however few*
Perhaps the set-theoretical constructions out of basic individuals 
enable us to give the meaning? of the non-basic language which resasts the
9* Wo;rd and Ob.lect* p* 260,
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formalism of prodicato la any event tho methodolo^cal standpoint
ia tho same: you have cloar and formalisable terms and easily distinguish» 
ahle objects on the one hand» and unclear and unformalisable terms and 
shadowy objects on thoother; and you then set yourself the task of analy­
sing the latter by devising a substitute in terms of the former*
reaction to this procedure of Quine’s and the nominalists - to sum 
up now - has been to say that In the gonoral case you cannot devise a 
function which effectively talzea shadowy objects into clear ones without 
appealing to your shadowy notion in the specification of the correct clear 
notion which is to be substituted for it; for notions thought to be slmdowy 
are the very ones upon which we so often rely in grouping and categorising 
things which are thought to be basic and# relatively speaking# discrete. 
(E.g., the case of sentences and sequences of characters; the case of 
mental attitudes and classes of possible worlds). And even the idea of a 
shadowy or logically recalcitrant notion has in practice to be abandoned; 
for to mal:e a prosy function properly effective# you have to incorporate 
assumptions about the esistenco and identity of the objects whose analysis
is being undertaken. A prosy function effectively relates objects in the
11universe of one theory to objects in the univcrso of another; but if the 
former set of objects esist anyway, then what could the function possibly 
succeed in achieving? •
10. See Putnam; Mathematics and tho Existence of Abstract Objects (Phll. 
Studies 1956). Hla suggestion about the moaning of the abstract
or recalcitrant terms was that they "express all the implications 
that they entail" (p. 35). If a non—basic sentence G (i.e. a 
sentence with a term for an "abstract" object) conjoined with a 
basic sentence e entails that e* » then one of the implications that 
S expresses is that e zee*; althou^, by G5del*s result, if em> e* 
is valid, it can be proved without considering S.
11. See the quotation in my text which is identified by footnote 5, above#
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